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105 
ARTICLE 
 
 
Environmental Controversies  
“Between Two or More States” 
ROBERT D. CHEREN† 
 
“Controversies between the States are becoming frequent, and 
in the rapidly changing conditions of life and business are likely to 
become still more so.”* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Controversies abound between distinct political communities 
that routinely interact with and affect one another, and the several 
states are no exception.  The Constitution prevents the states from 
using the full range of diplomatic methods ordinarily available in 
controversies between nations.  And while the Commerce Clause 
empowers Congress to unilaterally resolve controversies that are 
commercial in nature, the enumeration of congressional power in 
Article I, Section 8 limits those controversies between states that 
may be unilaterally resolved by Acts of Congress.  Rather, the 
plenary constitutional mechanisms for resolving state 
controversies are: (1) litigation in the original and exclusive 
 
†Associate, Squire Sanders (US) LLP. J.D. 2013, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law.  This Article received the 2013 Stanley I. and Hope S. 
Adelstein Environmental Law Award for Best Paper on Environmental Law.  
The Article addresses controversies between two or more states litigated in the 
Supreme Court of the United States under its original and exclusive 
jurisdiction.  As these are not appellate cases, each controversy yields several 
decisions and orders.  When an entire controversy for which the Court granted 
leave to file a bill of complaint is referred to rather than the contents of a 
specific decision, the name of the states and year of the first decision or order 
that appears in the reports are given like so: Kansas v. Colorado (1902). 
*Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 80 (1907). 
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jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over “controversies between two 
or more states,” and (2) trilateral negotiation of interstate 
compacts enforceable against states by Acts of Congress and by 
states through suits filed in the Supreme Court.1 
The state controversy jurisdiction of the United States 
Supreme Court was created by the Constitution’s extension of the 
“judicial power” of the Court “to controversies between two or 
more states” over which the Supreme Court has “original 
jurisdiction.”2  The compacting power of the states is recognized 
by the Constitution’s prohibition of states from entering into 
binding agreements and compacts without the assent of 
Congress.3  Valid compacts may be enforced by Acts of Congress 
and by states through enforcement suits against states under the 
Court’s state controversy jurisdiction.4 
The state controversy jurisdiction is so far most frequently 
used to resolve disputes over territory and interstate waters. 
States have also invoked this mechanism to obtain Supreme 
Court determinations of the constitutionality of the laws of other 
states and to determine the domicile of citizens.  Suits “between 
two or more states” constitute a small portion of the Court’s 
docket and only a tiny fraction of the docket of the entire federal 
judiciary.5  This state controversy jurisdiction is invoked by states 
submitting requests for leave to file bills of complaint against 
other states.  To date, the states have sought leave to file a bill of 
complaint against other states on 135 occasions.  The Court held 
ninety-nine of these requests were proper invocations of the 
 
 1. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend . . . to 
controversies between two or more states . . . . In all cases . . . in which a state 
shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.”); U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) 
(2012). 
 2. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power shall extend . . . to 
controversies between two or more states . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 
(“In all cases . . . in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction.”). 
 3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”). 
 4. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601 (1918). 
 5. This is due in part to the limited class of potential plaintiffs—only 
thirteen at the founding and still only fifty today. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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Court’s state controversy jurisdiction and thirty-six were 
improper.  The Court’s opinions and orders arising from the 
proper invocations of the Court’s jurisdiction appear on roughly 
4100 pages of the United States Reports.  The Court’s opinions 
and orders arising from the improper invocations appear on 
roughly 200 pages.  The state controversy cases are, to say the 
least, a small and specialized body of law.  But the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional role in resolving state controversies is 
highly important, especially in environmental law.  Among the 
ninety-nine exercises of the Court’s state controversy jurisdiction, 
numerous federal common law suits and compact enforcement 
suits have played a substantial role in the resolution of 
environmental controversies between states. 
The Supreme Court’s resolution of environmental 
controversies falls into two categories.  First, the Court apportions 
natural resources among states through federal common law suits 
and by enforcing resource apportionment compacts.  Second, the 
Court protects state natural resources from inequitable disruption 
by other states through federal common law suits and by enforcing 
resource protection compacts.  The Court has to date asserted its 
state controversy jurisdiction to apportion territory, water, and fish 
and to protect navigation, land use, and water.  Noticeably absent 
from these ninety-nine exercises of the Court’s state controversy 
jurisdiction are suits seeking protection of air from pollution. 
To determine the viability of air pollution suits, this Article 
first considers in detail the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction over 
controversies between states, the scope of the Court’s remedial 
power in controversies between states, and the rule of decision in 
suits between states.  From this analysis, this Article concludes in 
Part V.A. that suits seeking protection from air pollution against 
upwind states are available to downwind states under federal 
common law.  In Part V.B. this Article further concludes that while 
suits challenging emissions from individual sources are displaced 
by the Clean Air Act, this unilateral Act of Congress does not 
provide the rule of decision in a suit seeking protection from the 
aggregate emissions of an upwind state and therefore aggregate 
state emission suits are not displaced and remain a viable 
mechanism for resolving air pollution controversies. 
3
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Part I outlines the constitutional limitations on resolution of 
controversies between states through state self-help and 
unilateral Acts of Congress.  Part II outlines the plenary judicial 
power of the Supreme Court and the plenary legislative power of 
compacts to resolve environmental controversies between states.6  
Part III recounts the Court’s resolution of environmental 
controversies between states in resource apportionment and 
protection suits.  Part IV analyzes in detail the Court’s authority 
under the Constitution to resolve controversies between states by 
considering the scope of the state controversy jurisdiction, the 
scope of the Court’s remedial power, and the constitutional 
determination of the rule of decision in state controversy suits.  
Part V demonstrates the availability of air pollution protection 
suits filed in the Supreme Court by downwind states against 
upwind states for inequitably excessive aggregate state emissions 
notwithstanding the Clean Air Act’s displacement of suits seeking 
protection from individual sources of emissions.  An Appendix 
catalogs the ninety-nine state controversy suits properly filed and 
the thirty-six improper requests for leave to file state controversy 
suits. 
II. LIMITED ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSY 
RESOLUTION 
Nations and landowners have a panoply of mechanisms to 
resolve disputes with neighbors.  But the options for the states to 
resolve environmental controversies with other states through 
self-help are limited, and so too is Congress constitutionally 
limited in its power to unilaterally resolve state controversies 
over the environment. 
A. State Self-Help 
States are constitutionally prohibited from wielding the full 
range of diplomatic options usually available between 
independent political communities: “Bound hand and foot by the 
prohibitions of the constitution, a complaining state can neither 
 
 6. Plenary here denotes the relative absence of constitutional restrictions 
compared with the powers of Congress and states outlined in Part I. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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treat, agree, or fight with its adversary, without the consent of 
congress . . . .”7  So New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and 
Louisiana need not fear messing with Texas because the 
Constitution effectively forbids states from using their muscle to 
resolve disputes with one another.8  Texas cannot ban the export 
of natural gas into Arkansas.  Texas cannot pass a law forbidding 
the import of Oklahoma cattle.  And Texas cannot build a wall on 
its border with New Mexico. 
These constitutional restrictions are imposed not because 
these acts are always wrongful and unjustified and could not 
serve as a productive way to resolve disputes between Texas and 
its neighbors.  Indeed, if the states were not united, these actions 
would be referred to as “diplomacy.”  Rather, the constitutional 
provisions banning this conduct reflect a belief that on the whole, 
the ability to deploy these measures of self-help would work great 
evil to the union.  The Framers held this view because “[t]rade 
barriers, recriminations, [and] intense commercial rivalries had 
plagued the colonies.”9  There are of course, less forceful means of 
“diplomacy” that are constitutionally permissible, namely begging 
and bribing.  But the former is weak and the latter impracticable.  
Thus, the strictures of the Constitution disable states from 
exercising ordinary and effective means of dispute resolution 
between sovereigns.10 
 
 7. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 726 (1938); see also 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (“When a State enters the 
Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives.”). 
 8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. Kansas v. Colorado I, 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902) 
(“The States of this Union cannot make war upon each other.  They cannot 
‘grant letters of marque and reprisal.’  They cannot make reprisal on each other 
by embargo. They cannot enter upon diplomatic relations and make treaties.”); 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519 (“Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode 
Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions . . . .”). 
 9. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945). 
 10. States may, however, exercise petty and ineffective means of dispute 
resolution because the Supreme Court exercises its discretion in granting leave to 
file exclusive original jurisdiction cases.  See California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 
1027 (1981) (denying leave to file a bill of complaint “to adjudicate a controversy 
with . . . West Virginia arising out of an alleged breach of contract covering 
athletic contests between two state universities”); McKusick, supra note 5, at 209 
(noting athletic contests at issue were “football games between San Jose State 
University and the University of West Virginia”).  So a state may be able to issue 
an ultimatum to another state—stop polluting our interstate river or our state 
5
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B. Acts of Congress 
The Constitution limits the ability of Congress to unilaterally 
resolve interstate environmental conflicts.  Congress’s 
enumerated powers do not necessarily extend to all 
environmental controversies between states.  And the 
Constitution prevents Congress from compelling state legislative 
and regulatory action even as a necessary and proper exercise of 
one of the enumerated powers. 
The enumeration of the proper subject matter of 
congressional regulation in Article I does not explicitly include 
the environment or the “interstate environment.”11  The 
Commerce Clause together with the Necessary and Proper Clause 
have been interpreted broadly enough to encompass emissions 
controls and endangered species protection.12  But much of the 
nation’s environmental regulations were passed during the post-
New Deal détente, now a distant memory in the wake of NFIB v. 
Sebelius.13 
Further, the Constitution forbids congressional 
commandeering of state governments except in the enforcement of 
compacts because the several sovereign “States are not mere 
political subdivisions of the United States” and “State governments 
are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the 
 
university football teams will refuse to play your state university football teams.  
But see California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“The fact that two sovereign States have been unable to resolve this matter 
without adding to our burdens does not speak well for the statesmanship of either 
party but does not, in my opinion, justify our refusal to exercise our exclusive 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1251(a).”). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 12. See James R. May, Heathcare, Environmental Law, and the Supreme 
Court: An Analysis Under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Tax and 
Spending Clauses, 43 ENVTL. L. 233, 245 (2013). 
 13. Nat’l Fed. Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Jonathan 
H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 377, 379 (2005) (“From the New Deal through the 1980s the 
Supreme Court showed little interest in policing the division of state and federal 
power. Beginning in the 1990s, however, the Court reasserted the importance of 
state sovereignty and enumerated powers . . . .”); id. at 390–91 (“For most of the 
latter half of the twentieth century, the notion that there were justiciable limits 
on the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power was a dead letter. In the 
name of regulating commerce, Congress could regulate just about anything.”). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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Federal Government.”14  Simply put, the Constitution “confers 
upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”15  
Thus, as the Court held in New York v. United States, “Congress 
may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the 
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program,’”16 and as the Court held in Printz v. United 
States, neither may Congress simply commandeer the executive 
functions of the States.17 
Short of directly compelling state regulation, Congress may 
still coax states into regulating according to federally set 
guidelines.18  This coaxing method of regulation is usually 
referred to as cooperative federalism.  For the purposes of 
resolving environmental controversies that arise between states, 
the process is best referred to as indirectly compelling state 
regulation, to fashion a term by negation of Justice O’Connor’s 
proscription in New York v. United States of “directly compelling” 
 
 14. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
 15. Id. at 166. 
 16. Id. at 161 (alteration in original) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)); see also id. at 162 (“While 
Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in 
areas of intimate concern to the states, the Constitution has never been 
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern 
according to Congress’ instructions.”); id. at 166 (“[E]ven where Congress has 
the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting 
certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or 
prohibit those acts . . . . The allocation of power contained in the Commerce 
Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ 
regulation of interstate commerce.”). 
 17. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
 18. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166–68 (“Congress may urge a 
State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests. . . . First, 
under Congress’ spending power, ‘Congress may attach conditions on the receipt 
of federal funds.’ . . . Second, where Congress has the authority to regulate 
private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ 
power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal 
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. . . . By either of 
these methods, as by any other permissible method of encouraging a State to 
conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate 
decision as to whether or not the State will comply. . . . By contrast, where the 
Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state 
and federal officials is diminished.”). 
7
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regulations.19  This method is widely used, but it is meaningfully 
limited by the constitutional rule that Congress can never 
directly compel a state to adopt a regulatory program necessary 
to resolve an environmental controversy between states.   
Congress may also “regulate state conduct . . . . so long as 
they do not regulate states as states, but rather only regulate 
states as private actors, such as employers or owners of 
databases.”20  This includes congressional regulations that limit 
proprietary state actions that injure other states, but would not 
extend to any state controversies involving the exercise or non-
exercise of the legislative, executive, and administrative functions 
of the states.21 
The constitutional limitations on congressional power to 
enact federal statutes render some environmental controversies 
unresolvable by the unilateral acts of Congress.22  In others, the 
constitutional limitations may prohibit otherwise desirable 
means of resolving environmental controversies.23  Furthermore, 
the Court’s recent cases interpreting the scope of the Commerce 
Clause and the limits on congressional commandeering of state 
governments may portend successful challenges to some federal 
environmental statutes.24  Thus, the Court’s respect for the states 
has circumscribed Congress’s role as an arbiter of interstate 
environmental disputes.  Indeed, the United States argued 
against the limit on congressional regulation imposed by New 
York v. United States on this very ground, to no avail.25 
 
 19. Id. at 161. 
 20. Adler, supra note 13, at 400; see also Garcia v. San Antonia Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Reno v. Condon 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). 
 21. As will be shown below, states are responsible for more than the injuries 
that state action directly causes to other states. 
 22. See Part IV.C.b; Part V.B., infra. 
 23. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149 (“We conclude that while 
Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States 
to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their 
borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability to simply 
compel the States to do so.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 25. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 179-80 (“[T]he United States . . . 
argues that the Constitution envisions a role for Congress as an arbiter of 
interstate disputes. The United States observes that federal courts, and this 
Court in particular, have frequently resolved conflicts among States. . . . The 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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III. PLENARY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSY 
RESOLUTION 
What are the states to do given the limitation of their own 
power and the power of Congress to resolve environmental 
controversies between states?  The states may turn to two 
plenary means of resolving state controversies: state controversy 
suits and compacts. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Plenary State Controversy 
Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court’s extensive authority over interstate 
controversies is entirely set out and defined by the first two 
sections of Article III and the first section of 28 U.S.C. 1251.  
Article III, Section 1 provides: “The judicial power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one [S]upreme Court . . . .”26  And 
Article III, Section 2, in defining the jurisdictional scope of that 
judicial power, provides: “The judicial Power shall extend . . . to 
Controversies between two or more states . . . . In all Cases . . . in 
which a State shall be Party, the [S]upreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction.”27  Congress’s sole statutory provision 
regarding this jurisdiction is to make it exclusive to the Supreme 
Court: “The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.”28  
The sum total of these provisions is that the judicial power of the 
United States vested in the Supreme Court extends to 
 
United States suggests that if the Court may resolve such interstate disputes, 
Congress can surely do the same under the Commerce Clause. . . . While the 
Framers no doubt endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate 
commerce in order to avoid further instances of the interstate trade disputes 
that were common under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers did not 
intend that Congress should exercise that power through the mechanism of 
mandating state regulation.”). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a); see also Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 
(1992) (“[T]he uncompromising language of 28 U. S. C. § 1251(a), which gives to 
this Court ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or 
more States’ (emphasis added). Though phrased in terms of a grant of 
jurisdiction to this Court, the description of our jurisdiction as ‘exclusive’ 
necessarily denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other federal court.”). 
9
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controversies between two or more states over which the Court 
has original and exclusive jurisdiction.  As foundations of federal 
jurisdiction go, this framework is as simple as it gets.29 
Supreme Court historian Charles Warren in his book on the 
subject declares at the outset: “The great function of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, in adjudicating controversies between 
sovereign States of the Union has its roots in history.”30  Indeed, 
the history of the “between two or more states” clause is so deeply 
engrained in the constitutional woodwork that the Supreme 
Court has treated its development as precedent and as important 
as any interpretive decision of the Court. 
The Articles of Confederation “contained, amongst other 
provisions, one entirely new expedient of statecraft.”31  Benjamin 
Franklin on July 21, 1775 had suggested “that a Congress, 
representing all disputes and differences between colony and 
colony about limits or any other cause if such should arise.”32  
The first draft of such a provision was proposed by John 
Dickinson of Delaware on July 12, 1776.33  Article IX, Clause 2 of 
the Articles of Confederation ultimately provided a complex 
mechanism for congressional resolution of “disputes and 
differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between 
two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other 
causes whatever.”34  Though Congress was denominated the “last 
resort on appeal,” this power was to be exercised through a court 
either selected by the “joint consent” of the contravening states 
or—if the states do not agree—by a court created by Congress to 
hear the matter composed of between five judges and nine judges 
 
 29. The Exceptions Clause does not apply because the jurisdiction is not 
appellate and the lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction because it is 
withdrawn by 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 30. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 2 (1924). 
 31. Id. at 3. 
 32. Id. at 4 (quoting 6 WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 420 (1904)). 
 33. Id. at 126, n.5.   The Committee of Congress prepared the second draft 
based on Dickinson’s provision which provided: “The United States assembled 
shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . settling all disputes and 
differences now subsisting or that may hereafter arise between two or more 
Colonies concerning boundaries, jurisdiction or any other cause whatever.”  Id. 
at 126. 
 34. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 2. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
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appointed through an elaborate process.35  This authority was 
exercised precisely once before the Articles of Confederation were 
supplanted by the Constitution.36  While it was innovative, the 
drawbacks of this mechanism were one of the motivations for the 
Constitutional Convention.37 
At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers set out to 
provide a replacement for Article IX, Clause 2.  The Virginia Plan 
proposed on May 29, 1787 by Edmund Randolph included a 
provision giving the national judiciary jurisdiction to “hear and 
determine . . . ‘questions which may involve national peace or 
harmony.’”38  The Committee of the Whole on June 19 reported a 
draft following this suggestion with a provision “[t]hat the 
jurisdiction of the Natl. Judiciary shall extend to all . . . questions 
which involve the national peace & harmony.”39 
Rather than going forward with this Virginia Plan language, 
the Framers next drew upon the Articles of Confederation 
provision of jurisdiction over “all disputes and differences now 
subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more 
States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes 
whatever”40 by splitting this power in two.  The power to decide 
territorial controversies was given to the Senate for trial, and the 
power to decide other causes was given to the Supreme Court.41  
The Committee of Detail report on August 6 in Article IX, Section 
2 gave the Senate power to try “all disputes and controversies 
now subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist between two or 
more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory” and “[a]ll 
controversies concerning lands claimed under different grants of 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Pennsylvania v. Connecticut, 131 U.S. Appendix liv (1781). 
 37. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 3 (1919) (“[T]he 9th Article was a prophecy of 
better things, rather than a realization; for only one case was decided and only 
one commission was appointed under this procedure ; and when the government 
under the Constitution succeeded the government under the Articles there were 
controversies between eleven States concerning their boundaries, to mention 
only differences of this nature, unsettled between the States.”). 
 38. Id. at 3 n.1 (quoting 3 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 163 (Gaillard 
Hunt, ed.)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 3. 
 41. Id. at 3-4. 
11
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two or more states” utilizing procedures similar to those in the 
Articles of Confederation.42  That same draft in Article XI, 
Section 3 provided that “[t]he Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
shall extend . . . to controversies between two or more States 
(except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction).”43  The 
Court has long found significance in this stage in the drafting 
because it evidences that the “controversies between two or more 
states” that the Framers had in mind must include much more 
than territory and jurisdiction controversies, given the draft 
provision of jurisdiction included everything but these.44 
At this point in the debates the Framers amalgamated the 
jurisdiction of the Senate over territory and jurisdiction 
controversies and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over all 
other controversies into one provision.45  To do this, the Framers 
eliminated the Senate’s role and simply dropped the exception 
language from the provision for the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  
The Committee on Style on September 12 reported extending the 
judicial power “to Controversies between two or more States.”46  
It is this language that appears in the final constitutional 
provision of the state controversy jurisdiction: “The judicial power 
shall extend . . . to controversies between two or more states . . . .”47 
During the ratification, James Madison in Federalist No. 39 
noted that the state controversy jurisdiction as an example of an 
exception to the general principle that the federal government 
under the Constitution operates on the people and not the 
states.48   
 
 42. SCOTT, supra note 35, at 4 (1919) (quoting 4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 101-03 (Gaillard Hunt, ed.)). 
 43. Id. at 4 (quoting 4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 104-05 (Gaillard 
Hunt, ed.)).  Story reports a slightly different draft with the jurisdiction over 
controversies “between two or more states, except such as shall regard territory 
or jurisdiction.” 2 STORY, CONST. § 1673 n.1. 
 44. This drafting history makes clear the Framers did not intend to limit the 
jurisdiction to territory and jurisdiction because they had language before them 
that did just that in the Senate provision and they did not use it.  No one has 
ever attempted to interpret the provision so narrowly. 
 45. 2 STORY, CONST. § 1673 n.1 (citing JOURNAL OF CONVENTION 226); SCOTT, 
supra note 35, at 4. 
 46. SCOTT, supra note 35, at 4. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
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Alexander Hamilton provides a more extensive discussion in 
Federalist No. 80 that has proved influential in the interpretation 
of the Court’s authority over state controversies.49 
Hamilton begins by listing the proper objects of the judicial 
power vested in the Supreme Court, two of which he argues 
include controversies between states: (1) “all those [cases] which 
involve the peace of the confederacy”; and (2) “all those [cases] in 
which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and 
unbiased.”50 
Hamilton pointed to the “horrid picture of the dissensions 
and private wars” among German states in the 1400s “which 
distracted and desolated Germany prior to the institution of” a 
court to resolve controversies among them as a justification for 
the Court’s “power of determining causes between two states.”51  
Hamilton also argued that the federal government must have 
power to enforce federal law in controversies between states and 
that the Supreme Court is the body best suited to do so because 
the Court has no “local attachments” and is therefore “likely to be 
impartial between the different States.”52 
Two portions of the Federalist No. 80 are worthy of special 
notice.  First, Hamilton argues that “[w]hatever practices may 
have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are 
proper objects of federal superintendence and control.”53  Second, 
Hamilton pointed out the need for a mechanism for states to 
resolve even those disputes that had never before arisen and were 
not yet foreseen.54 
 
 49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (“[T]here are many other sources, besides interfering claims of 
boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the 
members of the Union. . . . . [T]hough the proposed Constitution establishes 
particular guards against the repetition of those instances which have 
heretofore made their appearance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend that the 
spirit which produced them will assume new shapes, that could not be foreseen 
nor specifically provided against.  Whatever practices may have a tendency to 
disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal 
superintendence and control.”). 
13
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During the ratification debates, the anti-federalists did not 
challenge the utility of the state controversy resolution power, 
either because the jurisdictional provision in the Articles of 
Confederation was substantively coextensive with that proposed 
in the Constitution and, or perhaps because, they agreed that 
providing for jurisdiction over state controversies was a good 
idea.55 
Congress determines whether the Court’s original 
jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent with the lower federal 
courts.56  Since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the 
state controversy jurisdiction has been exclusive.57 
As of this Article, the Supreme Court has exercised this 
power in ninety-nine state controversies.  As one compiler puts it, 
the cases “run like threads of gold” through the many volumes of 
the United States Reports.58  These ninety-nine controversies and 
the thirty-six improperly brought controversies are summarized 
in the Appendix, and Part III reviews in detail the environmental 
controversies between the states that have been resolved to date. 
B. Interstate Compacts as Plenary Legislative Power 
The Constitution permits states, with congressional assent, 
to enter into binding compacts resolving interstate controversies 
that become the supreme law of the land and are enforceable 
against one another through enforcement suits brought in the 
Supreme Court and by Acts of Congress.59 
 
 55. Interstate Disputes, HERITAGE.ORG, http://www.heritage.org/ 
constitution#!/articles/3/essays/112/interstate-disputes (last visited Sept. 25, 
2013) (“The logic of this position was such that even Anti-Federalists, such as 
Brutus, conceded the utility of the provision, and there is little or no recorded 
opposition to this grant of federal jurisdiction in the ratifying debates.”). 
 56. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78 n.1 (1992). 
 57. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80–81 (“[T]he Supreme Court shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is 
a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between a state 
and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original 
but not exclusive jurisdiction.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (“The Supreme Court shall 
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more 
States.”). 
 58. Scott, supra note 35, at vii. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”).   
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Some commentators believe the Compact Clause prohibits 
state collusion without the assent of Congress.60  The better view 
is that states can collude without congressional approval, and 
this cannot be challenged.  What states cannot do is enter into 
binding agreements enforceable against states without 
congressional approval.61  Though, the Court has found implied 
congressional assent, it has never enforced an agreement between 
states that did not have the assent of Congress. The Court has 
articulated a test for when the congressional assent is required, 
but this is meaningful whether the consequence is limited to the 
availability of compact enforcement suits in the Supreme Court.62  
Properly understood, the Compact Clause operates in the same 
manner as the statute of frauds—the Compact Clause renders 
agreements not enforceable against states if they are made 
without congressional assent. 
But this does not mean that the agreements cannot bind 
citizens. Suppose a citizen challenges the assessment of an 
interstate tax commission.  The citizen argues the interstate tax 
commission was created by state agreement but without 
 
The Exceptions Clause in Article I, section 10 could be grammatically read to 
apply to each of its restrictions as opposed to merely the final restriction on 
engaging in war.  This is undermined by the reference to “time of Peace” in the 
standing army limitation.  Id.  Still, it is worth pondering whether states during 
the Civil War could have entered into compacts without the consent of Congress. 
 60. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional 
Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 285 (2003); Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and 
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J. 372 (2007). 
 61. States can probably waive sovereign immunity in a compact that does not 
implicate federalism concerns, and this would be sufficient to make it binding at 
least in the state’s own courts without congressional consent.  But without a 
continuing voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity a state may only be sued by 
another state in the Supreme Court because the Eleventh Amendment prevents 
suits by citizens, and a state cannot be sued in the Supreme Court under a 
compact that has not been assented to by Congress.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 62. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369-70 (1976) (“The application 
of the Compact Clause is limited to agreements that are ‘directed to the 
formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the 
States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the 
United States.’ . . . Whether a particular agreement respecting boundaries is 
within the Clause will depend on whether ‘the establishment of the boundary 
line may lead or not to the increase of the political power or influence of the 
States affected, and thus encroach or not upon the full and free exercise of 
Federal authority.’” (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519-20, 22 
(1893))). 
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congressional assent.  The commission’s assessment is binding on 
the citizen so long as the state under whose authority it is 
enforced has properly delegated the necessary authority to the 
commission.  That another state has done so as well does not 
matter, nor does it matter that the state under whose authority 
the citizen is bound is collecting the tax on behalf of another 
state.  To argue otherwise would be to argue that the 
Constitution makes service for one state incompatible with 
service for another state.  The Constitution contains no such 
provision, and to say that it is implied by the Compact Clause is 
to put too much upon those words which speak only of compacts 
and nothing of delegation.63  If the Framers intended the 
Constitution to forbid interstate officers without congressional 
assent, it is unthinkable they would have left the matter implied 
in a Compact Clause that can simply and functionally be 
understood as a limit on enforceability of agreements between 
states, not the lawfulness of interstate collusion. 
There are environmental disputes that can be resolved 
through non-binding collusion, just as agreements between 
landowners do not always require judicial enforcement.  Just as 
with landowners and the statute of frauds, it is those disputes 
that can only be resolved by judicially enforceable agreements 
that are limited by the constitutional limit in the Compact 
Clause.  When an environmental controversy can be resolved by 
an agreement that produces mutual gains to the contending 
states, compacting should occur unless the costs of negotiating 
with one another and obtaining congressional assent are too 
high.64  Of course, when the performances by the states are not 
simultaneous, the existence of the Supreme Court’s authority 
(and willingness) to enforce compacts is crucial to their inception.  
Other environmental controversies are less likely to be resolved 
by compacting absent some other remedy for the states—those in 
which the controversy is asymmetrical.  For example, an 
 
 63. The Constitution express provision in the Incompatibility Clause that “no 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either 
House during his Continuance in Office” supports the view that the Constitution 
does not forbid officers of one state from simultaneously serving as officers of 
other states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 64. Full consideration of this point is outside the scope of this Article. 
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environmental controversy between upriver and downriver states 
over the use and pollution of river water is unlikely to be resolved 
by compacting unless the downriver states have some leverage. 
A little discussed case from 1918 held that compacts may also 
be enforced by the unilateral Acts of Congress.65  The significance 
of this holding was made clear by New York v. United States 
because the 1918 Court explicitly held that the Constitution does 
not limit congressional commandeering of state governments when 
Congress passes Acts to enforce compacts: “[T]he lawful exertion of 
[the national power’s] authority by Congress to compel compliance 
with the obligation resulting from the contract between the two 
States which it approved is not circumscribed by the powers 
reserved to the States.”66  Thus, if two states enter into an 
environmental controversy resolving compact, Congress would 
gain enforcement powers to regulate the underlying environmental 
problem that Congress may not otherwise have. 
 
 65. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601 (1918). 
 66. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601 (1918) (“The vesting in 
Congress of complete power to control agreements between States, that is, to 
authorize them when deemed advisable and to refuse to sanction them when 
disapproved, clearly rested upon the conception that Congress, as the repository 
not only of legislative power but of primary authority to maintain armies and 
declare war, speaking for all the States and for their protection, was concerned 
with such agreements, and therefore was virtually endowed with the ultimate 
power of final agreement which was withdrawn from state authority and 
brought within the federal power.  It follows as a necessary implication that the 
power of Congress to refuse or to assent to a contract between States carried 
with it the right, if the contract was assented to and hence became operative by 
the will of Congress, to see to its enforcement.  This must be the case unless it 
can be said that the duty of exacting the carrying out of a contract is not, within 
the principle of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, relevant to the power to 
determine whether the contract should be made.  But the one is so relevant to 
the other as to leave no room for dispute to the contrary.   Having thus the 
power to provide for the execution of the contract, it must follow that the power 
is plenary and complete, limited of course, as we have just said, by the general 
rule that the acts done for its exertion must be relevant and appropriate to the 
power.  This being true, it further follows, as we have already seen, that, by the 
very fact that the national power is paramount in the area over which it 
extends, the lawful exertion of its authority by Congress to compel compliance 
with the obligation resulting from the contract between the two States which it 
approved is not circumscribed by the powers reserved to the States.”). 
17
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSY SUITS 
BETWEEN STATES 
The Court resolves environmental controversies between 
states: (1) by apportioning scarce environmental resources; and 
(2) by protecting environmental resources from interference.  The 
controversies brought before the Court within these two 
categories to date are as follows: 
 
Apportioned 
Resources 
Protected 
Resources 
State Territory Waterway Navigability 
Interstate Waters Interstate Waters 
Migratory Fish Land Use 
 
These are by no means the only resources that the Court may 
apportion and protect.Indeed, Part V shows that the Court has 
jurisdiction to resolve controversies between states over air 
pollution.67 
This Part will survey the apportionment and protection suits 
litigated to date without detailing the jurisdictional, remedial, 
and rule of decision issues, as these matters are treated in depth 
and by issue in Part IV rather than by the substance of the 
controversies as the controversies are related here. 
A. Apportioning Environmental Resources Among States 
There is perhaps no more classically legal dispute than 
between two competing claimants to a resource.68  The same is 
true as between states.  To date, the majority of controversies 
litigated before the Supreme Court between two or more states 
meet this description. 
 
 67. Speculative discussion of other environmental controversies that fall 
within these two categories is relegated to the lengthy note 111, infra. 
 68. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805). 
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a. Apportioning Territory 
Adjacent states have most frequently contended with one 
another in the Supreme Court over the sovereign ownership of 
land.69  The Supreme Court historian Charles Warren noted in 
1924 that the seriousness of state controversies over territory is 
gravely evidenced by “the fact that in at least four instances—
New Jersey v. New York in the 1820’s; Missouri v. Iowa in the 
1840’s; Louisiana v. Mississippi in the 1900’s; and Oklahoma v. 
Texas in [the 1920’s], armed conflicts between the militia or 
citizens of the contending States had been a prelude to the 
institution of the suits in the Court.”70 
In the state controversy cases over territory, the states assert 
conflicting claims to land based on differing definitions of the 
interstate boundary.71  The problems giving rise to these suits are 
not limited to technical failings of cartographers.  For instance, 
what happens if a river that forms a boundary between two states 
 
 69. New York v. Connecticut (1799); New Jersey v. New York (1830); Rhode 
Island v. Massachusetts (1833); Missouri v. Iowa (1849); Florida v. Georgia 
(1850); Alabama v. Georgia (1859); Virginia v. West Virginia (1870); Missouri v. 
Kentucky (1870); Indiana v. Kentucky (1890); Nebraska v. Iowa (1892); Iowa v. 
Illinois (1893); Virginia v. Tennessee (1893); Missouri v. Nebraska (1904); 
Louisiana v. Mississippi (1906); Washington v. Oregon (1908); Missouri v. 
Kansas (1908); Maryland v. West Virginia (1910); Arkansas v. Tennessee (1912); 
North Carolina v. Tennessee (1914); Arkansas v. Mississippi (1919); Georgia v. 
South Carolina (1919); Minnesota v. Wisconsin (1920); Oklahoma v. Texas 
(1920); New Mexico v. Texas (1923); New Mexico v. Colorado (1925); Vermont v. 
New Hampshire (1925); Michigan v. Wisconsin (1926); New Jersey v. Delaware 
(1929); Wisconsin v. Michigan (1932); Arkansas v. Tennessee (1935); Kansas v. 
Missouri (1940); Mississippi v. Louisiana (1953); Louisiana v. Mississippi (1963); 
Illinois v. Missouri (1965); Ohio v. Kentucky (1966); Michigan v. Ohio (1967); 
Arkansas v. Tennessee (1968); Texas v. Louisiana (1970); Mississippi v. 
Arkansas (1971); New Hampshire v. Maine (1973); South Dakota v. Nebraska 
(1976); California v. Nevada (1977); Georgia v. South Carolina (1977); Tennessee 
v. Arkansas (1978); Texas v. Oklahoma (1980); Louisiana v. Mississippi (1980); 
Arkansas v. Mississippi (1982); Illinois v. Kentucky (1986); Louisiana v. 
Mississippi (1993); New Jersey v. New York (1998); New Hampshire v. Maine 
(2000); New Jersey v. Delaware (2006). There are also controversies over 
proprietary ownership of land. Massachusetts v. New York (1926); Nebraska v. 
Iowa (1964); California v. Arizona (1978). 
 70. WARREN, supra note 28, at 38. 
 71. A large number of boundaries are defined as the main channel of a river 
and are accordingly subject to change. 
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changes course?72  What if landfill extends the area of an 
island?73  Only a minority of the border controversies resolved to 
date arose from disagreement over the location of unchanging 
reference points.74  And new disputes of this description are 
limited by the Court’s recognition of sovereign acquiescence and 
prescription to resolve the problem of ancient boundary 
mistakes.75 
Many of these territory controversies involve interpretations 
of boundary compacts.  This is because Congress may not reduce 
the territory of a state without its consent, and so the usual 
manner for legislative settlement of a boundary between two 
states is a compact entered into by the states and assented to by 
Congress.76  It is not worth noting which cases are and which 
cases are not grounded in the interpretation of a boundary 
compact because they are no different from cases in which the 
document to be interpreted is a grant of land by Congress to the 
various sovereign states. 
 
 72. The wonderful principles of thalweg, accretion, and avulsion apply. 
 73. The terms of the territorial grants and the principles of accretion and 
avulsion apply. 
 74. See Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U.S. 1 (1910); North Carolina v. 
Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914); New Mexico v. Colorado, 267 U.S. 30 (1925); New 
Mexico v. Texas, 275 U.S. 279 (1927); California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125 (1980). 
 75. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Arkansas, 469 U.S. 1101 (1985) (summarily 
adopting master’s report); Oklahoma v. Arkansas, 473 U.S. 610 (1985) (“It Is 
Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed That: . . . Arkansas has exercised continuous 
sovereignty, dominion, control, and exclusive criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
the disputed tract since . . . 1905; that Sebastian County, Arkansas, has 
continuously levied and collected real property taxes within the disputed tract; 
and that Le Flore County, Oklahoma, has never levied or collected taxes within 
the disputed tract. . . . [T]he doctrine of acquiescence applies to the boundary 
dispute between . . . Oklahoma and . . . Arkansas.  Therefore . . . the disputed 
tract has become and continues to be a part of . . . Arkansas under the doctrine 
of acquiescence.”). 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the 
Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the 
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two 
or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the 
States concerned as well as of the Congress.”).  The unusual manner would be a 
state ceding territory to the Federal Government or another state because this 
does not create a consent issue.  It is possible therefore for Congress to 
“purchase” this consent.  The Federal Government’s power of eminent domain 
does not extend to the forced cessation of sovereignty, only title to land. 
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The majority of the territory controversy cases have been 
over water boundaries in part because of the lesser certainty of 
aquatic boundaries but also because “great [f]inancial interests” 
are at stake for the citizens of the contending states.77  For 
example, in one controversy the fisherman of the victor would 
gain access to valuable “oyster fisheries in the waters between 
the two states.”78  In another controversy, “control of the very 
valuable salmon fisheries” in the Columbia River hung in the 
balance.79  And in another controversy, lobster fishing rights 
were at stake.80  Recent droughts in the Southeast have led states 
to consider disputing borders to increase access to water.81  As to 
this last example, gaining sovereign ownership of rivers and lakes 
is not the only nor the most frequent way states have sought to 
gain access to water in the Supreme Court. 
b. Apportioning Water 
Requests for apportionment of interstate water resources are 
the second most prominent category of state controversy litigation 
in the Supreme Court even though the first litigated controversy 
did not arise until the turn of the twentieth century.82  In these 
 
 77. WARREN, supra note 28, at 43. 
 78. Id. at 44 (discussing Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906)). 
 79. Id. (discussing Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.S. 205 (1909)). 
 80. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 364, 364 n. 1 (1976) (“Maine’s 
regulatory laws, if applicable, are more restrictive than those of New 
Hampshire. For example, Maine requires a license, available only to Maine 
residents, for the taking of lobsters in Maine waters. . . . Maine also imposes 
stricter minimum- and maximum-size requirements. . . . Before the original 
action was filed, efforts to settle the dispute failed, and violence over lobster 
fishing rights in the area was threatened.”). 
 81. The Georgia  legislature passed “[a] Resolution proposing a settlement of 
the boundary dispute between the State of Georgia and the State of Tennessee; 
and for other purposes” and it has been sent to the Governor.  H.R. Res. 4, 2012 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/ 
Legislation/20132014/128071.pdf.  See also Andrew Exum, Graveyard of 
Peaches: How Tennessee Will Win Its War Against Georgia, WIRED (Apr. 1, 
2013), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/tennessee-georgia-war/all/. 
 82. Kansas v. Colorado (1902) (Arkansas River); Wyoming v. Colorado (1917) 
(Laramie River); Wisconsin v. Illinois (1926) (Lake Michigan); New Jersey v. 
New York (1929) (Delaware River); Arizona v. California (1930) (Colorado 
River); Connecticut v. Massachusetts (1931) (Connecticut River); Washington v. 
Oregon (1931) (Walla Walla River); Nebraska v. Wyoming (1934) (North Platte 
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cases, the states request an equitable determination of amounts 
of water the citizens of each state within a watershed may 
withdraw from it.  The underlying dispute is analogous to the 
disputes long resolved by common law courts regarding 
landowner rights to surface waters.  The common law of the 
individual states generally follows either a riparian rights or 
appropriation doctrine for allocating rights to surface waters.  
The Supreme Court has developed its own approach of equitable 
apportionment that recognizes the equal dignity of the states and 
the equal right of each state’s citizens to utilize the watershed. 
A majority of these water apportionment controversies 
involve nonnavigable rivers, and for good reason.83  The 
Commerce Clause gives to Congress “the general power over 
navigation” and Congress “control[s], in general, the use of 
navigable waters.”84  In 1902, when the first case arose in a 
dispute over the Arkansas River, it was conceded by the United 
States that Congress did not have power under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate the Arkansas River because it was not 
navigable.85  The existence of interconnected resource systems 
that cross state lines but that, as Justice Holmes put it in his 
cautionary note in Missouri v. Illinois, do “not fall within the 
power of Congress to regulate” leaves only two possibilities for 
 
River); Colorado v. Kansas (1942) (Arkansas River); Colorado v. New Mexico 
(1978) (Vermejo River); South Carolina v. North Carolina (2007) (Catawba 
River). 
 83. Kansas v. Colorado (1902) (Arkansas River); Wyoming v. Colorado (1917) 
(Laramie River); Washington v. Oregon (1931) (Walla Walla River); Nebraska v. 
Wyoming (1934) (North Platte River); Colorado v. Kansas (1942) (Arkansas 
River); Colorado v. New Mexico (1978) (Vermejo River). 
 84. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 22 (1824). 
 85. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).  The Court noted that it 
might be possible that Congress could regulate the Arkansas River under other 
clauses of the constitution but reserved the question.  Interestingly, “[t]he 
Arkansas River is unique in that the pronunciation of its name changes from 
State to State.  In Colorado, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, it is pronounced as is the 
name of the State of Arkansas, but in Kansas, it is pronounced Ar-KAN-sas.”  
Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 677 (1995).  It would be profitable for the The 
Green Bag 2d. to publish an analysis, in the same vein as Jay D. Wexler’s Laugh 
Track, of the pronunciation used by the justices at oral argument and their votes 
for and against Kansas in Arkansas River dispute cases. 
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peaceful and efficient allocation.86  Either the states must come to 
an agreement or the Supreme Court must resolve the 
controversy.  As the likelihood of the states reaching an efficient 
agreement is increased if the downriver state has a remedy 
against a non-cooperative upriver state, the Court recognized the 
cause of action for equitable apportionment of interstate waters 
in the Kansas v. Colorado controversy in 1906.87 
Having recognized the cause of action in part because of the 
perceived absence of congressional power, the Court nevertheless 
recognizes a cause of action for equitable apportionment of 
navigable waters.88  The first such case, Wisconsin v. Illinois, is 
interesting in that the contending states intended the water for 
very different uses.  Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago 
pumped 8,500 cubic feet of water per second from Lake Michigan 
into an artificial canal so as to enable it to be used to dispose of 
sewage from the residents of the city of Chicago.  This massive 
quantity of water was required to get the sewage to move through 
the canal, otherwise it would stand still.  This copious withdrawal 
decreased the water level of Lake Michigan, the other Great 
Lakes, and their connecting waterways by inches.  This 
diminishment threatened navigation, not the consumptive use of 
water.  The Court issued an injunction requiring graduated 
reductions in the water the Court found was wrongfully 
 
 86. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520 (1906).  This assumes the absence 
of Coasian coordination without interposition of a judicial remedy. 
 87. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95–96 (1907) (“Now the question 
arises between two States, one recognizing generally the common law rule of 
riparian rights and the other prescribing the doctrine of the public ownership of 
flowing water.  Neither State can legislate for or impose its own policy upon the 
other.  A stream flows through the two and a controversy is presented as to the 
flow of that stream.  It does not follow, however, that because Congress cannot 
determine the rule which shall control between the two States or because 
neither State can enforce its own policy upon the other, that the controversy 
ceases to be one of a justiciable nature, or that there is no power which can take 
cognizance of the controversy and determine the relative rights of the two 
States.  Indeed, the disagreement, coupled with its effect upon a stream passing 
through the two States, makes a matter for investigation and determination by 
this court.”). 
 88. Wisconsin v. Illinois (1926) (Lake Michigan); New Jersey v. New York 
(1929) (Delaware River); Arizona v. California (1930) (Colorado River); 
Connecticut v. Massachusetts (1931) (Connecticut River); South Carolina v. 
North Carolina (2007) (Catawba River). 
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withdrawn from Lake Michigan at the expense of the other states’ 
interests in navigation. 
Wisconsin v. Illinois had features sufficient to distinguish it 
from a request by states for apportionment of interstate navigable 
water systems (as opposed to nonnavigable water systems).  
Thus, recognition of a cause of action in Wisconsin v. Illinois did 
not compel the Court to extend the equitable apportionment 
cause of action to navigable waterways.  But it seems no 
defendant state raised this argument.  Accordingly, the Court 
continued to recognize actions for navigable water apportionment 
in the New Jersey v. New York controversy over the Delaware 
River.89  This was followed by the Arizona v. Colorado 
controversy over the Colorado River arising out of the plan to 
construct what is now the Hoover Dam.90  In the Arizona v. 
Colorado controversy, the Court again recognized its jurisdiction 
to equitably apportion interstate navigable waters, but also held 
that Congress had a concurrent power to apportion the use of 
navigable waters amongst states under the Commerce Clause 
and that the exercise of this power displaced the Court’s power to 
do so.91  The states have brought two other controversies over 
apportionment of navigable waters before the Court, bringing the 
number of navigable water apportionment cases to five.92 
As noted above, even where Congress does not have the 
power to apportion interstate waters because they are 
nonnavigable, the Supreme Court is not alone in its power to 
issue a binding resolution of the controversy.  The states can 
agree as to the proper apportionment of the water system.  For 
that agreement to bind the states, it must be a compact formed by 
the mutual assent of the states and Congress.  If it is not binding, 
the states following the agreement are simply cooperating with 
one another and there is no legally enforceable resolution of the 
controversy as between the states. 
After the Court recognized the cause of action for equitable 
apportionment of interstate water systems in 1906, many states 
 
 89. New Jersey v. New York (1929) (Delaware River). 
 90. Arizona v. California (1930) (Colorado River). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Connecticut v. Massachusetts (1931) (Connecticut River); South Carolina 
v. North Carolina (2007) (Catawba River). 
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entered into compacts apportioning the waters between them, 
including the waters of the Arkansas River.  They did so not only 
spurred by the Court’s recognition of the action, but at the behest 
of the Court which encouraged states to avoid equitable 
apportionment litigation by entering into compacts and to resolve 
any problems with the Court’s apportionment determinations by 
compacting around them.  The States heeded this advice, and the 
results give rise to another form of environmental controversy 
between states—breach of resource apportionment compact 
controversies. 
The Supreme Court generally has original and exclusive 
jurisdiction to enforce state compliance with interstate resource 
apportionment compacts.93  To date, all seven resource compact 
enforcement proceedings brought before the Supreme Court have 
been interstate water apportionment compacts.94  But, other 
compacts exist apportioning other resources, and upon their 
breach, actions can be brought before the court. The enforcement 
jurisdiction exists and so do the compacts, and this is no 
coincidence.  Why would any state expend resources entering into 
and complying with a compact that cannot be enforced?  If 
 
 93. The Court has rejected the sole attempt by a commission created by a 
compact to itself bring an enforcement suit against another state because the 
commission is not a sovereign state and so a controversy between it and another 
state is not a controversy between two or more states.  See Se. Interstate Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Comm’n v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 926 (2001).   
Such a commission cannot bring a suit in Federal Court against a non-compliant 
state because this is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  But see Alabama v. 
North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295 (2010) (permitting the Commission to be joined 
as a party plaintiff with other states seeking the same relief as the commission 
from a state over the dissent of Chief Justice Roberts that this violates the 
Eleventh Amendment).  A state could be sued in state court under the compact 
because the compact qualifies as federal law for Supremacy Clause purposes, 
but it would be sovereignly immune from such a suit without its consent.  It is 
an open question whether a state can irrevocably waive sovereign immunity to 
suit by a compact commission.  Such a consent is after all the basis of the 
Court’s jurisdiction in interstate controversy cases.  Perhaps a state can give an 
irrevocable consent to waive sovereign immunity in proceedings brought by an 
interstate compact commission only through processes equivalent to those used 
to ratify the Constitution.  Even if this is not a necessary condition for such a 
waiver, it should be sufficient. 
 94. Texas v. Colorado (1967); Texas v. New Mexico (1975); Kansas v. 
Colorado (1986); Oklahoma v. New Mexico (1987); Kansas v. Nebraska (1998); 
Virginia v. Maryland (2000); Montana v. Wyoming (2007). 
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enforcement is not thought necessary, the states can simply agree 
to the allocation of the resources. 
As outlined above, the Court encourages states to enter into 
resource apportionment compacts.  If these give rise to breach of 
compact proceedings, what is the gain?  The rule of decision in an 
equitable apportionment of interstate waters case is federal 
common law, whereas in a breach of compact case the rule of 
decision regarding the allocation of the resources is set by the 
compact.95  This is preferable because allocations set by the 
agreement of the parties are likely to be more efficient than those 
set by the court and determining the proper allocation requires 
the expenditure of significant judicial resources.96 
c. Apportioning Fish 
As noted above, many of the territory disputes are proxies for 
disputes over the bounty of the rivers and seas.97  Much of this 
bounty, like interstate waters, migrates between states and, 
accordingly, the sizes of each state’s catch are inextricably 
intertwined.  And so, there is a potential for the Supreme Court 
to equitably apportion catch shares amongst the states.  Recent 
research into voluntary catch share agreements suggest they 
advance both conservation and the economic productivity of 
fishing grounds by resolving commons problems.98  But there are 
impediments to private implementation of catch shares.99  Just as 
with interstate water resources, the states may enter into 
interstate catch share compacts without recognition of an 
 
 95. However, the rule of decision as to the principles to be applied in 
interpreting the contract, any obligations of good faith and fair dealing, and the 
availability of remedies not specified in the compact is federal common law.  See 
Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295. 
 96. The portion of those expenditures borne by a special master assigned to 
controversies by the Court is assessed as costs to the states. 
 97. See WARREN, supra note 28, at 43-44 and accompanying text.  See also 
New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 364, 364 n.1 (1976). 
 98. See generally Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent 
Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCI. 1678 (2008). 
 99. See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as 
Obstacle to Marine Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE  L. REV. 3 (2004); see 
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine 
Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9 (2002). 
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equitable apportionment of fisheries action by the Supreme Court 
but they are more likely to do so if a compact-less remedy for 
inequitable consumption of the bounty by a state exists in the 
Court.  And just as with navigable interstate waters, Congress 
may only resolve the matter by adopting federal regulations of 
individual appropriations, not by regulating states directly.  
There are efficiency advantages of compacts over federal 
regulation that make recognition of a cause of action that 
increases the use of compacts worthwhile.  For these reasons it is 
fortunate the Court has recognized a cause of action for equitable 
apportionment of interstate fisheries in the absence of 
compacts.100  And it is probable that there are more fishery 
management compacts today than there would be without this 
recognition. 
* * * 
The non-territorial controversies detailed in this section arise 
out of the existence of interstate resources.  When a state’s 
consumption of a resource reduces the available portion of 
resources that can be consumed by other states, the Supreme 
Court may be called upon to equitably apportion the usage of the 
resource amongst the several states.  In all of the environmental 
apportionment controversies, territorial and non-territorial, the 
contending states desire more of something, whether it be more 
territory, more water, or more fish.  And in resolving these 
controversies, the Court allocates a scarce resource amongst 
multiple claimants, just as the court in Pierson v. Post allocated 
one fox between two hunters.101 
B. Protecting State Environmental Resources from 
Interference 
Just as the controversies outlined above are epitomized by 
Pierson v. Post, the environmental controversies discussed in this 
 
 100. See Idaho v. Oregon (1975).  The recognition of the cause of action as well 
as the recognition of the interstate water apportionment cases seem to pose 
state action problems because the appropriators of the water and fish are 
usually private parties.   The court has evidently applied an inverse parens 
patriae doctrine in recognizing these actions.  This is discussed in depth below.  
See infra, Part III.B.d. 
 101. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (1805). 
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section are epitomized by Aldred’s Case.  In these controversies, 
the decisions of one state are alleged to interfere with another 
state’s enjoyment of environmental resources. 
a. Protecting Navigation 
In the earliest case of this description, South Carolina alleged 
Georgia and agents of the United States were improperly 
obstructing the navigation of the Savannah River and thereby 
interfering with South Carolina’s enjoyment of that resource.102  
While several of the territory controversies that centered around 
water boundaries were rooted in a state’s desire to gain access to 
a greater share of the bounty of the rivers and seas, the others 
were concerned with increasing each state’s ability to use rivers 
for their primary purpose—navigation.  This is reflected by the 
Court’s default rule for river boundaries.103  Once a state has 
jurisdiction over this valuable resource, it has a strong interest in 
keeping its portion of the river free of obstruction.  It is obviously 
less concerned with the navigability of the other state’s portion of 
the river, if not actually interested in reductions in the 
navigability of that portion. 
Surprisingly, only South Carolina has filed a bill of complaint 
alleging obstruction of navigation.104  Although the Court held 
that the obstruction South Carolina complained of was authorized 
 
 102. South Carolina v. Georgia (1876). 
 103. When a river is specified as a boundary, rather than the geographic 
middle of the river, the Court holds that the boundary is the center of the main 
navigation channel or “thalweg” of the river, which is usually the deepest 
portion of the river.   It may be closer to one state’s bank than another, and it 
may drift back and forth between the banks.  The Court adopts this boundary 
formula as a default principle because of the importance of controlling as much 
of the prime navigable portion of the waterway as possible is important to the 
states. 
 104. South Carolina v. Georgia (1876). Arizona’s suit against the Hoover Dam 
construction did not allege obstruction probably because Congress had 
authorized its construction.  Arizona v. California (1930).  This may have been a 
mistake, as there is language in South Carolina v. Georgia leaving open the 
question of whether Congress can totally disrupt the navigability of a river. The 
question is an open one.  The longstanding practice of damming navigable 
waterways for hydroelectric power suggests Congress has authority to do so, but 
this result is less constitutionally justifiable without the consent of the states 
adjoining the waterway. 
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by Congress, the resolution of the case on the merits indicates 
that South Carolina’s bill of complaint properly stated a 
controversy between states.  Nearly one hundred years later 
Vermont included in a bill of complaint an allegation that the 
activities complained of impeded navigation on Lake Champlain 
and Ticonderoga Creek.105  The Court overruled a demurrer, 
presumably affirming once again its jurisdiction to resolve 
controversies between states over obstruction of navigation in 
interstate waters, though it was not Vermont’s primary count or 
concern.106  The case was dismissed after the states settled before 
final disposition.  No other cases have tested the availability of 
the Court for resolution of controversies over obstruction of 
navigation, but perhaps this is because the rules are clear.107  
Congress and Compacts can authorize a state obstructing a 
portion of navigable waterway, otherwise they are probably per se 
unlawful.108 
b. Protecting Land 
Interstate waters gave rise to the filing of a bill of complaint 
by North Dakota against Minnesota alleging an interference with 
the enjoyment not of a waterway, but of land.109  North Dakota 
claimed that Minnesota had constructed so many drainage 
ditches leading into the Mustinka River that the resulting 
increased flow volume and speed caused the level of Lake 
Traverse to rise and in turn caused its outlet, the Bois de Sioux 
River, to overflow and flood valuable North Dakota land used for 
 
 105. Vermont v. New York (1971). 
 106. Id.  The navigability allegation was discussed more during New York’s 
oral argument on the demurrer than Vermont’s, and in both portions the 
discussions were limited.  Oral Argument, Vermont v. New York (1971). 
 107. But see Wisconsin v. Minnesota, 382 U.S. 935 (1965) (summarily denying 
leave to file a bill of complaint); McKusick, supra note 5, at 207 (noting 
Wisconsin filed bill “suit to enjoin Minnesota from permitting Northern States 
Power Company to build dam and coal-fired steam generating plant on St. Croix 
River, allegedly creating nuisance and impeding recreational use of river”). 
 108. This implicit rule against interstate water obstruction without 
congressional assent probably explains the significant federal involvement in 
hydroelectric power. 
 109. North Dakota v. Minnesota (1921). 
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farming.110  The Court resoundingly affirmed North Dakota’s 
right to seek relief for the alleged injury in the Supreme Court by 
filing a bill against the offending state, but held the state failed to 
meet its high burden on the merits of showing the flooding was 
caused by the ditches and not by heavy rains in another part of 
the watershed and dismissed the case without prejudice.111  The 
Court’s recognition of an action for interstate flooding in North 
Dakota v. Wisconsin has engendered no follow up state 
controversies litigated in the Supreme Court. 
c. Protecting Water 
States have brought three interstate water pollution 
controversies before the Court for resolution.112  In all three 
controversies, the Court recognized the existence of a controversy 
within its original and exclusive jurisdiction and its power to 
provide relief.  In Missouri v. Illinois, Missouri filed a bill of 
complaint against Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago 
alleging that the Sanitary District was planning to reverse the 
flow of the Chicago River such that it would flow into and pollute 
the Mississippi River.113  And in New York v. New Jersey, New 
York filed a bill of complaint against New Jersey and the Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Commissioners seeking an injunction against 
the discharge of sewage into the Upper Bay of the New York 
Harbor.114  Finally, in Vermont v. New York, Vermont filed a bill 
of complaint against New York and the International Paper 
Company for a pulp mill’s pollution of Lake Champlain and 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923) (“[W]here one State, 
by a change in its method of draining water from lands within its border, 
increases the flow into an interstate stream, so that its natural capacity is 
greatly exceeded and the water is thrown upon the farms of another State, the 
latter State has such an interest as quasi sovereign in the comfort, health and 
prosperity of its farm owners that resort may be had to this Court for relief.   It 
is the creation of a public nuisance of simple type for which a State may 
properly ask an injunction.”). 
 112. Missouri v. Illinois (1901); New York v. New Jersey (1919); Vermont v. 
New York (1971). 
 113. Missouri v. Illinois (1901). 
 114. New York v. New Jersey (1919). 
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Ticonderoga Creek.115  In Missouri v. Illinois and New York v. 
New Jersey, the Court held the complainant states failed to meet 
the heavy burden on the merits and dismissed the bills without 
prejudice for refiling if more could be shown in the future.116  In 
Vermont v. New York, after much evidence was heard by a 
master, the parties entered a joint request that the Court issue a 
decree appointing a South Lake Master to act as arbitrator, and 
after the Court denied the request the parties settled the case by 
agreement and the court dismissed the bill.117 
That these water pollution controversies did not result in the 
Court finding liability and issuing injunctions does not mean that 
the Court did not assist in resolving the environmental 
controversies at issue between the states.  In the cases resolved 
on the merits, the Court’s affirmation of its jurisdiction and the 
dismissal of complaints without prejudice almost certainly 
limited the amount of pollution by Illinois and New Jersey into 
the Mississippi River and New York Harbor, respectively.  And if 
Missouri and New York ever in fact obtained evidence of injury, 
they could use that evidence to negotiate without having to resort 
to litigation.  And New York assuredly made concessions to 
Vermont in the settlement of their controversy over the pollution 
of Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek. 
On the same day that the Court granted Vermont leave to 
file its bill of complaint against New York and the International 
Paper Company, the Court denied Illinois leave to file a bill of 
complaint against four Wisconsin cities and two local sewage 
commissions alleging pollution of Lake Michigan.118  The Court 
did so not on the ground that Wisconsin could not be sued for the 
alleged pollution, but because Illinois simply failed to join 
Wisconsin as a defendant and political subdivisions are not states 
for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).119  Otherwise, this would 
 
 115. Vermont v. New York (1971). 
 116. Missouri v. Illinois (1901); New York v. New Jersey (1919). 
 117. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974); Vermont v. New York, 
419 U.S. 955 (1974). 
 118. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
 119. Id.  The Court did not rest its holding on an interpretation of Article III. 
This may suggest that Congress has power to limit the exclusivity of the Court’s 
original jurisdiction over state controversies. 
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be wholly inconsistent with its grant of leave that same day in 
Vermont v. New York, even more so because the International 
Paper Company has less relation to the state of New York than 
the four cities and two sewerage commissions have to the state of 
Wisconsin. 
After deciding that political subdivisions are not states for 
purposes of section 1251(a)(1), the Supreme Court held that the 
bill against the cities and sewerage commissions did fall under 
the non-exclusive original jurisdiction provision of 28 U.S.C. 
1251(b) for suits by states against citizens of other states because 
political subdivisions are citizens of the state.120  The Court then 
exercised discretion by denying leave to file because the cause 
could be brought in a federal district court since it was not within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  Rather than 
refiling the bill in the Supreme Court with Wisconsin joined as a 
defendant, Illinois filed against the political subdivisions of the 
state in federal district court, presumably for strategic reasons.  
Several years later on appeal, the Court held the Clean Water Act 
displaced Illinois’ suit against the four cities and the two 
sewerage commissions.121  This begs the question whether the 
Clean Water Act also displaces suits by states against states like 
Missouri v. Illinois, New York v. New Jersey, and Vermont v. New 
York.  No states have filed bills alleging water pollution since the 
1981 state versus citizen displacement holding.  Part V, infra, 
argues that the displacement holding cannot apply to 
controversies between states and that a broad coalition of 
Justices are likely to so hold if a state were to file a bill of 
complaint for water pollution today.  And states are likely to 
consider doing so because the absence of water pollution 
controversies brought before the Court these past three decades is 
no indication that interstate water pollution is no longer a 
problem.122 
Also, on the same day that the Court granted Vermont leave 
and denied Illinois leave, the Court denied leave to file a bill in a 
case that represents another environmental controversy that, if it 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304, 332 (1981). 
 122. See Michael Wines, Spring Rain, Then Foul Algae in Ailing Lake Erie, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013, at A1. 
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were between states, could be resolved under the Court’s 
exclusive original jurisdiction—air pollution, a subject discussed 
in depth in Part V.123  Consideration of other potential 
controversies is outside the scope of this Article, except for the 
observations below the line here.124 
 
 123. See generally Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972). 
 124. Speculative discussion of other environmental controversies that fall 
within these two categories that have not been litigated is limited to this 
footnote. 
Apportionment of Wildlife. The recognition of a cause of action for equitable 
apportionment of interstate fisheries discussed above in Part III.A. suggests 
states might also seek equitable apportionment of interstate terrestrial and 
aerial game.  Some states may desire to seek equitable apportionment not to 
obtain a fair share of the consumption of a species and to prevent tragedy of the 
commons diminution of populations below economically optimal levels but 
instead to conserve a species.  For example two states with interstate wolf 
populations might have different views as to the importance of conserving 
wolves.  This poses a somewhat different issue than the interstate allocation of 
game because applying the equal state dignity principle to perform the 
allocation requires evaluative judgments of the importance of conservation of 
wolves and of other affected interests.  As discussed in Part III.A., Wisconsin v. 
Illinois posed a similar challenge to the court.  The use of the water of Lake 
Michigan improved the health and welfare of the citizens of Chicago by 
disposing of significant quantities of sewage.  But this use lowered the level of 
the Great Lakes and the connecting waterways thereby inhibiting navigation.  
The Court had to weigh these against one another, and reached the result that 
the injunction would be expanded to allow Chicago to construct some other 
manner of disposing of the waste. But unlike a species conservation controversy, 
both the sewage problem and the navigation problem could be resolved by the 
expenditure of monetary resources.  That the Court held in favor of the 
complainant states suggests it determined that Illinois was imposing a far more 
expensive remediation burden on the other states than it would cost to construct 
the necessary sewage disposal facilities to obviate the need to withdraw the 
water from Lake Michigan.  A species could become extinct unless a remedy is 
provided by the Court, for instance if a state permits destruction of the entirety 
of a necessary portion of a migratory species’ habitat.  In this instance the 
economic benefit of the development or other activity would have to be balanced 
against the non-consumptive enjoyment of the species by a neighboring state.  
The required balancing is a challenging problem for the Court, but not 
insurmountable.  If the Court reaches the wrong balance and enjoins the 
inequitable conduct even though it is worth less to the citizens of the 
complainant state than the value of the enjoined conduct to the defendant state, 
the states can enter into an interstate compact.  By recognizing the action and 
coming to some resolution, the Court incentivize states to negotiate compacts in 
the first instance and the compacting process is available to correct mistakes. 
Species conservation controversies pose standing issues.  One question is 
whether the citizen’s interest in conservation of a species is of a type that gives 
rise to parens patriae standing in state controversy cases.  See infra Part IV.A.d.  
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Alternatively, the state might have standing because the culling of its 
population of the animal is a direct injury to the state.  See id.  This is a 
plausible argument for standing in species conservation case, as the Court has 
held complete bans on the taking of species of wild animals within the borders of 
a state are constitutional because wild animals are the property of the state for 
purposes of a takings analysis.  See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 208–
09 (1900) (noting wild animals “belong to the ‘negative community;’ in other 
words, are public things subject to the absolute control of the State, which, 
although it allows them to be reduced to possession, may at its will not only 
regulate but wholly forbid their future taking.”) (quoting Geer v. Connecticut, 
161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896)).  As there are no similar state controversy cases in 
which a non-economic interest is advanced by a state, the particular problem 
addressed in this note is not elsewhere addressed in this Article. 
Apportionment of Subsurface Oil and Gas.  To date, the Court has settled 
two interstate oil and gas extraction controversies by resolving competing claims 
to territory.  In Texas v. Oklahoma a discovery of oil and gas underlying a border 
river led to an explosive confrontation between the states. Texas v. Oklahoma 
(1920); Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 84 (1921) (“[B]ecause of the recent 
discovery and development of oil and gas deposits in the bed of the river 
adjacent to Wichita County, Tex., serious conflicts had arisen between parties 
claiming title from the State of Texas and others claiming title from the State of 
Oklahoma or under the mineral laws of the United States; and that there was . . 
. danger of armed conflict between rival claimants . . . .”).  And in Mississippi v. 
Louisiana, Mississippi claimed an oil well drilled in Louisiana bottomed out 
within Mississippi.  In the former case, the Court resolved the territory dispute 
in favor of Oklahoma after first appointing a receiver to take possession of the 
disputed field to allow the court time to determine the territory controversy 
before private parties exhausted the oil and gas. In the latter case the Court 
held the well in fact bottomed out in Louisiana and therefore did not address 
Mississippi’s claims of subsurface trespass.  The Court has also resolved several 
controversies over the interstate commerce of coal, oil, and gas.  In no cases have 
states asserted rights against one another in the oil and gas arising out of the 
interstate nature of the pool akin to requesting the equitable apportionment of 
interstate waters and fisheries.  Analogous to interstate water and anadromous 
fish, subsurface oil and gas migrate across state lines, and the exploitation 
activities on each side of the border affect one another. The adjacent sovereigns 
over an interstate oil and gas pool share a unity of interest in the manner in 
which the field is developed, akin to the unity of interest shared by adjacent 
owners of a subsurface resource pool.  The Court has held that the unity of 
interest shared by adjacent owners legitimizes regulations by states on 
extraction of oil and gas.  Having recognized the importance of state 
coordination of subsurface resource exploitation due to this unity of interest 
between adjacent landowners, the Court may recognize the importance of 
providing opportunities for coordination to states in a similar position.  The 
potential need for these actions might be increased by the advent of horizontal 
slickwater hydrofracturing. 
There are two jurisdictional issues here, one largely resolved and one less 
so.  The first is whether a complainant state has standing to file a bill of 
complaint against a state for diminution of oil and gas resources.  The Court has 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM 
2014] CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 139 
 
V. JUDICIAL POWER TO RESOLVE  
CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 
This section examines three aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
judicial power to resolve controversies between states.  The first 
inquiry is jurisdictional: What constitutes a controversy between 
states upon which a complainant state may properly invoke the 
Court’s judicial power by filing a bill of complaint against another 
state?  The second inquiry is remedial: What relief may the Court 
grant a complainant state under its judicial power to resolve 
 
issued several decisions on both the direct injury and parens patriae claims of 
standing to complain of injuries to coal, oil, and gas supplies arising out of 
restrictions on interstate commerce.  Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1919) 
(leave granted to seek injunction against statute requiring natural gas 
producers give West Virginia cutovers preference); Maryland v. Louisiana (1979) 
(leave granted to seek injunction against Louisiana tax on the first use of gas 
imported from the outer continental shelf); Wyoming v. Oklahoma (1988) (leave 
granted to seek injunction against Oklahoma statute requiring coal plants burn 
at least ten percent Oklahoma coal); see infra Part III.B.c.  The second and less 
resolved issue is whether a state is responsible for diminutions caused by 
activities of private operators within the pool.  Unlike the water cases, the 
number of citizens involved is far less than the water cases.  But the issue is 
implicitly decided in Idaho v. Oregon because the states were responsible for the 
activities of their citizens who fished in the Columbia River.  This theory of 
defendant state responsibility based on the equal state dignity principle is 
discussed below in depth.  See infra Part III.A..  As for the common law 
treatment of subsurface oil and gas, see Peter M. Gerhart & Robert D. Cheren, 
Recognizing the Shared Ownership of Subsurface Resource Pools, 63 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1044 (2013). 
Interstate Disaster Risks.  These controversies are foreshadowed by North 
Dakota v. Wisconsin.  In some ways, the ditches in the interstate flooding cases 
are creating a risk of flooding rather than causing flooding.  Along this line, a 
state might file a bill of complaint against another state for permitting 
interstate wildfire hazards.  There are no cases yet, but this is a possibility the 
states annually ravaged by wild fires should consider.  If the Court were to 
recognize its jurisdiction over such an action, beneficial compacts would result.  
That they are likely to do so is supported by the Court’s statement that its 
jurisdiction extends where “there is no municipal code governing the matter.”  
Virginia v. West Virginia, 202 U.S. 1, 27 (1911) (citing Kansas v. Colorado II, 
206 U.S. 46, 82–84 (1907)). 
Invasive Species.  States have already brought suits related to invasive 
species, and this is another area that the Court’s resolution may be available.  
However, the Court might be especially reluctant to require state regulation of 
wild animals, just as the common law courts refused to hear common law 
nuisance actions between neighbors when the harm flows through the activities 
of wild animals.  See generally Robert D. Cheren, Note, Tragic Parlor Pigs and 
Comedic Rascally Rabbits, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 555 (2012). 
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controversies between states?  The third inquiry is justicial: What 
rule of decision applies to a controversy between states? 
A. Jurisdiction Over Controversies Between States 
The ninety-nine proper and thirty-six improper invocations of 
the Court’s jurisdiction over “controversies between two or more 
states” demonstrate that a bill of complaint may be filed if (1) a 
state is injured directly or through its citizenry, (2) by the acts of 
another state or its citizenry, and (3) its resolution is an 
appropriate use of the Court’s resources.125  The Court’s broad 
interpretation of the state controversy jurisdiction is a function of 
the manner in which the Court has posed and considered the 
question. 
The Court answered an early challenge to its jurisdiction by 
holding that the states’ adoption of the Constitution “waived their 
exemption from judicial power” as “they respectively made to the 
United States a grant of judicial power over controversies 
between two or more states” and that from this, the “Court . . . 
acquired jurisdiction.”126  Under this formulation, the 
jurisdictional power over the states was given by the states to the 
federal government.  It would seem that the determination of 
what constitutes an Article III controversy between states would 
be based upon what the states intended to cede to the national 
government. 
But the Court has instead taken the view that its jurisdiction 
to decide controversies between states is what the states received 
in exchange for giving up other sovereign rights to resolve 
controversies with other states.  Thus, the Court’s “power” over 
state controversies was “conferred by the Constitution as a 
substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies between 
sovereigns and a possible resort to force.”127  Before the 
Constitution, the “independent and sovereign” states in 
controversy with other states “could seek a remedy by 
negotiation, and, that failing, by force,” and as “[d]iplomatic 
powers and the right to make war” were “surrendered to the 
 
 125. See Appendix infra. 
 126. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 720 (1838). 
 127. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1923). 
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general government” in the adoption of the Constitution “it was to 
be expected that upon [general government] would be devolved 
the duty of providing a remedy” and that this remedy was 
provided by the “constitutional provisions” for the resolution of 
controversies between the states by the Supreme Court.128  And 
since the purpose of the substitute is to provide a remedy in those 
instances in which the strictures removed the remedy that would 
otherwise be available, the absence of a remedy is a touchstone 
for the presence of jurisdiction.129  The substitution conception of 
the Court’s jurisdiction stems from the Court’s consideration of 
the “history of the creation of the power.”130  The Court also 
draws upon the specific history of the drafting of the text as is 
recounted in Part II.A, supra.131  The substitution model of the 
jurisdiction leads to a broad conception of what controversies may 
be brought.132 
There are two instances of language in the Court’s opinions 
that suggest limits based on the history and function of the state 
controversy provision.  In one case, the Court noted that, as the 
power is a substitute for the surrendered diplomatic powers, 
“[t]he jurisdiction is therefore limited generally to disputes which, 
between States entirely independent, might be properly the 
 
 128. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 108, 241 (1901). 
 129. See id. (“An inspection of the bill discloses that the nature of the injury 
complained of is such that an adequate remedy can only be found in this court at 
the suit of the State of Missouri.”). 
 130. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372 (1923). 
 131. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1883) (“The reference we have made to 
the derivation of the words ‘controversies between two or more States’ 
manifestly indicates that the framers of the Constitution intended that they 
should include something more than controversies over ‘territory or jurisdiction’; 
for in the original draft as reported the latter controversies were to be disposed 
of by the Senate, and controversies other than those by the judiciary, to which 
by amendment all were finally committed.”). 
 132. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 108, 240-41 (1901) (“[J]urisdiction has been 
exercised in cases involving boundaries and jurisdiction over lands and their 
inhabitants, and in cases directly affecting the property rights and interests of a 
State. But such cases manifestly do not cover the entire field in which such 
controversies may arise, and for which the Constitution has provided a remedy; 
and it would be objectionable, and, indeed, impossible, for the court to anticipate 
by definition what controversies can and what cannot be brought within the 
original jurisdiction of this court.”). 
37
CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM 
142 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31 
 
subject of diplomatic adjustment.”133  And the Court has reasoned 
that “the jurisdiction is of so delicate and grave a character that 
it” could not have been “contemplated that it would be exercised 
save when the necessity was absolute and the matter in itself 
properly justiciable.”134 But these limitations have no discernible 
impact on the formulation of the extent of the jurisdiction, which 
go to the limits of the judicial power itself.135 
The substitution conception of the Court’s role in resolving 
controversies between states yields a litmus test for the court’s 
jurisdiction: whether the actions complained of “would be grounds 
for war if the states were truly sovereign.”136 If a state has causa 
belli, the Court has jurisdiction. 
Thusly framed, the jurisdictional requirements of a 
controversy between two or more states are not entirely in line 
with other cases and controversies under Article III.  Rather than 
shoehorn the analysis unnecessarily, it is best to consider the 
 
 133. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1923) (“The 
jurisdiction and procedure of this Court in controversies between States of the 
Union differ from those which it pursues in suits between private parties. This 
grows out of the history of the creation of the power, in that it was conferred by 
the Constitution as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies 
between sovereigns and a possible resort to force. The jurisdiction is therefore 
limited generally to disputes which, between States entirely independent, might 
be properly the subject of diplomatic adjustment.”). 
 134. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900). 
 135. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939) (“To constitute [a 
controversy between the States], it must appear that the complaining State has 
suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing ground for 
judicial redress, or is asserting a right against the other State which is 
susceptible of judicial enforcement according to the accepted principles of the 
common law or equity systems of jurisprudence.”); Texas v. Florida 306 U.S. 
398, 405 (1939) (“[O]ur constitutional authority to hear the case and grant relief 
turns on the question whether the issue framed by the pleadings constitutes a 
justiciable ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision, and whether the facts alleged and found afford an adequate basis for 
relief according to accepted doctrines of the common law or equity systems of 
jurisprudence, which are guides to decision of cases within the original 
jurisdiction of this Court.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 136. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 289 (2010) (“Our original 
jurisdiction over actions between States is concerned with disputes so serious 
that they would be grounds for war if the States were truly sovereign . . . . A 
dispute between States over rights to water fits that bill; a squabble among 
private entities within a State over how to divvy up that State’s share does 
not.”) (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 571 n.18). 
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issues from entirely within the decisions on real and purported 
state controversies litigated in the Supreme Court, rather than by 
reference to cases falling within different clauses of Article III, 
Section 2.  The Court has not yet distilled the requirements into a 
set of necessary elements, so an attempt has been made here to 
induce them. This Article contends three elements are present in 
the court’s decisions to date.  First, the complainant state must be 
injured directly or through its citizenry.  Second, this injury must 
be caused by the acts of another state or its citizenry.  Third, the 
resolution of the matter must be an appropriate use of the Court’s 
limited resources. 
a. Injury of Complainant State 
A complainant state must have suffered or be about to suffer 
a direct injury or an injury to its citizenry, and the suit may not 
be prosecuted to vindicate purely private grievances or national 
interests. 
The injury requirement is most easily met if a state 
proprietary interest is threatened or harmed.  The Court has 
recognized as sufficient states’ proprietary interests as consumers 
in the marketplace and as revenue collectors. A state facing 
higher prices is sufficiently injured. For example, in Pennsylvania 
v. West Virginia, the complainant states sought to protect their 
interest “as the proprietor[s] of various public institutions and 
schools whose supply of gas will be largely curtailed or cut off by 
the threatened interference with the interstate current” by the 
operation of a West Virginia statute requiring producers to give 
preference to West Virginia customers.137  The Court held that 
the threatened impairment of this interest was sufficient because 
the state would have to make “very large public expenditures” if 
the supply was reduced.138  Likewise, in Maryland v. Louisiana, 
the complainant states argued that state consumers of natural 
gas faced higher prices for natural gas as a result of the 
 
 137. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591 (1923). 
 138. Id. at 592 (“Each State uses large amounts of the gas in her several 
institutions and schools — the greater part in the discharge of duties which are 
relatively imperative. A break or cessation in the supply will embarrass her 
greatly in the discharge of those duties and expose thousands of dependents and 
school children to serious discomfort, if not more.”). 
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imposition of a tax on pipeline companies.  The Court held this 
direct injury sufficient.139 
Injuries to a state’s proprietary interest in its own property 
are also sufficient.  In a water apportionment case, Kansas v. 
Colorado, the Court held that the “vindication of [Kansas’s] 
alleged rights as an individual owner” for the deprivation of “the 
waters of the river accustomed to flow through and across the 
State” and the “destruction of the property of herself” was 
sufficient.140 
A state is also sufficiently injured if its tax receipts are 
reduced.  For example, in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, Wyoming 
severance tax receipts were reduced by an Oklahoma statute 
requiring coal-fired electricity generating plants to use a mixture 
of at least ten percent Oklahoma coal, and the Court held this 
“loss of specific tax revenues” was sufficient.141 
While direct injury to a state’s proprietaryinterest is 
sufficient, it is by no means necessary because the Court 
recognizes anotherstate interest that may be vindicated by suit in 
the Supreme Court against other states. 
 
 139. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736–37 (1981) (“It is clear that the 
plaintiff States, as major purchasers of natural gas whose cost has increased as 
a direct result of Louisiana’s imposition of the First-Use Tax, are directly 
affected in a ‘substantial and real’ way so as to justify their exercise of this 
Court’s original jurisdiction.”); id. at 736 n.12 (“As alleged in the complaint, the 
annual increase in natural gas costs directly associated with the First-Use Tax 
with respect to each of the plaintiff States is as follows: Maryland ($60,000); 
New York ($300,000); Massachusetts ($25,000); Rhode Island ($25,000); Illinois 
($270,000); Indiana ($70,000); Michigan ($650,000); Wisconsin ($70,000); New 
Jersey ($20,000). . . .  Total direct injuries to the plaintiff States was estimated 
to be $1.5 million . . . .”). 
 140. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 99 (1907). 
 141. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 438 (1992); id. at 442 n.3 (“In 1988, 
just over 163.8 million tons of Wyoming coal was mined. Only 14.6% of 
Wyoming’s coal production was sold in-state. Oklahoma purchased 8% of the 
coal mined, making it the third largest out-of-state consumer, behind Texas at 
19.7% and Kansas at 8.3%.”); id. at 445 (“Unrebutted evidence demonstrates 
that, since the effective date of the Act, Wyoming has lost severance taxes in the 
amounts of $535,886 in 1987, $542,352 in 1988, and $87,130 in the first four 
months of 1989.”); id. at 448-49 (agreeing with master’s finding that an 
undisputed “a direct injury in the form of a loss of specific tax revenues” is 
sufficient for state standing (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 
432 U.S. 333 (1977)). 
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The original jurisdiction may be invoked “by the State 
asparens patriae,trustee, guardian or representative of all or a 
considerable portion of its citizens.”142  This parens patriae 
standing to vindicate injuries to the citizenry was first announced 
by the Court in Kansas v. Colorado in 1902.143  There, the Court 
pointed to Missouri v. Illinois as precedent, as in that case “the 
threatened pollution of the waters of a river flowing between 
States, under the authority of one of them, thereby putting the 
health and comfort of the citizens of the other in jeopardy, 
presented a cause of action justiciable under the Constitution.”144  
As for the case before the Court: 
Kansas files her bill as representing and on behalf of her citizens 
. . . and seeks relief in respect of being deprived of the waters of 
the river accustomed to flow through and across the State, and 
the consequent destruction of the property . . . of her citizens and 
injury to their health and comfort.145 
Twenty years later, the Court explicitly held that the 
pollution of a body of water to the injury of state citizens gives 
rise to parens patriae standing in New York v. New Jersey.146  
And in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia two years later, discussed 
above, the Court held the complainant states had, in addition to 
their proprietary interests in the controversy, parens patriae 
standing to represent the threats to the “health, comfort, and 
welfare” of its people posed by a reduction in the supply of 
 
 142. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142 (1902) (“As will be perceived, the 
court there ruled that the mere fact that a State had no pecuniary interest in 
the controversy, would not defeat the original jurisdiction of this court, which 
might be invoked by the State as parens patriae, trustee, guardian or 
representative of all or a considerable portion of its citizens.”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1921) (“The health, 
comfort and prosperity of the people of the State and the value of their property 
being gravely menaced, as it is averred that they are by the proposed action of 
the defendants, the State is the proper party to represent and defend such rights 
by resort to the remedy of an original suit in this court under the provisions of 
the Constitution of the United States.”). 
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natural gas.147  And in Idaho v. Oregon, Idaho properly invoked 
the Court’s jurisdiction to redress a depletion of salmon returning 
to Idaho “to the detriment of Idaho fishermen.”148  Frequently the 
existence of parens patriae standing entails the existence of direct 
injury standing as well because the two are “indissolubly linked,” 
such as in Wyoming v. Colorado where harm to the citizen’s 
economic interests reduced the tax base of the complainant 
state.149 
The parens patriae standing doctrine has both an internal 
Article III and an external Eleventh Amendment requirement 
that a purported controversy between states not be in effect a suit 
for the vindication of purely private rights.  For a suit to 
constitute a controversy between two or more states under Article 
III, it cannot really be a controversy between the citizens of a 
state and another state.  This would be true whether or not the 
Eleventh Amendment were adopted.  In Pennsylvania v. New 
Jersey,  the Court denied Pennsylvania, Maine, Massachusetts, 
and Vermont leave to file bills of complaint against states seeking 
to recover unconstitutionally collected taxes on behalf of its 
citizens because the states had neither “sovereign nor quasi-
sovereign interests” in recovering the funds for its citizens.150  
The Court did not rest this denial on the Eleventh Amendment, 
rather the Court pointed to the “critical distinction, articulated in 
 
 147. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) (“The private 
consumers in each State not only include most of the inhabitants of many urban 
communities but constitute a substantial portion of the State’s population. Their 
health, comfort, and welfare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened 
withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream. This is a matter of grave 
public concern in which the state, as the representative of the public, has an 
interest apart from that of the individuals affected. It is not merely a remote or 
ethical interest, but one which is immediate and recognized by law.”). 
 148. Idaho v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 385 (1980) (“In the present suit, Idaho 
alleges that nontreaty fishermen in Oregon and Washington take a 
disproportionate share of fish destined for Idaho, thereby depleting those runs to 
the detriment of Idaho fishermen. It seeks equitable apportionment of 
anadromous fish destined for Idaho in the Columbia River.”). 
 149. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 468 (1922) (“[T]he welfare, 
prosperity, and happiness of the people of the larger part of the Laramie valley, 
as also a large portion of the taxable resources of two counties, are dependent on 
the appropriations in that State. Thus the interests of the state are indissolubly 
linked with the rights of the appropriators.”). 
 150. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665–66 (1976). 
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Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution, between suits brought by 
‘Citizens’ and those brought by ‘States’” that “would evaporate” if 
such suits could be filed by states on behalf of their citizens.151  
On its face, the Court’s language in this case would seem to cover 
many cases for which leave has been granted.  This might suggest 
this case was really a discretionary denial, a practice discussed 
below in the section on appropriateness.  The Court does refer to 
this as a “salutary rule” and notes concern over the docket being 
inundated, but the Court cites to a provision of the Constitution 
in its holding.152  The answer to this issue is probably found in 
Maryland v. Louisiana.153  In that case, the Court speaks of an 
injury that “affects the general population of a State in a 
substantial way” and notes the state’s citizens are suffering 
“substantial economic injury” as a result of increased costs.154  
Thus, perhaps the problem is one of substantiality.  Alternatively, 
the Court noted the absence of an option for individual redress in 
Maryland v. Louisiana, whereas in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 
the taxpayers each had a right to sue for a refund themselves. 
The internal Article III limits on parens patriae are often 
eclipsed by the more stringent external limit of the Eleventh 
Amendment.  The internal limit is only implicated if enough 
citizens of a state are affected so as to eliminate Eleventh 
Amendment problems.  When enough citizens’ interests are 
implicated, the difficult question of distinguishing between the 
impermissible elements of Pennsylvania v. New Jersey and the 
permissible elements of Maryland v. Louisiana is implicated. 
The Eleventh Amendment prohibition on suits “commenced 
or prosecuted against the United States by Citizens of another 
State”155 limits the institution of parens patriae suits that are 
essentially litigated on behalf of private citizens.  The 
constitutional standard seems to be the same as the standard for 
the establishment of agency—assent, benefit, and control.  An 
early case suggested that the Eleventh Amendment would not be 
violated so long as the state was at least the nominal party in the 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981). 
 154. Id. at 737-39. 
 155. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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suit because the Amendment “left its exercise over [controversies] 
between states as free as it had been before.”156  This statement 
omits the caveat that a suit filed by a state against another state 
is impermissible under the Eleventh Amendment if it is “a 
controversy in vindication of the grievances of particular 
individuals.”157 
In New Hampshire v. Louisiana, the Court held New 
Hampshire could not maintain a suit against Louisiana for the 
recovery of repudiated bonds because “[n]o one can look at the 
pleadings and testimony in these cases without being satisfied, 
beyond all doubt, that they were in legal effect commenced, and 
are now prosecuted, solely by the owners of the bonds and 
coupons.”158  Thus, the suit was impermissibly controlled by the 
bondholders.  In South Dakota v. North Carolina, South Dakota 
was permitted to bring an action because the bonds “were given 
outright and absolutely to the state,” thus, even though much of 
the suit was instigated by the previous holder of the bonds, the 
prosecution of the suit only benefited the State as owner of the 
bonds.159  In North Dakota v. Minnesota, the complainant state 
 
 156. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 731 (1838) (“[W]hile [the 
Eleventh Amendment] took from this Court all jurisdiction, past, present, and 
future . . . of all controversies between states and individuals; it left its exercise 
over those between states as free as it had been before.”). 
 157. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900) (“In order, then, to maintain 
jurisdiction of this bill of complaint as against the state of Texas, it must appear 
that the controversy to be determined is a controversy arising directly between 
the state of Louisiana and the state of Texas, and not a controversy in 
vindication of the grievances of particular individuals.”); Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981) (“[O]ur original jurisdiction is not affected by the 
provisions of the Eleventh Amendment which only withholds federal judicial 
power in suits against a State ‘by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.’ Thus, an original action between two States only 
violates the Eleventh Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually suing to 
recover for injuries to specific individuals.” (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 
405 U. S. 251, 258–59 n.12 (1972)). 
 158. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88–91 (1883). 
 159. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 310 (1904) (“Neither can 
there be any question respecting the title of South Dakota to these bonds. They 
are not held by the state as representative of individual owners, as in the case of 
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, for they were given outright and 
absolutely to the state.”).  But South Dakota could not join the previous owner of 
the bonds who still held additional bonds and other citizen bondholders as 
defendants in the suit with the hope that the Court would order a proportional 
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improperly sought money damages relief on behalf of farm 
owners injured by flooding that would be paid to them in 
proportion of their losses because the “power as a sovereign to 
present and enforce individual claims of its citizens as their 
trustee against a sister state” was lost by the adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment and that the injured farm owners had 
“contributed to a fund which has been used to aid in the 
preparation and prosecution” of the suit.160  The Court’s most 
recent discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issue indicates that 
the recovery of funds proportionate to the aggregate of individual 
losses that ultimately will be paid out to citizens is permissible so 
long as the suit is really controlled by the state.161  The Court will 
deny leave to file bills of complaint where the motion for leave to 
file indicates that the vindication of a private right is the 
dominant purpose and stimulus for the suit.162 
In a recent dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argues that the 
presence of citizens joined as party plaintiffs might pose Eleventh 
Amendment issues.163  Though the majority of the Court 
 
distribution of recovered funds to all bondholders, the state as well as the citizen 
defendants.  For this reason the court dismissed the citizen bondholders with 
costs to South Dakota.  As the point of the suit was not to recover on South 
Dakota’s bonds but to recover on the citizen bonds, the victory for South Dakota 
was a hollow one.  Id. at 313-14. 
 160. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1923). 
 161. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 7-9 (2001). 
 162. Illinois v. Michigan, 409 U.S. 36, 37 (1972) (“[I]t seems apparent from the 
moving papers and the response that Illinois, though nominally a party, is here 
‘in the vindication of the grievances of particular individuals.” (quoting 
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16)). 
 163. Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2317-19 (2010) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting from deferral of 
motion of summary judgment motion that suit by Commission is barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment on the grounds that Arizona v. California wrongly decided 
and “[t]he Commission is not a sovereign State”).  The dissent begins with three 
forceful sentences: 
The parties to this case are Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and the Southeast Interstate Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Management Commission.  One of these things is 
not like the others: The Commission is not a sovereign State.  The 
Court entertains its suit — despite North Carolina’s sovereign 
immunity — because the Commission “asserts the same claims and 
seeks the same relief as the other plaintiffs.” . . . Our Constitution 
does not countenance such “no harm, no foul” jurisdiction, and I 
respectfully dissent. 
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disagreed, it is inadvisable to join citizens as party plaintiffs in 
light of the Chief Justice’s concerns when the benefits of party 
plaintiffs’ status are limited to what can be had by amicus curiae. 
b. Responsibility of Defendant State 
Controversies between sovereigns do not require state action.  
Ordinarily, Article III requires a plaintiff’s injury be fairly 
traceable to a defendant’s conduct.  But the Court has not 
adopted this formula for its state controversy jurisdiction.  
Rather, a state must answer for injuries to a complainant state or 
its citizenry that are fairly traceable to either (1) the sovereign 
actions of the state, or (2) the actions of the state’s citizenry in 
which the state has a sufficient interest that it could bring a suit 
to protect the citizenry as parens patriae. 
The states are subject to suit under Article III because, by 
adopting the Constitution, the states each consented to be sued 
by other states in the Supreme Court and waived sovereign 
immunity.164  The Eleventh Amendment did not revoke this 
consent and waiver. 
States are directly responsible for injuries fairly traceable to 
the laws of the state and the authorized actions of its agents.  
State responsibility for legislative enactments is borne out by the 
numerous challenges to laws restricting interstate commerce.165  
And states appear to be responsible for the official acts of 
 
Id. at 2317; compare id., with SESAME STREET, ONE OF THESE THINGS IS NOT LIKE 
THE OTHERS (Columbia Records 1970) (“One of these things is not like the 
others.”). 
 164. Virginia v. West Virginia 206 U.S. 290, 319 (1907) (“Consent to be sued 
was given when West Virginia was admitted into the Union . . . .”); Monaco v. 
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934) (“The establishment of a permanent 
tribunal with adequate authority to determine controversies between the States, 
in place of an inadequate scheme of arbitration, was essential to the peace of the 
Union.  The Federalist, No. 80; Story on the Constitution, s 1679.  With respect 
to such controversies, the States by the adoption of the Constitution, acting ‘in 
their highest sovereign capacity, in the convention of the people,’ waived their 
exemption from judicial power.  The jurisdiction of this Court over the parties in 
such cases was thus established ‘by their own consent and delegated authority’ 
as a necessary feature of the formation of a more perfect Union.”). 
 165. E.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1919); Maryland v. Louisiana (1979). 
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governors.166  States are also responsible for the determinations 
of state tax assessors.167  And states are responsible for the 
actions of corporate agents directed by the state, such as a state 
sewerage commission.168  Conversely, states are not responsible 
directly for the unauthorized actions of state agents.169  And 
states are not directly responsible for the undirected actions of 
political subdivisions.170  The contours of direct responsibility are 
not well defined because there is a far broader theory of state 
responsibility that covers what would otherwise be questionable 
cases.171 
In 1900, the Court appeared to suggest that states could only 
be sued for injuries that states are directly responsible for, that 
is, that there would be a “state action” requirement.172  But the 
 
 166. State governors can sue in their official capacity on a state’s behalf and 
may be sued in their official capacity on a state’s behalf.  See, e.g., Idaho v. 
Oregon (1975); Kentucky v. Dennison (1861). 
 167. Texas v. Florida (1937). 
 168. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 302 (1921) (“[F]or the purpose of 
showing the responsibility of . . .  New Jersey for the proposed action of the 
defendant, the Passaic Valley sewerage commissioners, the bill sets out, with 
much detail, the acts of the Legislature of that state authorizing and directing 
such action on their part.  Of this it is sufficient to say that the averments of the 
bill, quite undenied, show that the defendant sewerage commissioners 
constitute such a statutory, corporate agency of the state that their action, 
actual or intended, must be treated as that of the state itself, and we shall so 
regard it.”). 
 169. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1900). 
 170. Thus, New Jersey was not directly responsible for the acts of the Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Commission merely because the sewerage commission was 
incorporated by the state legislature, but rather it mattered that its activities 
were directed by the state.  New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 302 (1921). 
 171. Chief among the questionable cases are the activities of municipal 
corporations who are chartered by state legislatures and have powers both 
delegated by the state legislation and in many states powers of home rule 
delegated by state constitutions.  Were it not for the theory of liability to be 
discussed below, there would be difficult questions as to how much state 
involvement in a particular project constitutes direction and authorization of the 
specific acts.  But this question is avoided by the theory of liability first 
suggested in Missouri v. Illinois, as discussed infra. 
 172. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1900) (“[I]n order that a 
controversy between States, justiciable in this court, can be held to exist, 
something more must be put forward than that the citizens of one State are 
injured by the maladministration of the laws of another. . . . [A] controversy 
between States does not arise unless the action complained of is state action, 
and acts of state officers in abuse or excess of their powers cannot be laid hold of 
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following term the Court announced a new theory of 
responsibility—state interest.  In Missouri v. Illinois, though the 
Court found state action, the Court also suggested Illinois could 
be held accountable for the actions of the Chicago Sanitary 
District because “Illinois would have a right to appear and 
traverse the allegations” levied in a suit against the Chicago 
Sanitary District.173  Illinois would have this right to intervene 
because an injunction against the Sanitary District would injure 
a proprietary interest of the State.  Under this view, a state may 
be sued if the state has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the 
decision such that it would be able itself to file a complaint.  This 
early hint of an important and broad conception of indirect state 
responsibility stemmed, as had parens patriae, from the Court’s 
analysis of the history of the provision.174  The state interest 
theory justifies the scope of the injuries for which states have 
been held responsible, but the Court’s decisions along the way 
focused on a principle that itself is unacceptably broad—indirect 
liability for permitted activities. 
Permitting first appeared one year after Missouri v. Illinois, 
in Kansas v. Colorado.175  The Court held Colorado responsible 
for diversions of the waters of the Arkansas River for irrigation.  
Some of these diversions were directed by the state, but a great 
number of the diversions Kansas complained of were made by 
Colorado citizens who had obtained permits from the state.176  
 
as in themselves committing one State to a distinct collision with a sister 
state.”). 
 173. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 242 (1901) (“The object of the bill is to 
subject this public work to judicial supervision, upon the allegation that the 
method of its construction and maintenance will create a continuing nuisance, 
dangerous to the health of a neighboring state and its inhabitants.  Surely, in 
such a case, . . . Illinois would have a right to appear and traverse the 
allegations of the bill, and, having such a right, might properly be made a party 
defendant.”). 
 174. Id. at 219 (“But in this, as in other instances, when called upon to 
construe and apply a provision of the Constitution of the United States, we must 
look not merely to its language but to its historical origin . . . .”).  This decision 
includes one of the most detailed reviews of the history of the “between two or 
more states” provision. 
 175. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). 
 176. Id. at 137. 
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM 
2014] CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 153 
 
The Court referenced these diversions in its holding summarizing 
the allegations of the bill: 
The gravamen of the bill is that . . . Colorado, acting directly 
herself, as well as through private persons thereto licensed, is 
depriving and threatening to deprive the State of Kansas and its 
inhabitants of all the water heretofore accustomed to flow in the 
Arkansas River through its channel on the surface, and through 
a subterranean course, across the state of Kansas . . . .177 
Like Missouri v. Illinois, this was not the only ground the 
complaint stood on, and the Court explicitly found state action.178  
But the cases that followed bore out the sufficiency of allegations 
of a state acting indirectly through private persons licensed by 
the state to engage in an activity. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the Court had two possible 
theories upon which to base an expansion of state responsibility 
in state controversy cases beyond state action.  On the one hand, 
the Court hints in Missouri v. Illinois that state interest 
sufficient for state standing is also sufficient for state 
responsibility.  And on the other hand, the Court hints in Kansas 
v. Colorado that permitting regimes are sufficient to impute 
responsibility for the permitted activity to the state.  The firmer 
foundation is the former.  If permitting is sufficient for indirect 
responsibility, a state could be sued whenever a driver licensed by 
a state damages the property of another state. The better view is 
that permitting is not relevant, and its frequent presence is only 
because state controversies are often over scarce resources that 
the states are likely to apportion amongst their citizens.  
Furthermore, permitting is beneficial to the conservation of 
interstate resources and the avoidance of state controversies, so 
holding states subject to responsibility for permitted activities 
that they would otherwise not be responsible for is inappropriate.  
The purpose of the state controversy provision is to resolve 
interstate conflict, not to impose disincentives for conservation.  
Though this Article takes the position in favor of the state 
 
 177. Id. at 145–46 (emphasis added). 
 178. Id. at 142 (“The action complained of is state action and not the action of 
state officers in abuse or excess of their powers.”). 
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interest theory, both permitting and state interest are present in 
the resolved controversies complaining of citizenry activities. 
In Wyoming v. Colorado, the Court held Colorado responsible 
for substantial diversions of the Laramie River and its tributaries 
by two private corporations with the knowledge, consent, and 
cooperation of the state.179  In Washington v. Oregon the Court 
evaluated claims by Washington against Oregon for the uses of 
water by private irrigators and farmers sinking wells.180  In 
Vermont v. New York, one the most striking examples, the Court 
granted leave to file a bill of complaint against New York for the 
pollution of Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek by the 
International Paper Co. and other private parties.181  And in 
Idaho v. Oregon, the Court granted Idaho leave to file a bill of 
complaint against Washington and Oregon for permitting their 
fishermen to take an inequitable portion of the anadromous fish 
 
 179. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 456 (1922) (“[T]wo corporate 
defendants, acting under the authority and permission of Colorado, were 
proceeding to divert in that State a considerable portion of the waters of the 
river and to conduct the same into another watershed . . . .”); Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509–10 (1932) (“The contention that the present bill 
shows that the acts complained of are not acts done by Colorado, or under her 
authority, but acts done by private corporations and individuals not parties to 
the present suit, is shown by the bill to be untenable.  It is there alleged 
that Colorado in 1926 permitted a diversion from the Laramie through the 
Laramie-Poudre tunnel appropriation materially in excess of the 15,500 acre-
feet specified in the decree; that in 1926, 1927 and 1928, with the knowledge, 
permission and co-operation of Colorado, diversions were made from the 
Laramie and its tributaries through the Skyline ditch appropriation in stated 
amounts materially in excess of the 18,000 acre-feet specified in the decree; that 
in 1926, 1927, 1928, and 1929, with the knowledge, consent and cooperation of 
Colorado, diversions were made from the Laramie and its tributaries through 
the meadow-land appropriations in various amounts pronouncedly in excess of 
the 4,250 acre-feet specified in the decree; and that Colorado has permitted 
other diversions from the Laramie and its tributaries in violation of the decree 
through the Bob Creek and other designated ditches, none of which were 
recognized or named in the findings or decree.”). 
 180. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523–25 (1936). 
 181. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 270 (1974) (“[W]e granted Vermont’s 
motion to file a bill complaint against New York and the International Paper Co. 
which alleged that as a result of discharge of wastes, largely from 
International’s mills, that company and New York are responsible for a sludge 
bed in Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek that has polluted the water, 
impeded navigation, and constituted a public nuisance.”). 
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in the Columbia River en route to spawning grounds in Idaho.182  
These four cases are not justiciable under a state action rubric, 
but whether they are justiciable because the defendant states had 
a sufficient interest in the activities of the citizenry or because 
the state had enacted permitting regimes is an open question.183 
The theory upon which it is based aside, the provision for 
controversies between states on account of state injuries that are 
caused by the citizenry of other states plays an important role in 
the federal scheme of enumerated congressional powers, limits on 
state self-help, and mechanisms for coordination of states 
through compacts and submission of controversies to the 
Supreme Court.  Congress’s adoption of the cooperative 
federalism model for national regulation of the environment 
represents its considered judgment that state governments 
utilizing the police power and representing local constituencies 
are best fit to implement environmental regulations.184 The 
alternative to cooperative federalism is regional environmental 
compacts under which state governments regulate utilizing the 
police power.  These compacts, consented to by the states and 
Congress, are enforceable in the Supreme Court and by Congress.  
A compact is therefore a method of achieving directly what 
Congress achieves indirectly through cooperative federalism: 
state implementation of regulations set in consideration of the 
national interest. But compacting is probably among the most 
expensive and difficult legislative processes in the world.  The 
existence of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to resolve the most 
 
 182. Idaho v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 385 (1980) (“In the present suit, Idaho 
alleges that nontreaty fishermen in Oregon and Washington take a 
disproportionate share of fish destined for Idaho, thereby depleting those runs to 
the detriment of Idaho fishermen. It seeks equitable apportionment of 
anadromous fish destined for Idaho in the Columbia River.”). 
 183. It is possible that the Court is imposing both requirements, that is, the 
state must impose a permitting regime and have a parens patriae interest in the 
permitted activities.  This is better than a permitting-only theory of 
responsibility, but still poses the problem of imposing greater liability on states 
that have taken the first step in resolving interstate resource scarcity or 
pollution problems by instituting permitting regimes, often at the behest of 
Congress. 
 184. Jason Scott Johnston offers a different view. Jason Scott Johnston, A 
Positive Political Economic Theory of Environmental Federalization, 64 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
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egregious instances of inequitable interstate pollution gives 
downwind states leverage to negotiate compacts with upwind 
states.  And the existence of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to 
apportion scarce interstate resources gives the incentives to 
negotiate an apportionment by compact rather than leave the 
matter for the Court’s resolution. 
Under the substitution theory, the Court’s jurisdiction over 
state controversies is an entitlement of the states in light of the 
loss of sovereign powers of self-help.  Limiting constructions 
therefore do not benefit defendant states who themselves will 
have occasion to redress conflicts with other states.  Indeed, this 
is probably why the requirements for defendant states are so 
unclear—states are rationally choosing not to advance limiting 
constructions on the requirements for state responsibility because 
those same states might soon be complainants.  This is a 
symmetry not found in many private party cases litigating the 
extent of the Article III jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
For these reasons, the only limit the Court has consistently 
imposed on the responsibility of defendant states is that the 
complainant state’s injury must not be more fairly traceable to 
the activities of the complainant state than those of the defendant 
or its citizenry.185 
Even the statutory limit, for purposes of exclusivity of the 
Court’s jurisdiction on attribution of political subdivision actions 
to states, is not a limit on state responsibility because all it 
requires is that the complainant name a state as a defendant in 
the bill rather than only its political subdivisions.186 
 
 185. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976) (“In neither of the 
suits at bar has the defendant State inflicted any injury upon the plaintiff 
States through the imposition of the taxes held . . . and alleged . . . to be 
unconstitutional. The injuries to the plaintiffs’ fiscs were self-inflicted, resulting 
from decisions by their respective state legislatures. Nothing required Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Vermont to extend a tax credit to their residents for income 
taxes paid to New Hampshire, and nothing prevents Pennsylvania from 
withdrawing that credit for taxes paid to New Jersey. No State can be heard to 
complain about damage inflicted by its own hand.”). 
 186. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972) (holding “the term 
‘States’” in 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) does not “include their political subdivisions” 
and granting leave to states to file bills against political subdivisions of other 
states is therefore discretionary under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3)). 
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So long as a defendant state has a sufficient interest in the 
actions of its citizenry that are injuring the complainant state, 
the matter is justiciable under Article III as a controversy 
“between two or more states.” 
c. Appropriateness of Controversy 
Despite Chief Justice Marshall’s remonstration that the 
Supreme Court has “no more right to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not 
given,”187 the Court in the latter half of the twentieth century 
asserted its right to exercise discretion not only in granting leave 
to file bills of complaint under the Court’s non-exclusive original 
jurisdiction,188 but in granting leave to file under the Court’s 
exclusive original jurisdiction over state controversies as well.189  
Therefore, complainant states must show that the determination 
of the controversy is an appropriate use of the Court’s resources. 
The doctrine of discretion over non-exclusive original jurisdiction 
was first announced by Justice Harlan in Ohio v. Wyandotte 
Chemicals Corp., though, as Justice Harlan noted, Justice 
Hughes had discussed the need for the exercise of discretion in 
non-exclusive original jurisdiction cases three decades earlier.190  
The following term the Court again exercised its discretion in 
denying leave of Illinois to file against political subdivisions of 
Wisconsin.191 
Unlike these non-exclusive original jurisdiction cases, the 
exercise of discretion in an exclusive original jurisdiction case 
would leave the complainant state without recourse in any court. 
Justice Frankfurter in 1939 had indicated concerns over the 
consequence of overly broad interpretations of the Court’s 
jurisdiction over state controversies, but he did not advocate 
discretionary denial of leave to file bills of complaint.192  The 
Court first extended the exercise of discretion in an exclusive 
 
 187. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C. J.). 
 188. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971). 
 189. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S.  794, 797-98 (1976). 
 190. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496–99 (1971). 
 191. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972). 
 192. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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jurisdiction case in Arizona v. New Mexico by denying Arizona 
leave to file a bill challenging the assessment of a tax on Arizona 
electricity generating utilities located in New Mexico.193  Justice 
Stevens concurred on the ground that Arizona did not have 
standing, but noted his disagreement with the extension of 
discretionary denials to exclusive jurisdiction cases.194  When the 
Court summarily denied California leave to file a bill of complaint 
against West Virginia for breach of a contract between state 
universities to play a football game, Justice Stevens, in dissent, 
reiterated his view that Justice Harlan’s reasoning in Ohio v. 
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. is inapplicable to exclusive original 
jurisdiction cases.195  Soon after he joined the Court, Justice 
Thomas indicated Justice Stevens may have had the better 
view.196 
In exercising its discretion, the Court examines a motion for 
leave to file to determine whether the controversy is appropriate 
for the Court’s original jurisdiction.197  Thus, in Maryland v. 
Louisiana the Court held that a challenge by nineteen states 
against the imposition of a first-use tax on natural gas imported 
into Louisiana from the outer continental shelf was 
appropriate.198  And eleven years later in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 
 
 193. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797-98 (1976) (per curiam) (“We . . . 
are not unmindful of Mr. Justice Harlan’s cautionary advice in Ohio v. 
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. . . .”). 
 194. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 798-99 (1976) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 195. California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027-28 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 196. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 474 n.* (1992). 
 197. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76–77 (1992) (“Determining 
whether a case is ‘appropriate’ for our original jurisdiction involves an 
examination of two factors. First, we look to ‘the nature of the interest of the 
complaining State,’ focusing on the ‘seriousness and dignity of the claim[.]’  ‘The 
model case for invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is a dispute 
between States of such seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the 
States were fully sovereign.’  Second, we explore the availability of an 
alternative forum in which the issue tendered can be resolved.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 198. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 739–44 (1981).  Justice Rehnquist 
dissented and argued that the case was inappropriate due to the nature of the 
interest involved and the availability of other forums.  Id. at 760–71 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
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the Court held the exercise of its original jurisdiction appropriate 
to hear a challenge to an Oklahoma statute requiring coal-fired 
electricity generating plants use a mixture of ten percent 
Oklahoma coal that Wyoming alleged reduced its severance tax 
receipts by lessening demand for Wyoming coal.199 
d. Congressional Control of State Controversy 
Jurisdiction 
Does Congress have the power to limit the Court’s 
jurisdiction over state controversies?  Probably not.  There is a 
significant distinction between the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court and other federal courts.200  And the Court has forcefully 
suggested, but not yet held, that Congress may not limit the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.201 
 
 199. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 450–54 (1992).  While Justice 
Thomas noted that perhaps discretion should not be exercised at all, assuming 
the existence of discretion he urged the Court to deny leave to file in cases in 
which the complainant state’s injury is based on its status as tax collector and is 
wholly derivative of the injuries of private parties.  Id. at 475–77 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Thomas indicated a concern that the result of the Court’s 
grant of leave would be a flood of litigation.  But the feared flood of tax-collector 
status challenges under the Commerce Clause have not materialized. See 
generally, McKusick, supra note 5, at 199.  This suggests that the states are not 
so easily moved to litigation as the private bar.  It supports the view that the 
limited number of potential plaintiffs and defendants, constraints on state 
resources, and perhaps some reluctance by states to willingly subject themselves 
even as plaintiffs to the Court’s jurisdiction and remedial powers ensures that 
what might otherwise be a flood is in practice only a trickle.  This evident reality 
suggests the Court may not need to exercise discretion over its exclusive original 
jurisdiction because the states already exercise significant discretion in deciding 
which controversies are worth submitting to the Court. For more on discretion 
and concerns over floodgates.  See McKusick, supra note 5. 
 200. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (“Only the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. 
Every other court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction 
wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict 
such jurisdiction at its discretion . . . .”). 
 201. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 64–66 (1979). 
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B. Remedial Power to Resolve Controversies Between 
States 
The Court has extensive remedial powers to resolve 
controversies between states.  These powers are proportional to 
the significant strictures the Constitution places on the states 
limiting their ability to treat with other states in order to resolve 
disputes: 
If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must 
admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that 
failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war 
having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be 
expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of 
providing a remedy, and that remedy, we think, is found in the 
constitutional provisions we are considering.202 
The Court resolutely confirmed the existence of its remedial 
powers in 1918 in Virginia v. West Virginia.203 And the Court 
 
 202. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); see also Virginia v. West 
Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 599–600 (1918) (“Throwing this light upon the 
constitutional provisions, the conferring on this court of original jurisdiction 
over controversies between states, the taking away of all authority as to war and 
armies from the states and granting it to Congress, the prohibiting the states 
also from making agreements or compacts with each other without the consent 
of Congress, at once makes clear how completely the past infirmities of power 
were in mind and were provided against. This result stands out in the boldest 
possible relief when it is borne in mind that not a want of authority in Congress 
to decide controversies between states, but the absence of power in Congress to 
enforce as against the governments of the states its decisions on such subjects, 
was the evil that cried aloud for cure, since it must be patent that the provisions 
written into the Constitution, the power which was conferred upon Congress 
and the judicial power as to states created, joined with the prohibitions placed 
upon the states, all combined to unite the authority to decide with the power to 
enforce—a unison which could only have arisen from contemplating the dangers 
of the past and the unalterable purpose to prevent their recurrence in the future 
. . . . The state, then, as a governmental entity, having been subjected by the 
Constitution to the judicial power under the conditions stated, and the duty to 
enforce the judgment by resort to appropriate remedies being certain even 
although their exertion may operate upon the governmental powers of the state . 
. .”). 
 203. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 591 (1918) (“That judicial power 
essentially involves the right to enforce the results of its exertion is elementary . 
. . . And that this applies to the exertion of such power in controversies between 
states as the result of the exercise of original jurisdiction conferred upon this 
court by the Constitution is therefore certain.”). 
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reaffirmed the broad scope of these powers in 1987 in Texas v. 
New Mexico.204  Aside from these cases, the Court has said little 
regarding the scope of its remedial powers, but its orders speak 
volumes.  This section gleans the constitutional scope of the 
Court’s remedial powers to resolve state controversies by 
examining the history of their exercise. 
a. Relief Afforded 
To date, the Court has exercised its remedial power to issue 
injunctions, issue money judgments, award costs to prevailing 
states, award prejudgment interest, order state action, appoint 
enforcement officers, and even order foreclosure on state 
property.  The Court has also held it has authority to issue writs 
of execution and hold states in contempt. 
The court frequently issues injunctions binding upon 
states.205  These injunctions typically also bind the officers, 
agents, and citizens of the state from engaging in the proscribed 
conduct, and at least once to its attorneys.206  The Court has 
 
 204. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128, 130–31 (1987) (“By ratifying the 
Constitution, the States gave this Court complete judicial power to adjudicate 
disputes among them, . . . and this power includes the capacity to provide one 
State a remedy for the breach of another . . . . The Court has recognized the 
propriety of money judgments against a State in an original action, South 
Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904); United States v. Michigan, 190 
U. S. 379 (1903); and specifically in a case involving a compact, Virginia v. West 
Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918). In proper original actions, the Eleventh 
Amendment is no barrier, for by its terms, it applies only to suits by citizens 
against a State. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 745, n. 21 (1981); United 
States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 
[192 U.S. 286]. That there may be difficulties in enforcing judgments against 
States counsels caution but does not undermine our authority to enter 
judgments against defendant States in cases over which the Court has 
undoubted jurisdiction, authority that is attested to by the fact that almost 
invariably the ‘States against which judgments were rendered, conformably to 
their duty under the Constitution, voluntarily respected and gave effect to the 
same.’ Virginia v. West Virginia, [246 U.S.] at 592.”). 
 205. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi (1906); Wyoming v. Colorado (1917); 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1919); Oklahoma v. Texas (1920); Texas v. New 
Mexico (1923); Wisconsin v. Illinois (1926); Maryland v. Louisiana (1979); New 
Jersey v. New York (1997); Virginia v. Maryland (2003). 
 206. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1906) (“Mississippi, its 
officers, agents and citizens”); Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372, 375 (1920) 
(“Texas, and . . . Oklahoma, and their respective officers, agents and employees, 
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enjoined states from disputing or asserting sovereignty over 
territory,207 and has done the same with respect to ownership of 
land.208  In one territory dispute, the Court enjoined a state from 
any purported disposition of oil rights or authorization of 
exploitation in an area the Court adjudged to lie within New 
Mexico.209  In another case, the Court enjoined the enforcement of 
the conditions on construction and water appropriation 
permits.210  The Court has enjoined enforcement of state laws and 
the collection of state taxes.211  After interpreting a compact, the 
 
and all persons now in possession of any of the said lands or claiming any right, 
title or interest therein”); Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372 (1920) (“Texas, her 
officers and agents”); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 624 (1923) 
(“the defendant State, and her several officers, agents and servants”); Maryland 
v. Louisiana, 452 U.S. 456, 457 (1981) (“Louisiana, its officers, agents, and 
employees”); Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 135 (1987) (“New Mexico, its 
officers, attorneys, agents, and employees”). But see New Jersey v. New York, 
526 U.S. 589 (1999) (“New York”); Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 79–80 
(2003) (“Maryland”). 
 207. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 58 (1906) (“It is further 
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that . . . Mississippi, its officers, agents, and 
citizens, be and they are hereby enjoined and restrained from disputing the 
sovereignty . . . of . . . Louisiana in the land and water territory south and west 
of said boundary line as laid down on the foregoing map.”); New Jersey v. New 
York, 526 U.S. 589 (1999) (“New York is enjoined from enforcing her laws or 
asserting sovereignty over the portions of Ellis Island that lie within . . . . New 
Jersey’s sovereign boundary . . . .”). 
 208. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 58 (1906) (“It is further 
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that . . . Mississippi, its officers, agents and 
citizens, be and they are hereby enjoined and restrained from disputing the . . . 
ownership of . . . Louisiana in the land and water territory south and west of 
said boundary line as laid down on the foregoing map.”). 
 209. Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372 (1920) (“Texas, her officers and agents, 
are hereby enjoined from selling any purported rights or making or issuing any 
grants, licenses or permits to any person, corporation or association covering or 
affecting any lands, or any part of the bed of Red river, lying north of the line of 
the south bank of such river as said south bank existed at the date of the 
ratification of the Treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain, that is to 
say, on the twenty-second day of February, 1821, and between the One 
Hundredth degree of West Longitude and the southeastern corner of the state of 
Oklahoma.”). 
 210. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 79–80 (2003) (“Any conditions 
attached to the construction/water appropriation permit granted by Maryland to 
the Fairfax County Water Authority . . . are null and void and . . . Maryland is 
enjoined from enforcing them.”). 
 211. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 624 (1923) (“[T]he 
defendant state, and her several officers, agents and servants, are hereby 
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Court has issued an injunction ordering compliance with the 
compact according to specific performance standards determined 
and set by the Court.212  The Court has issued complex 
injunctions in water appropriation cases that require significant 
state regulation of water consumption.213  When the Court issues 
injunctions against states apportioning resources or setting other 
limits, these injunctions bind the political subdivisions of the 
state and the state citizenry.214 
 
severally enjoined from enforcing, or attempting to enforce, that act . . . .”); 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 452 U.S. 456, 457 (1981) (“Louisiana, its officers, agents, 
and employees are permanently enjoined and prohibited from collecting the 
Louisiana First Use Tax.”). 
 212. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 135 (1987) (“It is Ordered, Adjudged, 
and Decreed that the State of New Mexico, its officers, attorneys, agents, and 
employees are hereby enjoined . . . [t]o comply with the Article III(a) obligation 
of the Pecos River Compact by delivering to Texas at state line each year an 
amount of water calculated in accordance with the inflow-outflow equation . . . 
[and t]o calculate the Index Inflow component of the inflow-outflow and channel-
loss equations . . . .”). 
 213. Wyoming v. Colorado, 260 U.S. 1 (1922) (“It is considered, ordered and 
decreed that the defendants, their officers, agents and servants, be, and they are 
hereby, severally enjoined from diverting or taking from the Laramie River and 
its tributaries in the state of Colorado more than fifteen thousand five hundred 
(15,500) acre-feet of water per annum in virtue of or through what is designated 
in the pleadings and evidence as the Laramie-Poudre Tunnel appropriation in 
that state . . . .”); Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 586 (1936); Nebraska v. 
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 665, 665-66 (1945) (“Colorado, its officers, attorneys, agents 
and employees, be and they are hereby severally enjoined . . . [f]rom diverting or 
permitting the diversion of water from the North Platte River and its tributaries 
for the irrigation of more than a total of 135,000 acres of land . . . ; [f]rom storing 
or permitting the storage of more than a total amount of 17,000 acre feet of 
water for irrigation purposes . . . ; [f]rom exporting . . . to any other stream basin 
or basins more than 60,000 acre feet of water in any period of ten consecutive 
years . .  . Wyoming, its officers, attorneys, agents and employees, be and they 
are hereby severally enjoined . . . [f]rom diverting or permitting the diversion of 
water . . . for the irrigation of more than a total of 168,000 acres of land in 
Wyoming during any one irrigation season [;] . . . [f]rom storing or permitting 
the storage of more than a total amount of 18,000 acre feet of water for 
irrigation purposes. . . .”); Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 99 (2009). 
 214. Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 506-07 (1932); see Oklahoma v. 
Texas, 252 U.S. 372, 375 (1920) (“The defendant, . . . Texas, and the 
complainant, . . . Oklahoma, and their respective officers, agents and employees, 
and all persons now in possession of any of the said lands or claiming any right, 
title or interest therein, are . . . enjoined until the further order of this court 
from removing any of the property hereinbefore described from said lands and 
from conducting any oil or gas mining operations thereon save under the 
direction and supervision of the receiver and from interfering with the 
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The Court frequently orders states to pay the costs of 
prevailing states.215  And the Court has issued money judgments 
in four controversies.216  The Court ordered North Carolina to pay 
South Dakota $27,400 due on repudiated bonds owned by South 
Dakota.217  The Court ordered West Virginia to pay Virginia 
“$12,393,929.50, with interest” from the date of judgment as owed 
under a compact settling West Virginia’s portion of Virginia’s 
debt at the time of secession.218  The Court ordered New Mexico 
to pay Texas $14,000,000 as damages for breach of the Pecos 
River Compact.219  And the Court ordered Colorado to pay 
 
possession, control or operations of the receiver.”); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 
696 (1930) (injunction against Illinois and Chicago withdrawing water from 
Lake Michigan beyond gradually decreasing limits). 
 215. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 496, 497 (1922) (“And it is also 
considered, ordered and decreed that the state of Wyoming do have and recover 
from the defendants her lawful costs herein.”), modified by Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 260 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1922) (“the costs of this suit be apportioned among 
and paid by the parties thereto as follows: The State of Wyoming one-third, the 
State of Colorado one-third, and the two corporate defendants jointly one-
third.”); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 583, 586 (1924) (awarding costs to 
Minnesota); Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 96 (1926) (“[S]ince no 
public boundary or public ownership was involved, costs are awarded against 
the complainant.”);  Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179, 200 (1930) (“We see no 
reason why costs should not be paid by the defendants, who have made this suit 
necessary by persisting in unjustifiable acts.”); Michigan v. Ohio, 410 U.S. 420, 
421 (1973) (“The costs of this suit, including the expenses of the Special Master, 
shall be borne by . . . Michigan.”); Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 103–04 
(2009) (“Costs through January 31, 2006, including reallocation of Kansas’ share 
of the Special Master’s fees and expenses, are awarded to Kansas in the amount 
of $1,109,946.73. These costs were paid in full on June 29, 2006.”). 
 216. South Dakota v. North Carolina (1904); Virginia v. West Virginia (1907); 
Texas v. New Mexico (1975); Kansas v. Colorado (1986). 
 217. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904) (“A decree will, 
therefore, be entered, which, after finding the amount due on the bonds and 
coupons in suit to be twenty-seven thousand four hundred dollars ($27,400) . . . 
no interest being recoverable . . . , shall order that the said State of North 
Carolina pay said amount with costs of suit to . . .  South Dakota . . . .”). 
 218. Virginia v. West Virginia, 238 U.S. 202, 242 (1915) (“It is therefore now 
here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this Court that the complainant, 
Commonwealth of Virginia, recover of and from the defendant, State of West 
Virginia, the sum of $12,393,929.50, with interest thereon from July 1, 1915, 
until paid, at the rate of five per cent per annum.”); 
 219. Texas v. New Mexico, 494 U.S. 111, 111 (1990) (“New Mexico shall pay 
Texas $14 million . . . . by delivering a check or draft in that amount made 
payable to . . . Texas or transferring that amount to . . . Texas by electronic wire 
transfer.”). 
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Kansas “$34,615,146.00 for damages and prejudgment interest” 
for violating the Arkansas River Compact.220 
The Court frequently issues orders under its remedial power 
that require states to take action.  The Court ordered states and 
citizens to surrender possession of property to a receiver pending 
determination of a territorial controversy.221  The Court ordered 
states to keep records and permit other states to inspect those 
records.222  The Court ordered specific performance of a contract 
between states to build an interstate bridge.223  And the Court 
ordered a state to provide an accounting of taxes 
unconstitutionally collected to complainant states and to refund 
the taxes.224 
The Court has also required extensive state actions to 
effectuate the Court’s apportionments of interstate resources.225  
In one typical case, the Court not only enjoined the state from 
withdrawing water but enjoined the state from permitting 
appropriations for irrigation beyond set thresholds, thereby 
requiring that the state implement a permitting regime to limit 
private appropriation.226  Further, the Court ordered the states to 
 
 220. Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 103 (2009) (“Judgment is awarded in the 
amount of $34,615,146.00 for damages and prejudgment interest, including the 
required adjustment for inflation, arising from depletions of usable streamflow 
of the Arkansas River at the Colorado-Kansas Stateline in the amount of 
428,005 acre-feet of water during the period 1950-1996. The damages were paid 
in full on April 29, 2005.”). 
 221. Oklahoma v. Texas, 252 U.S. 372, 375 (1920). 
 222. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 656 (1945); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 
325 U.S. 665, 670 (1945) (“Wyoming and . . . Colorado be and they hereby are 
each required to prepare and maintain complete and accurate records of the 
total area of land irrigated and the storage and exportation of the water of the 
North Platte River and its tributaries within those portions of their respective 
jurisdictions . . . and such records shall be available for inspection at all 
reasonable times . . . .”). 
 223. Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 700, 701-02 (1930). 
 224. Maryland v. Louisiana, 452 U.S. 456 (1981). 
 225. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (“We have invoked 
equitable apportionment not only to require the reasonably efficient use of 
water, but also to impose on States an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps 
to conserve and augment the water supply of an interstate stream.”) (relying on 
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922)). 
 226. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 665, 665–66 (1945) (“Colorado, its 
officers, attorneys, agents and employees, be and they are hereby severally 
enjoined . . . [f]rom diverting or permitting the diversion of water from the North 
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construct, at their mutual convenience, “gauging stations and 
measuring devices” near the state line as necessary to effectuate 
an apportionment decree.227  The Court has the authority to 
appoint masters to supervise states, and also to independently 
make the calculations required under its complex apportionment 
decrees.228  And in another instance, significantly touching on 
state sovereignty, Wyoming requested that the Court order 
Colorado to permit Wyoming to “install measuring devices at the 
places of diversion” of a river in Colorado.229  The Court indicated 
it had power to issue such an order but exercised its discretion 
not to issue the order unless it proved necessary to do so.230 
The Court has similarly extensive power to require states to 
take specific steps to reduce activities interfering with the 
enjoyment of environmental resources by other states, though the 
Court prefers to issue orders setting required levels and leaving 
the details to the diligence of the states.231  Dilly-dallying by a 
 
Platte River and its tributaries for the irrigation of more than a total of 135,000 
acres of land . . . ; [f]rom storing or permitting the storage of more than a total 
amount of 17,000 acre feet of water for irrigation purposes . . . ; [f]rom exporting 
. . . to any other stream basin or basins more than 60,000 acre feet of water in 
any period of ten consecutive years . . . Wyoming, its officers, attorneys, agents 
and employees, be and they are hereby severally enjoined . . . [f]rom diverting or 
permitting the diversion of water . . . for the irrigation of more than a total of 
168,000 acres of land in Wyoming during any one irrigation season [;] . . . [f]rom 
storing or permitting the storage of more than a total amount of 18,000 acre feet 
of water for irrigation purposes . . . .”). 
 227. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 665, 669 (1945) (“Such additional 
gauging stations and measuring devices at or near the Wyoming-Nebraska state 
line, if any, as may be necessary for making any apportionment herein decreed, 
shall be constructed and maintained at the joint and equal expense of Wyoming 
and Nebraska to the extent that the costs thereof are not paid by others . . . .”). 
 228. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 134 (1987). 
 229. Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 585 (1936). 
 230. Id. at 585–86. 
 231. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395, 406 (1933) (“The Court did not 
exhaust its power by the provisions enjoining the diversion according to the 
times and amounts prescribed. The Court omitted further specific requirements, 
not because of want of power, but in the expectation that the diligence of 
defendants in carrying out the program they had submitted to the Court would 
give no occasion for such specifications. In deciding this controversy between 
States, the authority of the Court to enjoin the continued perpetration of the 
wrong inflicted upon complainants, necessarily embraces the authority to 
require measures to be taken to end conditions, within the control of defendant 
State, which may stand in the way of the execution of the decree.”). 
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state in meeting its remedial obligations has led to stern 
injunctive rebuke by the Court leaving no doubt of the Court’s 
extensive authority under its remedial powers to order states to 
raise, appropriate, and spend funds to construct the required 
facilities.232 
The Court has indicated it has the authority to find states in 
contempt, but has never done so, in part because no state has 
ever persisted in failing to comply with the Court’s orders.233  
Neither has the Court had to issue writs of execution.  But in one 
case, this seems to have been avoided by deft work on the part of 
the Court. 
To avoid the prospect of issuing a writ of execution against 
North Carolina to compel it to pay South Dakota amounts owed 
on repudiated civil war bonds, the Court issued a money 
judgment and directed the Marshal of the Court to foreclose on 
intangible property owned by the state that secured the bond 
obligation if the judgment was not paid by a specified date.234  As 
 
 232. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395, 411 (1933) (“[T]he State of Illinois is 
hereby required to take all necessary steps, including whatever authorizations 
or requirements, or provisions for the raising, appropriation and application of 
moneys, may be needed in order to cause and secure the completion of adequate 
sewage treatment or sewage disposal plants and sewers, together with 
controlling works to prevent reversals of the Chicago River, if such works are 
necessary, and all other incidental facilities, for the disposition of the sewage of 
the area embraced within the Sanitary District of Chicago so as to preclude any 
ground of objection on the part of the State or of any of its municipalities to the 
reduction of the diversion of the waters of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system 
or watershed to the extent, and at the times and in the manner, provided in this 
decree.”). 
 233. Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572, 581-82 (1940) (considering but 
denying petition to find Colorado in contempt of Court’s decree on the merits 
because of potential for misunderstanding and uncertainty but noting there 
would be “no ground for any possible misapprehension” going forward). 
 234. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904) (“A decree will, 
therefore, be entered, which, after finding the amount due on the bonds and 
coupons in suit to be twenty-seven thousand four hundred dollars ($27,400), (no 
interest being recoverable . . . ), and that the same are secured by one hundred 
shares of the stock of the North Carolina Railroad Company, belonging to the 
State of North Carolina, shall order that the said State of North Carolina pay 
said amount with costs of suit to the State of South Dakota on or before the 1st 
Monday of January, 1905, and that in default of such payment an order of sale 
be issued to the marshal of this court, directing him to sell at public auction all 
the interest of the State of North Carolina in and to one hundred shares of the 
capital stock of the North Carolina Railroad Company, such sale to be made at 
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North Carolina had never actually reduced the intangible 
property to paper certificates, no physical force or possession was 
required.  The Marshal would simply auction the stock and the 
winner of the auction could then print certificates.  Two points 
are worth noting about this incident.  First, this indicates that 
the Marshal of the Supreme Court is the Sheriff of the United 
States.  Second, the order unintentionally set up a humorous 
clash between the Court and the other branches.  A federal law 
prohibited peddling from the steps of the Capitol and thus the 
Court issued an order that would require the Marshal to violate a 
federal law.  Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately depending on 
one’s perspective, the issue never came to a head as North 
Carolina simply paid the amount owed to South Dakota.235 
b. The Remedial Power to Commandeer 
The foregoing demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s 
remedial power to resolve “controversies between two or more 
states” is not circumscribed by the Tenth Amendment and is 
therefore distinct from Congress’s enumerated powers that are 
circumscribed by the Tenth Amendment unless the controversy 
arises out of a compact. 
The Court held in New York v. United States and in Printz v. 
United States that the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of power to 
the states (or alternatively, limits on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause) prohibits Congress from issuing commands to state 
legislatures and executives.236  The second clause of the Tenth 
 
the east front door of the Capitol building in this city, public notice to be given of 
such sale by advertisements once a week for six weeks in some daily paper 
published in the city of Raleigh, North Carolina, and also in some daily paper 
published in the city of Washington.”); Repudiated Bonds Made Good, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1904. 
 235. Robert G. Caldwell, The Settlement of Inter-State Disputes, 14 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 38, 62 (1920). 
 236. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149, 176-77, 180 (1992) (“We 
conclude that while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to 
encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste 
generated within their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress 
the ability to simply compel the States to do so. . . . While the Framers no doubt 
endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate commerce in order to 
avoid further instances of the interstate trade disputes that were common under 
64http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/2
CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM 
2014] CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES 169 
 
Amendment provides support for the view that this reservation 
does not apply to the Supreme Court: “[t]he powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”237  
The Constitution specifically makes states subject to the Court’s 
power to resolve “controversies between two or more states.”  
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York v. United States notes that 
the Supremacy Clause limits the applicability of the Tenth 
Amendment reservation to federal statutes enforceable in state 
courts and that the provisions of Article III enable the federal 
courts to order state officials to comply with federal law.238  The 
Court’s decision did not explicitly address the remedial power of 
the Court to resolve controversies between states as distinct from 
the other provisions of Article III, but it is a subset of the judicial 
power granted by Article III that is discussed.  Moreover, the 
United States specifically argued that Congress had power to 
resolve controversies between states by issuing commands to 
state legislatures and pointed to the Court’s remedial power to 
issue commands to states in resolving controversies between 
states, an argument Justice O’Connor sets out in the opinion and 
rejects without explicitly drawing the crucial distinction between 
the Court’s remedial power and Congress’s power.239  Justice 
 
the Articles of Confederation, the Framers did not intend that Congress should 
exercise that power through the mechanism of mandating state regulation.”). 
 237. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added). 
 238. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 178–79 (“Federal statutes 
enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but 
this sort of federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text of the 
Supremacy Clause. No comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress 
to command state legislatures to legislate. Additional cases . . . discuss the 
power of federal courts to order state officials to comply with federal law. See . . . 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 407 U.S. 91, 106–108 (1972) . . . . Again, however, 
the text of the Constitution plainly confers this authority on the federal courts, 
the ‘judicial Power’ of which ‘shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States . . . ; [and] 
to Controversies between two or more States; [and] between a State and 
Citizens of another State.’ U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2. The Constitution contains 
no analogous grant of authority to Congress. Moreover, the Supremacy Clause 
makes federal law paramount over the contrary positions of state officials; the 
power of federal courts to enforce federal law thus presupposes some authority 
to order state officials to comply.”). 
 239. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 179-80 (“[T]he United States . . . 
argues that the Constitution envisions a role for Congress as an arbiter of 
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Stevens in dissent however does note that the decision creates a 
distinction between the Court’s undoubted remedial power and 
Congress’s power, though he argues that because the Court has 
the power so too must Congress.240  No Justice in New York v. 
United States or Printz v. United States ever even intimates that 
the Court’s remedial powers are limited by the Tenth 
Amendment, for to do so would be to discount numerous remedial 
 
interstate disputes.  The United States observes that federal courts, and this 
Court in particular, have frequently resolved conflicts among States.  See, e.g., 
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 
(1992). Many of these disputes have involved the allocation of shared resources 
among the States, a category perhaps broad enough to encompass the allocation 
of scarce disposal space for radioactive waste.  See, e. g., Colorado v. New 
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).  The 
United States suggests that if the Court may resolve such interstate disputes, 
Congress can surely do the same under the Commerce Clause. . . . While the 
Framers no doubt endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate 
commerce in order to avoid further instances of the interstate trade disputes 
that were common under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers did not 
intend that Congress should exercise that power through the mechanism of 
mandating state regulation.”). 
 240. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 211 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The notion that Congress does not 
have the power to issue ‘a simple command to state governments to implement 
legislation enacted by Congress’, ante, at 2428, is incorrect and unsound. There 
is no such limitation in the Constitution. . . . The Constitution gives this Court 
the power to resolve controversies between the States. Long before Congress 
enacted pollution control legislation, this Court crafted a body of ‘interstate 
common law,’ Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 (1972), to govern 
disputes between States involving interstate waters.  
See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1992).  In such contexts, we 
have not hesitated to direct States to undertake specific actions.  For example, 
we have ‘impose[d] on States an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to 
conserve and augment the water supply of an interstate 
stream.”  Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) 
(citing Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922)).  Thus, we unquestionably 
have the power to command an upstream state that is polluting the waters of a 
downstream State to adopt appropriate regulations to implement a federal 
statutory command.  With respect to the problem presented by the case at hand, 
if litigation should develop between States that have joined a compact, we would 
surely have the power to grant relief in the form of specific enforcement of the 
take title provision.  Indeed, even if the statute had never been passed, if one 
State’s radioactive waste created a nuisance that harmed its neighbors, it seems 
clear that we would have had the power to command the offending State to take 
remedial action. Cf. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee. . . . If this Court has such 
authority, surely Congress has similar authority.”). 
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precedents set out above in which the Court issued commands to 
states. 
However, New York v. United States and Printz v. United 
States do omit one important exception to the Tenth Amendment’s 
prohibition on issuing commands to state legislatures and 
executives.  As discussed in Part I, the Court in Virginia v. West 
Virginia held in no uncertain terms that Congress’s power to issue 
commands to states to enforce compacts is plenary.241  Thus, the 
effect of the Tenth Amendment is to limit congressional power to 
issue commands to state legislatures and executives only in the 
absence of a compact and does not in any way circumscribe the 
Court’s authority to do so under its remedial powers over 
controversies between two or more states. 
c. Congressional Control of the Court’s Remediation 
Power 
Judge Iredell, dissenting in Chisholm v. Georgia, suggests 
Congress controls the remedial power of the Court.242  But there 
does not seem to be an instance of Congress doing so.  When 
confronted with the suggestion that the Tax Injunction Act did so, 
the Court “note[d] in passing” that the argument was “lacking in 
merit” because “the Tax Injunction Act, which by its terms only 
applies to injunctions issued by federal district courts . . . is 
inapplicable in original actions.”243  When confronted with the 
suggestion that 28 U.S.C. § 1821 statutorily set the witness fees 
that could be awarded as costs in original jurisdiction cases, the 
Court avoided the issue.244  Chief Justice Roberts however, joined 
by Justice Souter, squarely and succinctly reached the issue in a 
concurring opinion: 
I join the opinion of the Court in full. I do so only, however, 
because the opinion expressly and carefully makes clear that it in 
no way infringes this Court’s authority to decide on its own, in 
original cases, whether there should be witness fees and what 
they should be. 
 
 241. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601-02 (1918). 
 242. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 432 (1793) (Iredell, J.). 
 243. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981). 
 244. Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 102 (2009). 
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 Our appellate jurisdiction is, under the Constitution, subject to 
“such Exceptions, and . . . such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make.” Art. III, § 2. Our original jurisdiction is not. The Framers 
presumably “act[ed] intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion” of these terms. INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 It is accordingly our responsibility to determine matters related 
to our original jurisdiction, including the availability and amount 
of witness fees. For the reasons given by the Court, I agree that 
$40 is a reasonable choice for the fees at issue here.  But the 
choice is ours.245 
As the Court’s interpretation of the state controversy 
provision, in light of its history and the Court’s obligation to 
provide remedies to states wronged by other states in light of 
their surrender of sovereign powers, supports Chief Justice 
Roberts’ position, this Article agrees.246 
C. Rules of Decision in Controversies Between States 
Rules of decision in controversies between states may stem 
from compacts, federal statutes, and federal common law, but not 
all sources of law are equal, and the source of law that controls 
depends on the matter to be decided.  The priority of sources of 
law as rules of decision on a given matter in state controversies is 
a question of federal constitutional law.  There must always be a 
rule of decision in a controversy between states properly brought 
before the Supreme Court for resolution.  The Court “may be 
called on to adjust differences that cannot be dealt with by 
Congress or disposed of by the legislature of either State alone” 
 
 245. Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 109-10 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
 246. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (“If Missouri were an 
independent and sovereign State all must admit that she could seek a remedy 
by negotiation, and, that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to 
make war having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be 
expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy, 
and that remedy, we think, is found in the constitutional provisions we are 
considering . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary 
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 940–41 (1997) (excerpting same language). 
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and in those instances must craft a rule of decision.247  But there 
is no matter that may be brought before the Court that cannot be 
dealt with by Congress and the governments of both states acting 
together to form a compact because no principle of federalism 
restrains the operation of laws formed by the sovereign states 
acting in concert with Congress.  The priority of sources of rules 
of decision on a given matter in state controversies is: 
(1) a compact between the contravening states on any matter; 
(2) a federal statute on a congressionally regulable matter; and 
(3) a federal common law rule in the absence of all of the above. 
Compacts preempt all other rules of decision.  Federal 
statutes on congressionally regulable matters displace federal 
common law.  Federal common law controls unless preempted by 
compact or displaced by a federal statute on a congressionally 
regulable matter.  Below, the terms of the Rule of Decision Act 
are adapted to show this constitutional rule of decision 
framework. 
a. Compacts as Rules of Decision 
Compacts between the several states assented to by Congress, 
except where the Constitution otherwise requires or provides, are 
the rule of decision in controversies between two or more states 
before the Supreme Court, in cases where they apply. 
This principle of constitutional law has never been 
questioned and has always been followed by the Supreme Court, 
and Congress has at no time ever attempted to abrogate its 
application in any case.  The assent of all relevant legislatures 
leaves no room, absent countervailing constitutional provisions, 
for independent judicial determination of the rule of decision 
where the matter is set forth in a compact between the state 
parties to the controversy. 
The agreement of states without the assent of Congress does 
not supply the rule of decision in the Supreme Court in the 
 
 247. Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27 (1911) (citing Missouri v. 
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519-20 (1906); Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 82–84 
(1907)). 
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resolution of controversies between states.  Thus, states that 
enact reciprocal legislation gain no enforcement rights against 
one another before the Court, and their continued compliance is 
purely voluntary.  State agreements do, however, bind 
individuals subject to the powers of the agreeing states without 
congressional assent because the Compact Clause limits only 
agreements enforceable on states in the Supreme Court, not 
concerted action.  The key distinction for constitutional purposes 
is that the states can cease complying with an agreement that 
does not meet the requirements of the Compact Clause at any 
time. 
b. Federal Statutes as Rule of Decision 
The Acts of Congress, except where the Constitution or compacts 
otherwise require or provide, are the rule of decision in 
controversies between two or more states before the Supreme 
Court, in cases where they apply. 
The Acts of Congress alone, without the assent of states, are 
sufficient to displace federal common law in controversies 
between states only as to matters within congressional power as 
circumscribed by the Tenth Amendment, the Revenue Clauses, 
and other provisions of the Constitution.248  That is to say, the 
Acts of Congress displace federal common law as far as they go. 
But the Acts of Congress may only go so far.  And the matters 
involved in state controversies, more than in any other class of 
cases, are frequently outside of the constitutional competence of 
Congress to provide rules of decision without the concurrent 
assent of the states. 
The sole Acts of Congress do have a significant role in 
providing rules of decision for the resolution of state controversies 
in theory.  For example, were states ever to litigate a controversy 
that required a decision as to weights and measures, the Acts of 
Congress would provide a rule of decision.  And likewise, Acts of 
Congress under other constitutional provisions would also 
provide a rule of decision. The dominant such provision is the 
 
 248. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
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Commerce Clause.249  Thus, the Acts of Congress are the rule of 
decision in controversies over the apportionment of any navigable 
waterway of the United States—resources wholly within the 
congressional regulatory ambit since Gibbons v. Ogden.250  
Conversely the sole Acts of Congress are not rules of decision in 
controversies over territory because Congress may not adjust the 
boundaries between the several states without their consent.251  
And so along the Mississippi River there is a curious distinction 
between the applicability of the Acts of Congress as rules of 
decision in controversies between states, depending upon the 
question posed.252  Congress may not alone determine the 
location of the river’s boundary between two states, but may 
decide to dam the river, construct a bridge, or otherwise impact or 
adjust the waterway such that the federal common law 
determination of the border between the states will change 
according to the principles of thalweg, accretion, and avulsion.253 
Another class of controversy to which the sole Acts of 
Congress may supply the rule of decision is commercial activities 
that fall within the domain of the Commerce Clause, as 
augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause.254  Curiously, 
although the Supreme Court has frequently intimated that 
 
 249. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 250. 22 U.S. 1, 22 (1824); see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564–65 
(1963) (“We have concluded . . . that Congress in passing the Project Act 
intended to and did create its own comprehensive scheme for the apportionment 
among California, Arizona, and Nevada of the Lower Basin’s share of the 
mainstream waters of the Colorado River, leaving each State its tributaries . . . . 
[A]pportionment of the Lower Basin waters of the Colorado River is not 
controlled by the doctrine of equitable apportionment . . . . It is true that the 
Court has used the doctrine of equitable apportionment to decide river 
controversies between States. But in those cases Congress had not made any 
statutory apportionment. In this case, we have decided that Congress has 
provided its own method for allocating among the Lower Basin States the 
mainstream water to which they are entitled under the Compact. Where 
Congress has so exercised its constitutional power over waters, courts have no 
power to substitute their own notions of an ‘equitable apportionment’ for the 
apportionment chosen by Congress.”). 
 251. See generally, Poole v. Fleeger’s Lessee, 36 U.S. 185, 191 (1837). 
 252. See e.g., Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1 (1893), Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 
208 (1901); Arkansas v. Mississippi, 250 U.S. 39 (1919); Lousiana v. Mississippi, 
384 U.S. 24. (1966). 
 253. See e.g., Arizona v. California, 282 U.S. 795 (1930). 
 254. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Congress should supply the rule of decision in certain such 
controversies between states, in no commercial state controversy 
resolved by the Court has it found a ready-made rule of decision 
supplied by a sole Act of Congress.  The exemplar of this 
circumstance is the Court’s determination of escheat rights 
amongst the states in unconsummated interstate transactions.255 
There are undoubtedly some areas of decision that 
themselves fall outside of the enumerated powers of Congress.  To 
date, the Court has consistently assumed, without deciding, that 
Congress cannot regulate the nonnavigable waterways of the 
United States under its enumerated powers.  And in the last two 
decades the Court has held that the sole Acts of Congress may not 
regulate the possession of guns in schools, violence against 
women, or inaction.  There have been six state controversies over 
nonnavigable waterways.256  But Congress has never attempted 
to provide a rule of decision through a sole Act of Congress in any 
of these cases, and so the Court has not yet had occasion to 
declare the non-displacement of federal common law of 
apportionment of interstate waterways that are nonnavigable.  
But the Court’s consistent designation in every waterway case as 
either navigable or nonnavigable, and the Court’s holding of 
displacement in Arizona v. California, strongly suggest that the 
over 100 years of apportionment precedent indicate the Court’s 
view of the significance of the regulability of the subject matter by 
sole Acts of Congress in determining whether or not federal 
common law is displaced.257 
 
 255. See Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 510 (1993) (“If the States are 
dissatisfied with the outcome of a particular case, they may air their grievances 
before Congress. That body may reallocate abandoned property among the 
States without regard to this Court’s interstate escheat rules. Congress overrode 
Pennsylvania by passing a specific statute concerning abandoned money orders 
and traveler’s checks . . . and it may ultimately settle this dispute through 
similar legislation.”); see generally Texas v. New Jersey (1965); Pennsylvania v. 
New York (1972). 
 256. See appendix infra. 
 257. Arizona v. California, 282 U.S. 795 (1930). 
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c. Federal Common Law as Rule of Decision 
The federal common law, except where the Constitution, compacts, 
or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, is the rule of 
decision in controversies between two or more states before the 
Supreme Court. 
Federal common law provides the rule of decision in 
controversies between states as to those matters in which it is not 
preempted by compact or displaced by Acts of Congress.  That is, 
when all else fails, the Court determines the appropriate rule.  
The Court has never doubted its residual power to determine 
rules of decision in state controversies.258 
When the Court is called upon to determine a rule of decision 
in a controversy between states, it applies an equal dignity 
principle, and over time, the Court’s application to specific cases 
has generated a body of federal common law for state 
controversies.  The Court succinctly explained this principle and 
this process of common law adjudication in Kansas v. Colorado: 
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to 
each other, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the 
same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on 
no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to none. 
Yet, whenever, as in the case of Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 
the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural 
laws into the territory of another State, the question of the extent 
and the limitations of the rights of the two States becomes a 
matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this court is 
called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize 
the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice 
between them. In other words, through these successive disputes 
 
 258. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) (“Nor is our jurisdiction 
ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado are States sovereign and 
independent in local matters, the relations between them depend in any respect 
upon principles of international law. International law is no alien in this 
tribunal.”). Warren reports that Daniel Webster argued in Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts that the Rules of Decision Act applied to state controversies, but 
the court evidently disagreed. WARREN, supra note 5, at 40-41. 
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and decisions this court is practically building up what may not 
improperly be called interstate common law.259 
While this process is not wholly unlike ordinary common law, 
there are differences stemming from the nature both of the 
controversies and the parties.260  Federal common law in state 
controversies is not limited to the consideration of evaluating 
quasi-tortious state action.  For example, the federal common law 
frequently provides rules of decision in territorial controversies.  
And the Court also has been forced by congressional inaction to 
fashion rules for the priority of escheat claims by the states to 
abandoned property.261 
In fashioning federal common law rules of decision in state 
controversies, the Court looks to many sources of law for 
inspiration.  The Court has repeatedly looked to principles of 
international law in the determination of state boundaries.262  
 
 259. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907). 
 260. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (“We are met at the 
outset by the question what rule is to be applied. It is established that a more 
liberal answer may be given than in a controversy between neighbors members 
of a single State . . . . Different considerations come in when we are dealing with 
independent sovereigns having to regard the welfare of the whole population 
and when the alternative to settlement is war.  In a less degree, perhaps, the 
same is true of the quasi-sovereignties bound together in the Union.”). 
 261. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 675, 677 (1965) (“With respect to tangible 
property, real or personal, it has always been the unquestioned rule in all 
jurisdictions that only the State in which the property is located may escheat. 
But intangible property, such as a debt which a person is entitled to collect, is 
not physical matter which can be located on a map. The creditor may live in one 
State, the debtor in another, and matters may be further complicated if, as in 
the case before us, the debtor is a corporation which has connections with many 
States and each creditor is a person who may have had connections with several 
others and whose present address is unknown. Since the States separately are 
without constitutional power to provide a rule to settle this interstate 
controversy and since there is no applicable federal statute, it becomes our 
responsibility in the exercise of our original jurisdiction to adopt a rule which 
will settle the question of which State will be allowed to escheat this intangible 
property.”). 
 262. See, e.g., Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479, 511 (1890) (citing EMMERICH 
DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, Book 2, c. 11, §149); Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 8 
(1893) (applying international law principle of thalweg with general citation to 
“recognized treatises on international law, of modern times”); Virginia v. 
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 524 (1893) (citing HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW part II, c. 4, §164 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., Little 
Brown & Co. 8th ed. 1866)); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 49–53 (1906) 
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(reviewing international law principle of thalweg and applying the rule to 
determine the boundary); Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27 (1911) (“The 
case is to be considered in the untechnical spirit proper for dealing with a quasi-
international controversy . . . .”); Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U.S. 1, 44 
(1910) (citing 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 243 for prescriptive 
acquisition of territory); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 170 (1918) 
(reaffirming thalweg principle); Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295, 308 (1926) 
(citing HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1916); 1 
JOHN MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST, 294 et seq.) (“That rights of the 
character here claimed may be acquired on the one hand and lost on the other 
by open, long-continued and uninterrupted possession of territory, is a doctrine 
not confined to individuals but applicable to sovereign nations as well . . . and, a 
fortiori to the quasi-sovereign states of the Union.”); New Jersey v. Delaware, 
291 U.S. 361, 379 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) (“International law today divides the river 
boundaries between states by the middle of the main channel, when there is 
one, and not by the geographical centre, half way between the banks . . . . The 
Thalweg, or downway, is the track taken by boats in their course down the 
stream, which is that of the strongest current.”) (citing (1 HALLECK, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (4th ed. 1878); 1 MOORE, DIGEST INTERNATIONAL LAW 
617 (1906); 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (1910); ORBAN, ETUDE DE 
DROIT FLUVIAL INTERNATIONAL 343 (1896); KAECKENBECK, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 
176 (1918); HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (1922); FIORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
CODIFIED § 1051 (1918); CALVO, DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1885)); 
id. at 381 (tracing development of Thalweg) (citing 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
§ 137 (1922); 1 NYS, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 425–26; GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC 
PACIS (1631); VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS (1797); ENGELHARDT, DU REGIME 
CONVENTIONNEL DES FLEUVES INTERNATIONAUX 72 (1879); 5 KOCH, HISTOIRE DES 
TRAITES DE PAIX 156 (1838); KAECKENBECK, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 176 (1918); 
ADAMI, NATIONAL FRONTIERS  17 (Behrens trans. 1927)); id. at 383 (discussing 
adjudicatory determination of rules of decision in the absence of treaties and 
conventions) (citing LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 52, 60, 70, 85, 100, 110–11, 255, 404, 432 (1933)); id. at 383–84 
(discussing affect of international law principles that have “only a germinal 
existence”) (citing HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 12, 15–16 (8th ed. 1880); 
LAUTERPACHT at 110, 255; JENKS, THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE 11–12 (1916); 
VINOGRADOFF, CUSTOM AND RIGHT 21 (1925)).  Justice Cardozo in New Jersey v. 
Delaware provides the following excerpt from an international law case in a 
footnote: 
International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain, and 
generally does not contain, express rules decisive of particular cases; 
but the function of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of opposing 
rights and interests by applying, in default of any specific provision 
of law, the corollaries of general principles . . . . This is the method of 
jurisprudence; it is the method by which law has been gradually 
evolved in every country resulting in the definition and settlement of 
legal relations as well between States as between private 
individuals. 
Id. at 416 n.7 (quoting Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph 
Company, Ltd. (Gr. Br.) v. United States, 6 R.I.A.A. 17, 114 (1923)). 
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Recently the Court has extensively consulted state common law 
in applying federal common law to the interpretation of a 
compact.263  In another recent instance, the Court fashioned its 
determination of witness fees in a costs judgment in the same 
manner as Congress provided for in a statute that the Court 
noted did not control.264  And state law is “an important 
consideration” in fashioning federal common law rules of decision 
in equitable apportionment of water between states.265 
As noted above, federal common law is the applicable rule of 
decision unless preempted or displaced.  But as to some matters, 
the sole Acts of Congress are insufficient to supply a rule of 
decision because the matter is beyond congressional powers.  This 
may be because the matter is not within the enumerated powers 
of Congress, as the Court has assumed but not held in 
nonnavigable waters cases, or because the Tenth Amendment, or 
another constitutional limitation on the exercise of its 
enumerated powers, prohibits congressional regulation of the 
matter.  This results in a sort of pre-eminence of federal common 
law as to certain matters over the Acts of Congress, though not 
over compacts, as these always preempt federal common law 
rules of decision.  And this constitutional pre-eminence in certain 
matters has not gone unrecognized by the Court: 
As Congress cannot make compacts between the States, as it 
cannot, in respect to certain matters, by legislation compel their 
separate action, disputes between them must be settled either by 
force or else by appeal to tribunals empowered to determine the 
right and wrong thereof. Force under our system of Government 
is eliminated. The clear language of the Constitution vests in this 
court the power to settle those disputes. We have exercised that 
 
 263. Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2309 (2010) (consulting 
Restatement of Contracts in interpretation of compact).  
 264. Kansas v. Colorado, 556 U.S. 98, 102-03 (2009). 
 265. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (“Equitable 
apportionment is the doctrine of federal common law that governs disputes 
between States concerning their rights to use the water of an interstate stream. 
. . . The laws of the contending States concerning intrastate water disputes are 
an important consideration governing equitable apportionment.”). 
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power in a variety of instances, determining in the several 
instances the justice of the dispute.266 
And in another case, the Court reiterated that the Court “may be 
called on to adjust differences that cannot be dealt with by 
Congress or disposed of by the legislature of either State 
alone.”267 
In these matters, the Court supplies the rule of decision 
unless there is a compact.  There are several areas in which this 
is so.  First, matters must be decided by the court or compacts if 
the subject matter is outside of the enumerated powers of 
Congress, such as nonnavigable rivers.268  Second, matters must 
be decided by the Court or compacts if the resolution of the 
controversy requires the issuance of commands to state 
governments, as commandeering state legislatures and 
executives is beyond the power of Congress.269  Third, matters 
must be decided by the Court or compacts if the adequate 
resolution of the controversy by Congress would require an 
unapportioned requisition from a state’s treasury in violation of 
the Revenue Clauses, though no such case has been brought to 
date. 
In light of this pre-eminence of federal common law over Acts 
of Congress as to certain matters, the Court has adopted and 
 
 266. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907). 
 267. Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27 (1911) (citing Kansas v. Colorado 
II, 206 U.S. 46, 82–84 (1907)). 
 268. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 95-96 (1907) (“Now the question 
arises between two States, one recognizing generally the common law rule of 
riparian rights and the other prescribing the doctrine of the public ownership of 
flowing water. Neither State can legislate for or impose its own policy upon the 
other. A stream flows through the two and a controversy is presented as to the 
flow of that stream. It does not follow, however, that because Congress cannot 
determine the rule which shall control between the two States or because 
neither State can enforce its own policy upon the other, that the controversy 
ceases to be one of a justiciable nature, or that there is no power which can take 
cognizance of the controversy and determine the relative rights of the two 
States. Indeed, the disagreement, coupled with its effect upon a stream passing 
through the two States, makes a matter for investigation and determination by 
this court.”). 
 269. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 240-241 (1901) (“An inspection of 
the bill discloses that the nature of the injury complained of is such that an 
adequate remedy can only be found in this court at the suit of the State of 
Missouri.”). 
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applies a precautionary principle to all state controversy cases.  
This doctrine was first announced by Justice Holmes in Missouri 
v. Illinois.270  Justice Holmes noted concern over the class of cases 
that, 
[do] not fall within the power of Congress to regulate, the result 
of a declaration of rights by this court would be the establishment 
of a rule which would be irrevocable by any power except that of 
this court to reverse its own decision, an amendment of the 
Constitution, or possibly an agreement between the States 
sanctioned by the legislature of the United States.271 
Such cases pose “difficulties in the way of establishing such a 
system of law” that, while they would “not be insuperable, . . . 
would be great and new.”272  Accordingly, the Court adopted the 
requirement that in all state controversy cases “[b]efore this court 
. . . intervene[s] the case should be of serious magnitude, clearly 
and fully proved, and the principle to be applied should be one 
which the court is prepared deliberately to maintain against all 
considerations on the other side.”273 
 
 270. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519-522 (1906). 
 271. Id. at 520; see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary 
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 941 (1997) (“Essentially, Holmes concluded that the 
only possible source of law was the provision of the Constitution granting 
jurisdiction to the Court over such disputes, and the necessity of applying legal 
rules which would not be subject to revision by the legislatures of either state.”). 
 272. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. at 520. 
 273. Id. at 521; see, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) 
(“[W]e come to consider the evidence introduced, but subject to the rule that the 
burden upon the State of New York of sustaining the allegations of its bill is 
much greater than that imposed upon a complainant in an ordinary suit 
between private parties. Before this court can be moved to exercise its 
extraordinary power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one State 
at the suit of another, the threatened invasion of rights must be of serious 
magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” (citing 
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496)); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 312-
13 (1921) (“Considering all of this evidence, and much more which we cannot 
detail, we must conclude that the complainants have failed to show by the 
convincing evidence which the law requires that the sewage which the 
defendants intend to discharge into Upper New York Bay, even if treated only in 
the manner specifically described in the stipulation with the United States 
Government, would so corrupt the water of the Bay as to create a public 
nuisance by causing offensive odors or unsightly deposits on the surface or that 
it would seriously add to the pollution of it.”). 
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Rather than attempting to apply Justice Holmes’s 
precautionary principle to only those classes of cases in which the 
rule announced could not be displaced by the sole Act of Congress, 
the Court seems to apply the principle unless it is absolutely clear 
that the only issue to be decided is one for which Congress can 
displace the Court’s decision.  Thus, in the nonnavigable water 
appropriation cases, the Court has not determined whether 
Congress does or does not have the power to apportion 
nonnavigable waters.  Rather, the Court proceeds as if the Court 
is fashioning law that may only be preempted by compact.  In 
contrast, the Court resolved the three escheat property cases 
without any special precaution because Congress could obviously 
supplant the Court’s decisions (and indeed in one instance did 
so).274 
The Court also adopts another measure of precaution aside 
from that suggested by Justice Holmes.  The Court consistently 
urges states to form compacts to resolve disputes.275  Indeed, one 
gets the sense from the cases that once states began to heed this 
advice the Court has relaxed its application of the precautionary 
principle in reliance on the availability of compact.  This is 
sensible because the Court was uncertain at the time of Missouri 
 
 274. Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 510 (1993); Texas v. New Jersey, 
379 U.S. 674 (1965); Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972) (decision 
overruled by 12 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2503 as discussed in Delaware v. New York, 507 
U.S. 490, at 510). 
 275. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943) (“The reason for 
judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of States in such cases is that, 
while we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they involve the interests of quasi-
sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the 
possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration 
rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may 
appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the 
compact clause of the federal Constitution. We say of this case, as the court has 
said of interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual accommodation 
and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of 
invocation of our adjudicatory power.”); Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.S. 205, 
218 (1909) (“We submit to the States of Washington and Oregon whether it will 
not be wise for them to pursue the same course, and, with the consent of 
Congress, through the aid of commissioners, adjust, as far as possible, the 
present appropriate boundaries between the two States and their respective 
jurisdiction.”). 
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v. Illinois whether compacts preempt federal common law, as 
Justice Holmes noted, and this is now well established. 
VI. AIR POLLUTION CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN 
STATES 
This final Section addresses the prospects of filing an 
interstate air pollution complaint in the Supreme Court for 
resolution under the Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction to 
resolve “controversies between two or more states” similar to a 
case unsuccessfully brought against individual sources by North 
Carolina in North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority.276  No 
controversy between states over air pollution has ever been 
litigated.  Nevertheless, application of the forgoing analysis of the 
Court’s plenary jurisdiction over state controversies demonstrates 
that states may bring air pollution suits against other states and 
that only compacts can displace these interstate actions. 
A. Downwind States May Bring Air Pollution 
Controversy Suits 
Air pollution travels across state boundaries.  Emissions of 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides into the atmosphere in one 
state can lead to acid rain in other states.  Emissions of mercury 
and particulate matter in one state can lead to negative health 
consequences and environmental impacts in other states.  And 
the prevailing winds leave some states more subject to interstate 
air pollution than others, the so-called downwind states, and 
others less subject to interstate air pollution, the so-called upwind 
states.277  The Court has consistently recognized state actions 
seeking protection of environmental resources.278  To date, the 
Court has recognized its jurisdiction over suits seeking judicial 
protection of navigation, land, and water—the protection of air is 
no great leap; however, no state has ever filed a bill of complaint 
against another state for air pollution.  Rather, states have so far 
 
 276. 615 F.3d 291 (2010). 
 277. Robert De C. Ward, The Prevailing Winds of the United States, 6 ANNALS 
ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 99, 103, 106 (1916) (showing several states are 
generally downwind in both summer and winter). 
 278. See supra Part III.B. 
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filed two suits under the Court’s non-exclusive original 
jurisdiction against individual emitters.279 
In the first state suit against individuals under the Court’s 
original jurisdiction, Georgia filed a bill of complaint against the 
Tennessee Copper Company and the Ducktown Sulphur, Copper, 
& Iron Company seeking “to enjoin the defendant copper 
companies from discharging noxious gas from their works in 
Tennessee over the plaintiff’s territory.”280  The Court, per 
Justice Holmes, held Georgia properly stated a claim under 
federal common law because, 
[i]t is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a 
sovereign that the air over its territory should not be 
polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the 
forests on its mountains, be they better or worse, and 
whatever domestic destruction they have suffered, should 
not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons 
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills 
should not be endangered from the same source.281 
On the merits the Court held against the copper companies and 
awarded Georgia injunctive relief.282  In the second suit against 
 
 279. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907) (holding copper 
companies liable for sulphur dioxide emissions); see also Georgia v. Tenn Copper 
Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 678 (1915); 
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 
304 U.S. 546 (1938); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 305 U.S. 565 (1938); 
Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 116 (1972) (discretionary denial 
of leave to file). 
 280. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907). 
 281. Id. at 238. 
 282. Id. at 238–39 (“[T]he defendants generate in their works near the Georgia 
line large quantities of sulphur dioxide which becomes sulphurous acid by its 
mixture with the air. It hardly is denied, and cannot be denied with success, 
that this gas often is carried by the wind great distances and over great tracts of 
Georgia land. On the evidence the pollution of the air and the magnitude of that 
pollution are not open to dispute . . . [W]e are satisfied, by a preponderance of 
evidence, that the sulphurous fumes cause and threaten damage on so 
considerable a scale to the forests and vegetable life, if not to health, within 
[Georgia], as to make out a case within the requirements of Missouri v. Illinois . 
. . .”). 
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individuals, the Court exercised its discretion to deny leave to file 
a bill under the Court’s nonexclusive jurisdiction.283 
The state air pollution plaintiff record is one win on the 
merits and one discretionary denial of leave to file a bill.  The 
outcome in the first suit strongly indicates that a federal common 
law air quality protection suit may be brought under the Court’s 
plenary state controversy jurisdiction.  And as lower courts do not 
have jurisdiction over controversies between states, discretionary 
denial is far less likely in a suit brought by states against states 
than in a suit brought by states against individuals.  The Court 
recently held that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common 
law air quality protection suits brought by states against 
individuals.284  This Article argues below in Part V.B. that this 
holding does not apply to controversies between states and for 
now proceeds on this assumption. 
A recent unsuccessful state law nuisance suit filed by North 
Carolina against the Tennessee Valley Authority in a federal 
district court demonstrates the demand for, and amplifies the 
importance of, the Supreme Court as a forum for the resolution of 
interstate air pollution controversies.285  North Carolina’s suit 
alleged the Tennessee Valley Authority’s emissions of sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and particulate matter from its 
coal plants constituted a public nuisance under state law and 
sought an injunction requiring emissions reductions.286  The 
district court granted an injunction, but the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit reversed on appeal in 2010.  The Fourth 
Circuit held that the Clean Air Act preempts downwind state 
nuisance law and that a defendant’s compliance with permits 
issued under state implementations of the Clean Air Act is a bar 
to claims under source state nuisance law absent a showing of 
negligence.287  The merits of the decision of the Fourth Circuit in 
 
 283. Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. at 116. 
 284. See North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 
2010). 
 285. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 286. Complaint at 1, 4, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 
486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20).  The bill of complaint in Wisconsin v. 
Illinois served as a model for the last two sentences. 
 287. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d at 308-10. 
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this case are beyond the scope of this Article, but its decision—
when combined with the Supreme Court’s holdings that the Clean 
Air Act displaces federal common law suits against individual 
sources—leaves the downwind states in the Fourth Circuit 
without recourse against individual sources of air pollution in 
upwind states apart from federal statutory remedies under the 
Clean Air Act.288  Those remedies are of little use to North 
Carolina and other downwind states that seek greater protection 
from air pollution than the Clean Air Act offers.289 
This Section will briefly outline how to refashion North 
Carolina’s complaint in North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority into a viable bill of complaint against other states 
seeking protection of a downwind state’s air quality from 
interstate pollution.  For North Carolina and other downwind 
states to obtain judicial protection of its air quality from 
interstate pollution under federal common law in the Supreme 
Court, the states must (1) allege great loss or serious injury;290 (2) 
file a bill alleging facts clearly sufficient to call for relief;291 (3) 
demonstrate an Article III, Section 2 controversy between 
states;292 (4) seek relief against and for states, not just 
individuals;293 and (5) prove the claim clearly and fully.294 
 
 288. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. at 497. 
 289. See North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,, 615 F.3d at 307 (“‘North 
Carolina is seeking a Court order requiring TVA to control its emissions to 
levels similar to those required for coal-fired power plants in North Carolina by 
the North Carolina Clean Smokestacks Act on a similar timetable.’” (quoting a 
press release from 2006)). 
 290. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906) (“Before this court ought to 
intervene the case should be of serious magnitude . . . .”); Alabama v. Arizona, 
291 U.S. 286, 291-292 (1934) (“Leave will not be granted unless the threatened 
injury is clearly shown to be of serious magnitude and imminent . . . . The facts 
alleged are not sufficient to warrant a finding that the enforcement of the 
statutes of any defendant would cause Alabama to suffer great loss or any 
serious injury.”). 
 291. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. at 291-292 (1934) (“A State asking leave to 
sue another to prevent the enforcement of laws must allege, in the complaint 
offered for filing, facts that are clearly sufficient to call for a decree in its 
favor.”). 
 292. See supra Part IV.A.a–b. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 521. (1906) (“Before this court ought to 
intervene the case should be . . . clearly and fully proved . . . .”). 
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Using the bill of complaint filed in Wisconsin v. Illinois and 
the complaint in North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
and in light of the nature of a downwind state’s suit against 
upwind states,an appropriately modest prayer for relief at the 
outset of a bill of complaint would be as follows: 
Plaintiff, the State of _____ (“the State”), respectfully requests 
leave to file this bill of complaint in equity against defendant 
_____ (“the Defendant”) to address emissions of air pollution from 
coal-fired electric generating units (“EGUs”) installed in electric 
generating stations (“power plants”) located in the Defendant’s 
territory that have in the past significantly contributed, and 
continue to significantly contribute, to substantial adverse effects 
on the health and welfare of citizens of the State, damage to the 
State’s natural resources and economy, and harm to the State’s 
finances.  The Defendant is inequitably permitting the emission 
of excessive quantities of air pollution into the atmosphere 
thereby threatening great losses upon the State and violating the 
State’s sovereign rights.  The State prays that this Court issue 
necessary and appropriate orders to gradually restore the just 
rights of the State in order to avoid so far as might be the 
possible the economic consequences which the Defendant has 
subjected itself and its citizens by permitting the expenditures of 
great sums on the construction of power plants within its 
territory.295 
States can file bills of complaint on their own behalf as well 
as on behalf of the citizenry of the states as parens patriae.296  In 
its complaint against the Tennessee Valley Authority, North 
Carolina filed its claim in just these terms: 
North Carolina is a sovereign State of the United States of 
America. It brings this cause of action on its own behalf to protect 
State property, resources, and revenue, asparens patriaeon 
behalf of its citizens and residents to protect their health and 
 
 295. See Complaint at 1, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 
2d 486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20). 
 296. See supra Part IV.A.a.  The requirements for state and citizenry injury in 
an air pollution suit are discussed infra Part V.A.d. 
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well-being, and to protect those natural resources held in trust by 
the State.297 
In filing against upwind states, this portion can be used 
nearly verbatim, substituting only the name of the downwind 
state, though additional pleading will be necessary as discussed 
below. 
States can file bills of complaint against other states for the 
other states’ own actions, as well as the actions of the other 
states’ citizenry.298  For displacement reasons, downwind states 
should not bring suit against upwind states in their capacities as 
owners and commercial operators of any of the listed facilities, 
but downwind states should still assert both state action and 
citizenry action to properly affect the substitution of states for 
individual sources.  For both assertions, the bill must identify the 
upwind states and the sources of air pollution in their respective 
territories.299  A downwind state should then assert its claims 
against the upwind states as (1) issuers of permits to the listed 
facilities; and (2) parens patriae of the listed facilities.300  The 
requirements to plead state responsibility are addressed below, 
but this will suffice for the description of the state defendants in 
the bill of complaint.  Downwind states should consider filing 
 
 297. Complaint at 2, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 
486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20).  The bill of complaint in Wisconsin v. 
Illinois served as a model for the last two sentences. 
 298. See supra Part IV.A.b.  The requirements for state responsibility in an air 
pollution suit are discussed infra Part V.A.d. 
 299. In its complaint against the Tennessee Valley Authority, North Carolina 
lists only the entity’s facilities located in the three states.  Complaint at 3, North 
Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 
1:06CV20).  To this, North Carolina should add additional private and state 
owned facilities. 
 300. As discussed supra in Part IV.A.b. and infra in Part V.A.d., it is unclear 
whether the Court recognizes jurisdiction in cases like Idaho v. Oregon and 
Vermont v. New York on account of state permitting or on a theory of parens 
patriae state responsibility.  This Article argues the latter is the better theory, 
but the matter should be pressed in the alternative until explicitly decided.  On 
the permitting score, see North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 
309-10 (4th Cir. 2010) (“TVA’s electricity-generating operations are expressly 
permitted by the states in which they are located. . . . An activity that is 
explicitly licensed and allowed by Tennessee law cannot be a public nuisance.”). 
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separate suits against each upwind state rather than joining the 
suits together to avoid multifariousness problems.301 
As for the Court’s jurisdiction, a downwind state’s bill of 
complaint should state that the Court has original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over this “controversy between two or more states” 
under Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 and 28 U.S.C. 1251(a).  The 
North Carolina complaint against the Tennessee Valley Authority 
included pleadings on venue, but this is superfluous in the 
Supreme Court, as would be any allegations of personal 
jurisdiction such as those included in the American Electric Power 
Co. v. Connecticut complaint.302  But, in order to make out a claim 
of the existence of a controversy “between two or more states” 
within the meaning of the Constitution, a downwind state’s bill of 
complaint must allege that the downwind state is injured directly 
or through its citizenry by the acts of the upwind defendant states 
or through their respective citizenry.303 
In its litigation against the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
North Carolina pled injury both directly and through its 
citizenry, and a downwind state can make the same allegations of 
injury in a bill of complaint against states filed in the Supreme 
Court.  North Carolina generally alleged that the emissions of 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and particulate matter 
“harm human health, safety, comfort, the environment, and the 
economy . . . in North Carolina” and resulted in “increased 
financial burdens to the State.”304  The state specifically alleged 
the following: 
(1) the emissions are “prejudicial to the health, comfort, safety, 
and property of North Carolina’s citizens at large and to the 
economy, finances, and natural resources of the State of North 
Carolina;” 
 
 301. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1934) (holding bill against 
states with differing statutes on Commerce Clause grounds for restricting the 
sale of convict labor multifarious). 
 302. Complaint, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486 
(W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20). 
 303. See supra Part IV.A.a–b; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 304. Complaint at 4, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 
486 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (No. 1:06CV20). 
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(2) the fine particulate matter emissions cause “citizens of North 
Carolina” to suffer from “premature death, cardiovascular 
disease (including heart attacks and cardiac arrhythmia), 
aggravation of respiratory disease (including asthma), decreased 
lung function, changes to lung tissue and structure, and other 
respiratory effects;” 
(3) the emissions of nitrogen oxides contribute “to the formation 
of ground-level ozone, which causes North Carolina citizens to 
experience adverse health effects, including chest pains, 
aggravated asthma, shortness of breath, reduced lung function, 
coughing, and throat irritation;” 
(4) emissions of mercury eventually contaminate “lakes, rivers, 
and estuaries in North Carolina” where they “chemically 
transform into methylmercury” that “becomes increasingly 
concentrated as it travels up the food chain, reaching 
concentrations in fish tissue that can be toxic to those who 
consume affected fish” because they may cause “a variety of 
developmental neurological abnormalities;” 
(5) the negative health consequences of the emissions lead to 
“increased costs to the citizens of the State from increased 
hospital visits and other medical costs and from absence from 
work.” 
(6) the emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and 
particulate matter “contribute to haze that markedly decreases 
visibility in North Carolina, including in the State’s treasured 
State parks” and “degrades the quality of the environment for the 
citizens of North Carolina and visitors to the State;” 
(7) the emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides “contribute 
to the deposition of acid compounds in North Carolina” that 
“causes the acidification of surface waters, including lakes, 
streams and ponds, and damages forests in North Carolina;” 
(8) these emissions “contribute to loss of revenue for the State 
and a substantial increase in expenditures for the State to 
combat and remedy the effects” of the emissions.305 
The sufficiency of these harms for a controversy between 
states is evidenced by the Court’s recognition of jurisdiction over 
the controversies in Idaho v. Oregon, the suit on behalf of Idaho 
salmon fisherman, and Vermont v. New York, the suit alleging 
 
 305. Id. at 4-6. 
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pollution of Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek.306  As for 
the sufficiency of air pollution injuries to states, the bill of 
complaint in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. included a subset of 
these alleged injuries and the Court recognized its jurisdiction to 
resolve the controversy between the state and the source of the 
emissions on the ground that “the State has an interest 
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the 
earth and air within its domain” and “has the last word as to 
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its 
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”307  And the harms alleged by 
North Carolina are more immediate than the threatened loss of 
sovereign territory caused by global warming that five Justices 
recognized as sufficient in Massachusetts v. EPA.308 
The substantive sufficiency of these alleged injuries to a 
downwind state and its citizenry is, however, a different matter 
than the way in which they must be pled.  The Court has long 
required that bills of complaint in state controversies allege facts 
that “are clearly sufficient,” akin to the Twombly-Iqbal 
heightened pleading standard.309  This presumably applies to all 
necessary components of a state controversy complaint, including 
injury.  Therefore, downwind states should offer greater 
specificity and detail of its injury, perhaps by offering 
quantitative measures of the harms as previous successful state 
complaints have.310 
 
 306. Idaho v. Oregon (1975); Vermont v. New York (1971). 
 307. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
 308. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–19 (2007). 
 309. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1934) (“A State asking leave 
to sue another to prevent the enforcement of laws must allege, in the complaint 
offered for filing, facts that are clearly sufficient to call for a decree in its 
favor.”). 
 310. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736 n.12 (1981) (“As 
alleged in the complaint, the annual increase in natural gas costs directly 
associated with the First-Use Tax with respect to each of the plaintiff States is 
as follows: Maryland ($60,000); New York ($300,000); Massachusetts ($25,000); 
Rhode Island ($25,000); Illinois ($270,000); Indiana ($70,000); Michigan 
($650,000); Wisconsin ($70,000); New Jersey ($20,000) . . . . Total direct injuries 
to the plaintiff States was estimated to be $1.5 million, and injury to the citizen 
consumers was estimated at $120 million.”); see also Brief for Fourteen States as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 
F.3d 291 (2010) (No. 10-997) (noting “that emissions from the plants at issue 
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As demonstrated in Part IV.A.b, states must answer for 
injuries to a complainant state or its citizenry that are fairly 
traceable to either the sovereign actions of the state, or the 
actions of the state’s citizenry in which the state has a sufficient 
interest that it could bring a suit to protect the citizenry as 
parens patriae.  As discussed below, downwind state suits against 
upwind states in their capacity as owners and operators of 
sources of emissions are probably preempted by the Clean Air 
Act.  But this still leaves open suits against upwind states as (1) 
issuers of permits; and (2) parens patriae of the emissions of the 
citizenry. 
This Article takes a dim view of the permitting theory of 
liability, but downwind states cannot afford to omit this theory in 
a bill of complaint unless it is explicitly rejected by the Court.  
Accordingly, downwind states should include allegations of state 
permitting of the emissions.  Taking the statement discussed 
above in the Court’s summary of the bill of complaint in Colorado 
v. Kansas as a model, downwind state complaints should allege 
that upwind states are “acting . . . through private persons 
thereto licensed” to emit air pollutants that have caused the 
downwind state’s injuries.311 
The better argument for upwind state responsibility for 
downwind state injuries is that the upwind states have 
significant parens patriae interests in the emissions activity of 
their respective citizenry.  As discussed in Part IV.A.b, this 
theory of defendant state responsibility was first suggested in 
Missouri v. Illinois and seems to underlie the Court’s recognition 
of the state responsibility for private appropriation of water in 
Wyoming v. Colorado, private well boring and irrigation in 
Washington v. Oregon, private water pollution in Vermont v. New 
York, and private fishing in Idaho v. Oregon.312  Of these, the 
 
annually result in the premature deaths of 99 North Carolinians, 49 New 
Yorkers, and 27 Marylanders”). 
 311. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1902).  As there are significant 
arguments against this theory of defendant state responsibility, it should be 
clearly set apart from other theories of defendant state responsibility. 
 312. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 242 (1901); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 
U.S 419, 456 (1922); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523–25 (1936); 
Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974); Idaho v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 385 
(1980). 
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facts of Vermont v. New York are especially compelling — the 
Court recognized its jurisdiction to resolve a controversy between 
the states primarily over emissions from just one private entity, 
the International Paper Company.  According to the theory of 
these cases, upwind states may be sued so long as they have a 
sufficient interest in the activities of their respective citizenry 
that result in emission that cause injury to states downwind. 
It would be difficult to conceive of how an upwind state could 
disclaim its significant interests in the activities that result in 
interstate air pollution.  Emission controls are costly, and these 
costs are passed on to consumers, including the state itself.  If the 
market will not bear these cost increases, production may be 
reduced.  For these reasons, Alabama, an upwind state, 
successfully intervened on appeal in North Carolina v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, and its arguments in favor of intervention are 
equally valid in favor of holding states responsible for the 
emissions of their citizenry.313 
B. Only Individual Source Suits Are Displaced by the 
Clean Air Act 
As there are no air pollution compacts in force between the 
states, federal common law air pollution controversy suits are not 
displaced and may be filed in the Supreme Court by downwind 
states against upwind states, notwithstanding the Clean Air Act 
and the Court’s 2011 holding in American Electric Power Co. v. 
Connecticut that suits by states against individual sources are 
displaced by the Clean Air Act. 
Suits that might otherwise be maintained under federal 
common law may be displaced by compacts and Acts of Congress 
that supply the rule of decision in the underlying controversy 
between the states.  As discussed in Part IV.C, compacts entered 
into by states with the assent of Congress always provide the rule 
of decision in controversies between compacting states in those 
matters to which they pertain but the unilateral Acts of Congress 
 
 313. State of Alabama’s Motion to Intervene, North Carolina v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1623) (“Alabama has 
important sovereign interests at stake”); North Carolina v. Tennessee, No. 09-
1623 (4th Cir. July 20, 2009) (granting Alabama’s motion to intervene). 
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only sometimes provide the rule of decision in controversies 
between states.  Thus, for Acts of Congress to displace suits 
between states, there is a threshold inquiry regarding the 
constitutional power of Congress to supply the rule of decision.314 
Congress may constitutionally regulate the emissions of 
individual sources of interstate air pollution under the Commerce 
Clause and does so by way of the provisions of the Clean Air Act.  
After Garcia reversed National League of Cities, Congress may 
even regulate the proprietary emissions of individual state 
sources.  But under the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution 
in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States, 
Congress may not commandeer the states by directly compelling 
the states to regulate air pollution.  Thus, the rule of decision in a 
suit between a downwind state and an upwind state for the 
latter’s proprietary emissions may be supplied by the unilateral 
Acts of Congress.  For this reason, federal common law of 
nuisance suits even between states are vulnerable to 
displacement, and the Court’s recent decision in a federal 
common law of nuisance suit between states and private sources 
of emissions suggests they have indeed been displaced by the 
Clean Air Act.315 
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, California, 
Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin joined with New York City,316 together 
 
 314. As for air pollution compacts, there are none. See CAROLINE N. BROUN, ET. 
AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 311, § 
9.4.5 (2006) (noting failed attempts to enact interstate air pollution compacts).  
This is so despite great scholarly interest in the potential of compacts to resolve 
air pollution controversies in the late 1960s.  See generally, Interstate 
Agreements for Air Pollution Control, 1968 WASH. U. L. REV. 260 (1968); A Model 
Interstate Compact for the Control of Air Pollution, 4 HARV. J. LEGIS. 369 (1966–
1967); Lewis C. Green, State Control of Interstate Air Pollution, 33 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (1968); Leonard A. Weakley, Interstate Compacts in the 
Law of Air and Water Pollution, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 81 (1970). 
 315. However, as will be seen in a moment, this does not apply when the suit 
seeks relief from the aggregate emissions of the respective upwind states, not 
individual sources, because Congress cannot supply the rule of decision, and in 
the alternative, because Congress cannot afford the “same relief” as the Court 
and compacts can. 
 316. New Jersey and Wisconsin stopped participating before the case reached 
the Court presumably because new governors were elected. 
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with three land trusts who had filed a separate complaint,317 filed 
a complaint against American Electric Power Company, Inc., a 
wholly owned subsidiary, Southern Company, Xcel Energy Inc., 
Cinergy Corporation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority.318  The 
plaintiffs alleged the defendants “are the five largest emitters of 
carbon dioxide in the United States” and that “[t]heir collective 
annual emissions of 650 million tons constitute 25 percent of 
emissions from the domestic electric power sector, 10 percent of 
emissions from all domestic human activities, . . . and 2.5 percent 
of all anthropogenic emissions worldwide.”319  The plaintiffs 
claimed that “[b]y contributing to global warming, the plaintiffs 
asserted, the defendants’ carbon-dioxide emissions created a 
‘substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights,’ in 
violation of the federal common law of interstate nuisance, or, in 
the alternative, of state tort law.”320  The plaintiffs requested 
“injunctive relief requiring each defendant ‘to cap its carbon 
dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage 
each year for at least a decade.’”321 
On appeal of the Second Circuit’s holding that the claims 
could proceed, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed and held 
the federal common law nuisance claim by the states, a city, and 
three land trusts against the four private parties and the 
Tennessee Valley Authority was displaced by the provisions of the 
Clean Air Act because “[t]he Act itself . . . provides a means to 
seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power 
plants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking federal 
common law,” and “[t]here is no room for a parallel track.”322  
This displacement holding would extend to a suit by a state 
against another state for the upwind state’s proprietary 
emissions from individual sources. 
 
 317. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 n.3  (2011) 
(“Open Space Institute, Inc., Open Space Conservancy, Inc., and Audubon 
Society of New Hampshire.”). 
 318. Id. at 2534 n.5. 
 319. Id. at 2534. 
 320. Id. at 2534. 
 321. Id. at 2534. 
 322. American Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. at 2530–31. 
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But the Court’s holding of displacement does not limit the 
right of states to bring suits against one another under federal 
common law so long as the suit is not seeking injunctions against 
individual sources and instead seeks protection from the 
excessive aggregate emissions of the defendant upwind state.  
The Clean Air Act displaces federal common law resolution of 
controversies between states challenging emissions of individual 
sources, but not entire states because there are constitutional 
limits on congressional power recognized in New York v. United 
States and Printz v. United States.323  As “the Framers explicitly 
chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to 
regulate individuals, not States,” Congress may not supply the 
rule of decision in a controversy between states unless the 
Congress has plenary power over the subject matter, whether 
that be navigable waters or proprietary emissions.324  
Accordingly, the effect of the Clean Air Act is limited to 
displacement of suits for individual emissions, not state-wide 
emissions. 
Air pollution controversy suits are not displaced by the Clean 
Air Act even if the Court were to hold that Congress could supply 
the rule of decision.  The displacement doctrine articulated by 
Justice Ginsburg in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut in 
an opinion joined by every participating justice would not reach a 
suit between states over aggregate upwind state emissions 
because the Court can provide remedies that Congress may not 
under New York v. United States.325  As Justice Stevens noted in 
dissent in New York v. United States, that decision holds 
Congress may not provide—in the words of Justice Ginsburg in 
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut—”the same relief” 
that state plaintiffs may seek from the Supreme Court.326  Thus, 
the New York v. United States limit on the power of Congress to 
regulate states also limits the displacement of federal common 
law in cases “between two or more states” in which states seek 
 
 323. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 324. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
 325. Id. at 145. 
 326. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 212 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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relief that Congress may not constitutionally provide.327 But the 
simpler route to the same conclusion is discussed above: namely 
that Congress does not have the constitutional power to supply 
the rule of decision, so displacement is not possible as a threshold 
matter. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Suits between states in the Supreme Court seeking 
resolution of environmental controversies have already played a 
significant role in the apportionment and protection of this 
nation’s natural resources.  For the Court to play a greater role in 
the future, the states for whom this forum was provided in 
exchange for surrender of important sovereign powers must 
invoke the jurisdiction in novel controversies.  If past cases are 
any indication, the Court will heed the call. 
 
 327. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 ,179 (1992). 
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APPENDIX OF SUITS BETWEEN TWO OR MORE 
STATES 
This appendix attempts, as others have before, to document 
in one place the reported history of controversies between states 
litigated in the Supreme Court.328  It follows the practice of 
previous compilations of omitting “[m]inor procedural orders such 
as allowance of additional time in which to plead,” assignment of 
masters, receipt of records from masters, and “receipt of post-
decree progress reports.”329  The cases are separated between 
those properly brought and those in which the court denied leave 
to file a bill or dismissed the bill on demurrer.  The cases are 
dated and ordered according to first reported entry in the United 
States Reports except that cases after October of 1961 are ordered 
by docket number.330  Supplemental and contextual information 
not contained within the decisions and notable commentary is 
provided in footnotes when appropriate.  It is worth recompiling 
these cases as there is no widely available comprehensive 
 
 328. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED IN THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 537–41 (controversies between states organized 
by state through 1918); CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN 
STATES, at 113–15 (controversies between states through 1923); Vincent L. 
McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court’s Management of Its 
Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 MAIN L. REV. 185, 216–42 (1992) (all 
original jurisdiction litigation between 1961 and 1992); Note, The Original 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 665, 701-19 (1959) (all 
original jurisdiction litigation through 1958). There have been two compilations 
of opinions. SCOTT, ANALYSIS (select opinions through 1918); JAMES BROWN 
SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION: CASES DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1918) (all cases through 1918).  Several authors have summarized many of the 
cases. SCOTT, ANALYSIS; WARREN; JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE DISPUTES: 
THE SUPREME COURT’S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION (2006).  Zimmerman, a Professor 
of Political Science, erroneously asserts at the outset of his contribution that “no 
book and relatively few articles have been published on the subject of the court’s 
original jurisdiction.” ZIMMERMAN at x.  Another author has attempted to 
compile a win-loss record for each state.  JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES: 
UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH TEN OF ITS MOST CURIOUS 
PROVISIONS (2012). 
 329.  The Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, supra note 328, at 701. 
 330. When the first reported entry is a procedural matter that would 
otherwise be excised, it has been included. 
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appendix of the cases.  Further, this appendix uses a tabular 
display to allow more in depth summaries than are provided 
when the information is provided in citation parentheticals.  
Interested parties and future compilers may contact the author to 
obtain the data contained herein in an easily accessible format. 
A. Controversies Between States Properly Brought 
Before the Court 
1 New York v. 
Connecticut 
4 U.S. 1 (1799) New York filed a bill of complaint against Connecticut and private 
landowners seeking an injunction against Connecticut ejectment 
proceedings on the ground that the land belonged to New York in 
consequence of a 1683 agreement between the two states.  The 
Court denied the injunction because “New York was not a party to 
the [ejectment] suits below nor interested in the decision of those 
suits.”331 
4 U.S. 3 (1799) 
4 U.S. 6 (1799) 
2 New Jersey v. 
New York 
28 U.S. 461 (1830) New Jersey filed a bill of complaint against New York disputing the 
“title to and sovereignty over the waters of New York Harbor and 
Hudson River.”332  After a heated jurisdictional dispute, the states 
“settled their dispute by a compact assented to by Congress.”333 
30 U.S. 284 (1831) 
31 U.S. 323 (1832) 
3 Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts 
32 U.S. 651 (1833) Rhode Island filed a bill of complaint against Massachusetts 
seeking settlement of its northern boundary.  The Court decided in 
favor of Massachusetts on the merits of the boundary dispute after 
an extensive resolution of the Court’s power to decide the boundary. 
36 U.S. 226 (1837) 
37 U.S 657 (1838) 
37 U.S. 755 (1838) 
38 U.S. 23 (1839) 
39 U.S. 210 (1840) 
40 U.S. 233 (1841) 
45 U.S. 591 (1846) 
 
 331. New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. 3, 4 (1799).  Connecticut did not appear 
because the legislature had not met, rather the attorney for the individual 
plaintiffs in the ejectment case appeared and defended Connecticut court 
proceedings. 
 332. WARREN, supra note 328, at 39 (“This dispute had given rise to much 
bitterness of feeling and retaliatory legislation between the States; and there 
had been forcible seizures and practically armed conflict over the rights of 
various steamboat owners to run their boats upon these waters—so that 
William Wirt, in arguing the great Steamboat Monopoly Case in 1824, said: 
‘Here are three States almost on the eve of war,’ and that if the Court did not 
interpose its friendly hand, ‘there would be civil war.’”). 
 333. WARREN, supra note 328, at 40. 
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4 Missouri v. 
Iowa 
48 U.S. 660 (1849) Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Iowa seeking settlement of 
its northern boundary.  The Court decided in favor of Iowa on the 
merits of the dispute.  The Court perpetually enjoined and 
restrained each state from exercising jurisdiction beyond the 
boundary the Court established and appointed commissioners to 
mark the line the court established and to plant cast iron pillars 
every ten miles along the borders.334 
51 U.S. 1 (1850) 
160 U.S. 688 (1896) 
165 U.S. 118 (1897) 
5 Florida v. 
Georgia 
52 U.S. 293 (1850) Florida filed a bill of complaint against Georgia seeking settlement 
of a portion of its northern boundary.  The United States sided with 
Florida as to the location of the boundary and the attorney general 
moved “for leave to be heard on behalf of the United States.”  This 
led to a heated split decision granting the motion to be heard.  No 
further proceedings in this controversy are evident in the reports. 
58 U.S. 478 (1854) 
6 Alabama v. 
Georgia 
64 U.S. 505 (1859) Alabama filed a bill of complaint against Georgia seeking 
settlement of its Chattahoochee River border with Georgia.  The 
dispute turned on the interpretation of words of a contract of 
cession to the United States.  The Court decided in Georgia’s 
favor.335  
7 Kentucky v. 
Dennison 
65 U.S. 66 (1860) Kentucky filed a bill of complaint against the governor of Ohio in 
his official capacity seeking a writ of mandamus commanding him 
to deliver a Cincinnati man indicted for assisting in the escape of a 
Kentucky slave.  The Court held that the governor of Ohio could not 
be compelled to do so. 
8 Virginia v. 
West Virginia 
78 U.S. 39 (1870) Virginia filed a bill of complaint against West Virginia seeking to 
settle its boundary by attacking the validity of its purported cession 
of Berkeley and Jefferson counties to West Virginia on the grounds 
that Congress never expressly assented.  The Court found Congress 
impliedly assented and held in favor of West Virginia.  
 
 334. WARREN, supra note 328, at 41 (“Missouri at one time had called out 1500 
troops and Iowa 1100, to defend their respective alleged rights. The conflict of 
claims was more serious, by reason of the fact that if Missouri prevailed, these 
2000 square miles would become additional slave territory; if Iowa won, they 
would be free.”). 
 335. WARREN, supra note 328, at 42–43 (“[T]he Southern States, though 
having little confidence at that time in the political branches of the Government, 
were entirely content to leave the decision of some of their sovereign rights as 
States to the Supreme Judiciary. Hence, we have the remarkable spectacle of 
two states who, less than one year from the date of the decision, were to secede 
from the Union, accepting the decision of a Court under a Constitution which 
they were so soon to repudiate.”). 
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9 Missouri v. 
Kentucky 
78 U.S. 395 (1870) Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Kentucky seeking to settle 
its Mississippi River boundary at Wolf Island.  The Court held in 
favor of Kentucky. 
10 South Carolina v. 
Georgia 
93 U.S. 4 (1876) South Carolina filed a bill of complaint against Georgia, Secretary 
of War Alonzo Taft, and the chief and a lieutenant-colonel of the 
Army Corps of Engineers seeking an injunction against the 
obstruction of a channel of the Savannah River.  The Court held the 
obstruction authorized by Congress under its commerce power 
notwithstanding pre-Constitution compact between the states 
prohibiting obstructions of the river. 
11 Indiana v. 
Kentucky 
136 U.S. 479 (1890) Indiana filed a bill of complaint against Kentucky seeking 
settlement of a portion of its southern border with Kentucky. 
Indiana and Kentucky each claimed jurisdiction over a two 
thousand acre tract north of the Ohio River.  Kentucky claimed the 
tract was at one time an island in the Ohio River and Indiana 
claimed only a bayou had separated the tract from the mainland to 
the north.  The Court held in favor of Kentucky. 
159 U.S. 275 (1895) 
167 U.S. 270 (1897) 
12 Nebraska v. 
Iowa 
143 U.S. 359 (1892) Nebraska filed a bill of complaint against Iowa seeking to settle its 
Missouri River boundary near Omaha where there were marked 
changes in the course of the main channel.  The Court held that 
principles of accretion and avulsion apply and found on the merits 
that the sudden shift of the Missouri River was avulsion and the 
boundary did not change as a result. 
145 U.S. 519 (1892) 
13 Iowa v. 
Illinois 
147 U.S. 1 (1893) Iowa filed a bill of complaint against Illinois seeking settlement of 
its Mississippi River boundary.  Iowa argued the boundary to be the 
geometric middle and Illinois argued it to be the middle of the main 
channel.  The Court held in favor of Illinois. 
151 U.S. 238 (1894) 
202 U.S. 58 (1906) 
14 Virginia v. 
Tennessee 
148 U.S. 503 (1893) Virginia filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee seeking to settle 
its southern boundary.  Virginia claimed the boundary to be “on the 
parallel of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north” and 
Tennessee claimed the states had agreed to a different boundary 
without express congressional consent.  The Court held in favor of 
Tennessee that Congress impliedly assented and the Court 
appointed commissioners to mark the boundary.  The states then 
entered into a compact adjusting the line. 
158 U.S. 267 (1895) 
177 U.S. 501 (1900) 
190 U.S. 64 (1903) 
15 Missouri v. 
Illinois 
180 U.S. 208 (1901) Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Illinois and the Sanitary 
District of Chicago complaining of the construction of an artificial 
channel from the Chicago River to the Des Plaines River such that 
sewage and waste from the Chicago River would ultimately 
200 U.S. 496 (1906) 
202 U.S. 598 (1906) 
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discharge into the Mississippi River to the injury of Missouri.  The 
Court overruled a demurrer but dismissed the bill without 
prejudice after taking evidence and awarded costs to Illinois. 
16 Kansas v.  
Colorado 
185 U.S. 125 (1902) Kansas filed a bill of complaint against Colorado claiming its rights 
by prior appropriation to the use and enjoyment of Arkansas River 
water.  The Court recognized the action in two opinions, but 
ultimately dismissed the petition without prejudice and invited 
Kansas to institute new proceedings  “whenever it shall appear 
that, through a material increase in the depletion of the Arkansas 
by Colorado, its corporations or citizens, the substantial interests of 
Kansas are being injured to the extent of destroying the equitable 
apportionment of benefits between the two States resulting from 
the flow of the river.”336 
206 U.S. 46 (1907) 
17 South Dakota v. 
North Carolina 
192 U.S. 286 (1904) South Dakota filed a bill of complaint against North Carolina, 
Simon Rothschilds, and Charles Salter seeking payment on ten 
repudiated state bonds issued by North Carolina secured by the 
stock of the North Carolina Railroad Company or in lieu of 
payment foreclosure on the stock.  Private parties had donated the 
ten bonds to South Dakota with the hopes that a successful original 
suit would convince North Carolina to pay its obligations to private 
bond holders.  The private defendants represented private owners 
of the bonds. North Carolina alleged they were included in the 
complaint as defendants as a means of evading the Eleventh 
Amendment.  The Court held the private defendants were not 
necessary parties and were entitled to no relief.  The Court held in 
favor of South Dakota and ordered North Carolina to pay the 
amount owed on the ten bonds, $27,400, by the end of the year or 
the Marshall of the Supreme Court would foreclose the North 
Carolina Railroad Company Stock by sale from the United States 
Capitol steps. 
18 Missouri v. 
Nebraska 
196 U.S. 23 (1904) Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Nebraska seeking 
settlement of its Missouri River boundary.  The dispute arose out of 
shift in the Missouri River over a twenty-four hour period.  The 
Court held the shift was an avulsion and did not change the 
197 U.S. 577 (1905) 
 
 336. Kansas v. Colorado II, 206 U.S. 46, 117-18 (1907). WARREN supra note 28, 
at 47–48 (“[A] momentous question as to how far a State by instituting extensive 
irrigation works within its boundary could deprive another State of the water of 
a non-navigable river flowing from one State into the other, and could thus 
reduce much arable land in a neighboring State to a desert condition”). 
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boundary between the states. 
19 Louisiana v. 
Mississippi 
202 U.S. 1 (1906) Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi seeking 
settlement of its coastal boundary.  The dispute arose out of 
conflicting congressional grants first giving Louisiana all islands 
within nine miles of its coast and then giving Mississippi all islands 
within eighteen miles of its shore.  The Court held in favor of 
Louisiana.337 
202 U.S. 58 (1906) 
20 Virginia v.  
West Virginia 
206 U.S. 290 (1907) Virginia filed a bill of complaint against West Virginia seeking a 
decree for an equitable proportion of the public debt of Virginia 
owed by West Virginia.  The Court held that the Court had power 
to issue a remedy equivalent to execution of judgment but as 
Congress also has this power under the Compact Clause when the 
execution is in accord with a compact that it is the better course to 
give Congress the opportunity to exercise its power. 
220 U.S. 1 (1911) 
231 U.S. 89 (1913) 
234 U.S. 117 (1914) 
238 U.S. 202 (1915) 
241 U.S. 531 (1916) 
246 U.S. 565 (1918) 
21 Washington v. 
Oregon 
211 U.S. 127 (1908) Washington filed a bill of complaint against Oregon seeking 
settlement of its Columbia River boundary.  The Court held in favor 
of Oregon that the center of the north channel continued to serve as 
the boundary.338 
214 U.S. 205 (1909) 
22 Missouri v. 
Kansas 
213 U.S. 78 (1908) Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Kansas seeking settlement 
of a portion of its western boundary.  Missouri claimed sovereignty 
over a four hundred acre island in the Missouri River west of its 
main channel on the ground that it lay east of the meridian 
boundary that existed before Congress extended Missouri’s 
jurisdiction to the river.  The court held that the intent of the 
adjustment was to make the river the boundary and so the 
accretion resulted in the cession of the territory to Kansas. 
23 Maryland v. 
West Virginia 
217 U.S. 1 (1910) Maryland filed a bill of complaint against West Virginia seeking 
settlement of its meridian boundary.  The Court determined the 
boundary is the historically recognized albeit inaccurate line. 
217 U.S. 577 (1910) 
 
 337. WARREN supra note 328, at 43–44 (“By far the most important boundary 
case . . . involved great Financial interests—the oyster fisheries in the waters 
between the two States. The controversy had been pending for ten years; each 
State had appointed armed patrols, and by law and force sought to exclude 
fishermen of the other States . . . The situation was precisely that of an 
economic conflict in mutually claimed territory, which, if occurring between 
nations of Europe or elsewhere, would be very probable cause of war.”) 
 338. WARREN supra note 328, at 44 (“[A] suit . . . involving the channel of the 
Columbia River presented [an] inflamed boundary question, the decision of 
which might leave one or the other State in control of the very valuable salmon 
fisheries.”).  The controversy was ultimately settled by compact. 
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24 Arkansas v. 
Tennessee 
32 S.Ct. 836 (1912) Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee seeking 
settlement of its Mississippi River boundary.  The Court held in 
favor of Arkansas that the recognition of the principle of thalweg 
does not limit the application of the principle of avulsion. 
246 U.S. 158 (1918) 
247 U.S. 461 (1918) 
25 North Carolina v. 
Tennessee 
235 U.S. 1 (1914) North Carolina filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee Seeking 
a settlement of its eastern boundary.  The Court determined and 
recognized the boundary established by the commissioners that 
were appointed by the states in 1821. 
240 U.S. 652 (1916) 
26 Wyoming v. 
Colorado 
243 U.S. 622 (1917) Wyoming filed a bill of complaint against Colorado asserting  
appropriation rights against a diversion of the nonnavigable 
Laramie River and sought an injunction against Colorado and two 
corporate defendants.  The Court held the rule of appropriation 
applies and entered an injunction against Colorado limiting the 
diversion of water to 15,500 acre-feet of water per year.  Wyoming 
subsequently asserted Colorado was not complying with the Court’s 
decree and successfully obtained an injunction ordering adherence 
to the decree. 
259 U.S. 419 (1922) 
259 U.S. 496 (1922) 
42 S. Ct. 587 (1922) 
260 U.S 1 (1922) 
286 U.S. 494 (1932) 
287 U.S. 579 (1932) 
298 U.S. 573 (1936) 
309 U.S. 627 (1940) 
309 U.S. 572 (1940) 
353 U.S. 953 (1957) 
27 New York v.  
New Jersey 
249 U.S. 202 (1919) New York filed a bill of complaint against New Jersey and the 
Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners seeking an order enjoining 
the discharge of sewage into the Upper Bay of New York Harbor.  
The Court dismissed the bill without prejudice on the merits for 
failure to prove threat of injury by clear and convincing evidence. 
256 U.S. 296 (1921) 
28 Arkansas v. 
Mississippi 
250 U.S. 39 (1919) Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi seeking 
settlement of its Mississippi River boundary. The Court determined 
the boundary between the states to be the center of the main 
channel of the Mississippi River as it was prior to 1848 avulsion. 
252 U.S. 344 (1920) 
40 S. Ct. 585 (1920) 
256 U.S. 28 (1921) 
29 Georgia v.  
South Carolina 
39 S. Ct. 258 (1919) Georgia filed a bill of complaint against South Carolina seeking 
settlement of its Savannah River, Tugaloo River, and Chatooga 
River boundary.  The Court interpreted Article II of the Beaufort 
Convention to define the boundary between the states not 
according to the principle of thalweg but rather as the geometric 
middle of the stream where there are no islands and the geometric 
midway between islands and the South Carolina shore where there 
253 U.S. 477 (1920) 
257 U.S. 516 (1922) 
259 U.S. 572 (1922) 
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are islands.  The Court also determined that the islands of the 
Chattooga River are within Georgia’s jurisdiction.339 
30 Pennsylvania v. 
West Virginia 
39 S. Ct. 490 (1919) Pennsylvania and Ohio each filed a bill of complaint against West 
Virginia seeking an injunction against enforcement of a West 
Virginia statute requiring producers of natural gas to give 
preference to West Virginia customers as a violation of the 
Commerce Clause.  The Court entered the requested injunction 
over the objections of Holmes and Brandeis on the merits and 
McReynolds and Brandeis on jurisdiction. 
252 U.S. 563 (1920) 
257 U.S. 620 (1922) 
262 U.S. 553 (1923) 
262 U.S. 623 (1923) 
263 U.S. 350 (1923) 
263 U.S. 671 (1923) 
31 Minnesota v. 
Wisconsin 
252 U.S. 273 (1920) Minnesota filed a bill of complaint against Wisconsin seeking 
settlement of its Upper St. Louis Bay and Lower St. Louis Bay 
boundary.  The Court held in favor of Minnesota that the principal 
and not the deepest channel is the main channel under the 
principle of thalweg. 
254 U.S. 14 (1920) 
258 U.S. 149 (1922) 
32 Oklahoma v. 
Texas 
252 U.S. 372 (1920) Oklahoma filed a bill of complaint against Texas contending the 
southern bank of the Red River constituted the boundary between 
the two states as determined by the court in United States v. Texas, 
162 U.S. 1.  The Court first granted the motion of the United States 
to intervene, issued an injunction, and appointed a receiver over 
disputed property between the main channel of the Red River and 
its southern bank in light of potential armed conflict between 
Oklahoma and Texas after the discovery of oil and gas deposits in 
the bed of the river.  The Court then held the boundary res 
judicata.  Texas counterclaimed as to another portion of the 
boundary.  The Court held this portion of the boundary not res 
40 S. Ct. 394 (1920) 
40 S. Ct. 580 (1920) 
40 S. Ct. 582 (1920) 
253 US 465 (1920) 
254 U.S. 609 (1920) 
254 U.S. 280 (1920) 
254 U.S. 603 (1920) 
256 U.S. 70 (1921) 
261 U.S. 340 (1923) 
262 U.S. 505 (1923) 
 
 339. Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U.S. 516, 174 (1922) (“The taxation of 
dams and hydro-electric plants, already constructed and hereafter to be 
constructed, in the boundary rivers, renders the decision of the questions 
involved of importance to the two States.”). 
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265 U.S. 493 (1924) judicata and resolved the claim on the merits.340 
265 U.S. 500 (1924) 
265 U.S. 505 (1924) 
265 U.S. 513 (1924) 
267 U.S. 452 (1925) 
269 U.S. 314 (1926) 
269 U.S. 539 (1926) 
272 U.S. 21 (1926) 
273 U.S. 93 (1927) 
274 U.S. 714 (1927) 
276 U.S. 596 (1928) 
281 U.S. 109 (1930) 
33 North Dakota v. 
Minnesota 
256 U.S. 220 (1921) North Dakota filed a bill of complaint against Minnesota for the 
construction of drainage ditches that allegedly increased the flow of 
the Mustinka River such that it raised the level of Lake Traverse 
and caused its outlet, the Bois de Sioux River, to overflow in North 
Dakota and flood adjacent properties and sought money damages 
on behalf of North Dakota property owners and an injunction.  The 
Court held it had jurisdiction over the claim for an injunction, but 
not over the claim for damages on behalf of North Dakota property 
owners because of the Eleventh Amendment.  The Court found for 
Minnesota on the merits and dismissed the bill without prejudice 
with costs taxed against North Dakota. 
263 U.S. 365 (1923) 
263 U.S. 583 (1924) 
34 New Mexico v. 
Texas 
264 U.S. 574 (1923) New Mexico filed a bill of complaint against Texas seeking 
settlement of a portion of its boundary.  The Court determined the 
boundary by finding the location of the middle channel of the Rio 
Grande River in 1850. 
45 S. Ct. 127 (1924) 
266 U.S. 586 (1924) 
267 U.S. 583 (1925) 
271 U.S. 650 (1926) 
 
 340. After resolving the boundary dispute, the court had to resolve the 
proprietary claims over the land in question between the United States, 
Oklahoma, and individual claimants and also to resolve the receivership.  Those 
decisions and orders are at 256 U.S. 602 (1921); 257 U.S. 609 (1921); 257 U.S. 
611 (1921); 257 U.S. 616 (1921); 257 U.S. 308 (1921); 42 S. Ct. 96 (1921); 257 
U.S. 621 (1922); 258 U.S. 606 (1922); 258 U.S. 574 (1922); 259 U.S. 565 (1922); 
42 S. Ct. 587 (1922); 260 U.S. 705 (1922); 260 U.S. 711 (1923); 261 U.S. 606 
(1923); 261 U.S. 345 (1923); 262 U.S. 724 (1923); 263 U.S. 681 (1923); 265 U.S. 
76 (1924); 265 U.S. 573 (1924); 265 U.S. 490 (1924); 266 U.S. 583 (1924); 267 
U.S. 7 (1925); 268 U.S. 252 (1925); 268 U.S. 676 (1925); 268 U.S. 678 (1925); 268 
U.S. 680 (1925).  Texas also claimed the receiver was obligated to pay certain 
taxes to Texas. 266 U.S. 298 (1924); 266 U.S. 303 (1924); 268 U.S. 472 (1925). 
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274 U.S. 716 (1927) 
275 U.S. 279 (1927) 
276 U.S. 557 (1928) 
276 U.S. 558 (1928) 
283 U.S. 788 (1931) 
51 S. Ct. 357 (1931) 
51 S. Ct. 363 (1931) 
35 New Mexico v. 
Colorado 
267 U.S. 30 (1925) New Mexico filed a bill of complaint against Colorado seeking 
settlement of its thirty-seventh parallel of north latitude boundary. 
The Court held that regardless of its accuracy, the historically 
recognized survey of the thirty-seventh parallel governed. 
267 U.S. 582 (1925) 
268 U.S. 108 (1925) 
357 U.S. 934 (1958) 
36 Vermont v.  
New Hampshire 
46 S. Ct. 16 (1925) Vermont filed a bill of complaint against New Hampshire seeking 
settlement of its Connecticut River boundary.  The Court held in 
favor of Vermont. 
282 U.S. 796 (1930) 
50 S. Ct. 462 (1930) 
51 S. Ct. 18 (1930) 
52 S. Ct. 124 (1931) 
289 U.S. 593 (1933) 
53 S. Ct. 788 (1933) 
290 U.S. 589 (1933) 
290 U.S. 602 (1933) 
290 U.S. 579 (1934) 
298 U.S. 642 (1936) 
57 S. Ct. 192 (1936) 
299 U.S. 519 (1936) 
57 S. Ct. 428 (1937) 
300 U.S. 636 (1937) 
57 S. Ct. 491 (1937) 
37 Michigan v. 
Wisconsin 
270 U.S. 295 (1926) Michigan filed a bill of complaint against Wisconsin seeking 
settlement of its complex boundary.  The Court held that the 
boundaries were settled by adverse possession of sovereignty. 
272 U.S. 398 (1926) 
38 Wisconsin v.  
Illinois 
270 U.S. 631 (1926) Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New 
York filed a bill of complaint against Illinois and the Sanitary 
District of Chicago seeking an injunction against the withdrawal of 
8,500 cubic feet of water per second from Lake Michigan by pump 
into a canal on the grounds that it lowered the levels of other Great 
Lakes and connecting waterways to their injury.  The Court first 
held Illinois and “its creature the Sanitary District were reducing 
the level of the Great Lakes, were inflicting great losses upon the 
270 U.S. 634 (1926) 
273 U.S. 637 (1926) 
273 U.S. 642 (1926) 
273 U.S. 644 (1926) 
274 U.S. 488 (1927) 
278 U.S. 367 (1929) 
279 U.S. 821 (1929) 
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281 U.S. 179 (1930) complainants and were violating their rights” but “the restoration 
of the just rights of the complainants was made gradual rather 
than immediate” and the Court referred the case for consideration 
of the proper remedy to the master.  The Court then entered an 
injunction against Chicago and its Sanitary District setting 
gradually decreasing limits to withdrawals.  After concerns 
regarding the pace of work to enable the Sanitary District to meet 
the requirements of the injunction the Court strengthened decree to 
require Illinois “to take all necessary steps” in order to secure 
adequate sewage facilities so as to reduce the need to withdrawal 
water from Lake Michigan.  The Court’s supervision of withdrawal 
of water from Lake Michigan continued by Illinois continued for 
decades.341 
281 U.S. 696 (1930) 
287 U.S. 578 (1932) 
289 U.S. 395 (1933) 
289 U.S. 710 (1933) 
309 U.S. 569 (1940) 
309 U.S. 636 (1940) 
311 U.S. 107 (1940) 
340 U.S. 858 (1950) 
352 U.S. 945 (1956) 
352 U.S. 947 (1957) 
352 U.S. 983 (1957) 
352 U.S. 984 (1957) 
361 U.S. 956 (1960) 
388 U.S. 426 (1967) 
449 U.S. 48 (1980) 
39 Massachusetts v. 
New York 
271 U.S. 65 (1926) Massachusetts filed bill of complaint against New York, the city of 
Rochester, and several corporations and individuals asserting 
private title over a twenty-five acre strip of property fronting Lake 
Ontario within the city limits of Rochester and sought to enjoin 
Rochester from taking it by eminent domain.  Massachusetts 
claimed to own the land by virtue of the 1786 Treaty of Hartford 
under which Massachusetts had given up its sovereignty claims 
over land which is now part of western New York in exchange for 
pre-emptive rights of private ownership over land then in 
possession of Native Americans.  Massachusetts conveyed its 
interest in the Territory in 1788.  Thereafter the shoreline receded 
and brought the land now in dispute above water.  The Court held 
Massachusetts did not obtain title to the land through the treaty 
and even if it did it had conveyed that interest.  
271 U.S. 636 (1926) 
 
 341. Interestingly, then former Associate Justice and former Secretary of 
State Charles Evans Hughes was appointed Special Master on June 7, 1926 and 
delivered the first report in the case to the Supreme Court on November 23, 
1927.  He had resigned from the court to run for president in 1916.  By the time 
the Court heard arguments on his second report, Hughes had been appointed 
Chief Justice.  Naturally, he “took no part in the consideration or decision” of 
the Court’s consideration of his second report.  Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 
179, 202 (1930).  But by 1932 whatever concerns the Court may have had about 
his prior service appear to have faded, as he delivered an opinion of the court in 
the case. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933). 
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40 Kentucky v. 
Indiana 
278 U.S. 571 (1928) Kentucky filed a bill of complaint against Indiana seeking an order 
of specific performance of a contract between Kentucky and Indiana 
for the construction of an interstate bridge after Indiana refused to 
proceed when citizens filed a suit in Indiana state court challenging 
the project.  The Court held for Kentucky and ordered specific 
performance of the contract because Indiana conceded its 
obligations. 
49 S. Ct. 478 (1929) 
50 S. Ct. 68 (1929) 
281 U.S. 163 (1930) 
281 U.S. 700 (1930) 
41 New Jersey v.  
New York 
279 U.S. 823 (1929) New York filed a bill of complaint seeking to enjoin New York and 
New York City from diverting water from the Delaware River and 
its tributaries to the Hudson River watershed for the purpose of 
increasing New York City’s water supply.  The Court entered a 
decree permitting New York to divert up to 440 million gallons of 
water daily without restriction.  The Court enjoined diversions in 
excess of that amount unless (a) New York provided for treatment 
of sewage and industrial waste entering the rivers according to 
minimum standards set by the Court in the decree; (b) New York 
ensured the stage of the Delaware River would not fall below 0.50 c. 
s. m. at Port Jervis, New York, and Trenton; and (c) New York 
afforded New Jersey and Pennsylvania specified rights of 
inspection.  The Court adjusted the terms of its decree upon 
petition of New York City in 1954. 
280 U.S. 528 (1930) 
283 U.S. 336 (1931) 
283 U.S. 805 (1931) 
345 U.S. 369 (1953) 
346 U.S. 853 (1953) 
347 U.S. 941 (1954) 
347 U.S. 995 (1954) 
42 New Jersey v. 
Delaware 
279 U.S. 825 (1929) New Jersey filed a bill of complaint seeking a determination of its 
Delaware Bay and River boundary with Delaware.  New Jersey 
claimed the boundary to be the center of the main channel 
according to thalweg.  Delaware claimed sovereignty to the midway 
between the banks and shores except over one segment in which it 
claimed sovereignty over the entire riverbed.  The Court upheld 
Delaware’s claim of title to the entire riverbed of the segment and 
applied thalweg to the remainder. 
280 U.S. 529 (1930) 
291 U.S. 361 (1934) 
295 U.S. 694 (1935) 
304 U.S. 590 (1937) 
305 U.S. 576 (1938) 
43 Arizona v. 
California  
282 U.S. 795 (1930) Arizona filed a bill of complaint against the Secretary of the 
Interior and signatories to the Colorado River Compact—
California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming—
challenging construction of Hoover Dam as an unconstitutional 
attempt to enforce a compact as against Arizona that it refused to 
ratify.  The Court held the construction of the dam was a valid 
exercise of congressional power because the Colorado River is 
navigable (the Court took judicial notice of navigability though it 
was denied by Arizona). 
283 U.S. 423 (1931) 
44 Arizona v. 344 U.S. 919 (1953) Arizona filed a bill of complaint against California and seven 
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California  345 U.S. 914 (1953) California agencies over the apportionment of the water of the 
Colorado River and its tributaries.  Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and 
the United States joined.  The Court determined that the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act controlled and determined the rights of the 
parties to water accordingly. 
347 U.S. 985 (1954) 
350 U.S. 880 (1955) 
350 U.S. 114 (1955) 
368 U.S. 917 (1961) 
373 U.S. 546 (1963) 
376 U.S. 340 (1964) 
383 U.S. 268 (1966) 
439 U.S. 419 (1979) 
460 U.S. 605 (1983) 
466 U.S. 144 (1984) 
493 U.S. 886 (1989) 
530 U.S. 392 (2000) 
531 U.S. 1 (2000) 
547 U.S. 150 (2006) 
45 Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts 
282 U.S. 660 (1931) Connecticut filed a bill of complaint against Massachusetts seeking 
to enjoin the diversion of waters from the Connecticut River 
watershed.  The Court held Connecticut failed to show it was 
entitled to relief. 
283 U.S. 789 (1931) 
46 Washington v. 
Oregon 
283 U.S. 801 (1931) Washington filed a bill of complaint against Oregon seeking judicial 
apportionment of the waters of the nonnavigable Walla Walla 
River.  The Court held Washington failed to show it was entitled to 
relief. 
297 U.S. 517 (1936) 
47 Wisconsin v. 
Michigan 
287 U.S. 571 (1932) Wisconsin filed a bill of complaint against Michigan alleging 
mistakes in the Court’s decree issued in its determination of the 
border between the states.  The Court issued a corrected decree.  
295 U.S. 455 (1935) 
297 U.S. 547 (1936) 
48 Nebraska v. 
Wyoming 
293 U.S. 523 (1934) Nebraska filed a bill of complaint against Wyoming seeking 
equitable apportionment of the waters of the nonnavigable North 
Platte River.  The Court established interstate priorities and 
apportioned the water used for irrigation purposes amongst the 
three states and issued an extensive decree that required the states 
to limit the quantities of water used for irrigation within their 
respective jurisdictions and required the states to keep records of 
water used in irrigation. 
295 U.S. 40 (1935) 
296 U.S. 553 (1935) 
304 U.S. 545 (1938) 
325 U.S. 589 (1945) 
345 U.S. 981 (1953) 
507 U.S. 584 (1993) 
515 U.S. 1 (1995) 
534 U.S. 40 (2001) 
49 Arkansas v. 
Tennessee 
296 U.S. 545 (1935) Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee seeking 
determination of a portion of their boundary along a portion of the 
Mississippi River shifted by avulsion in 1821.  The Court held that 
310 U.S. 563 (1940) 
311 U.S. 1 (1940) 
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312 U.S. 664 (1941) the avulsion did not change the boundary, but that Tennessee’s 
undisputed possession over the territory ripened into sovereignty. 
50 Texas v.  
Florida 
300 U.S. 642 (1937) Texas filed a bill of complaint against Florida, New York, 
Massachusetts, and the wife and sister of a decedent alleging that 
his domicile at the time of his death was Texas.  The Court 
determined that the domicile at the time of death was 
Massachusetts. 
300 U.S. 643 (1937) 
302 U.S. 662 (1938) 
306 U.S. 398 (1939) 
51 Kansas v. 
Missouri 
310 U.S. 614 (1940) Kansas filed a bill of complaint against Missouri seeking 
determination of the boundary along the Missouri River claiming 
sovereignty over about 2,000 acres of land resulting from an alleged 
combination of accretions and avulsions of the Missouri River.  The 
Court held Kansas failed to prove its case. 
322 U.S. 213 (1944) 
322 U.S. 654 (1944) 
340 U.S. 859 (1950) 
52 Colorado v. 
Kansas 
316 U.S. 645 (1942) Colorado filed a bill of complaint against Kansas and the Finney 
County Water Users’ Association seeking an injunction against 
private litigation brought by Kanas appropriators of the waters of 
the Arkansas basin private against Colorado appropriators to 
establish interstate priorities.  The Court granted the 
injunction.342 
320 U.S. 383 (1943) 
322 U.S. 708 (1944) 
53 Texas v.  
New Mexico 
343 U.S. 932 (1952) Texas filed a bill of complaint against New Mexico.  Five years later 
the Court denied leave to amend the bill of complaint and granted a 
motion to dismiss the bill of complaint for the absence of the United 
States as an indispensable party. 
352 U.S. 991 (1957) 
54 Mississippi v. 
Louisiana 
346 U.S. 862 (1953) Mississippi filed a bill of complaint against Louisiana disputing the 
river boundary.  The court adopted the master’s report and decree. 350 U.S. 5 (1955) 
55 Virginia v. 
Maryland 
355 U.S. 3 (1957) Virginia filed a bill of complaint against Maryland seeking an order 
enjoining “enforcement of [a] Maryland statute regulating fishin, 
oystering, and crabbing on and in the Potomac River.”343  The 
Court dismissed the bill after the parties reached a settlement. 
355 U.S. 269 (1957) 
371 U.S. 943 (1963) 
56 Texas v.  
New Jersey 
369 U.S. 869 (1962) Texas filed a bill of complaint against New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
and the Sun Oil Company seeking an injunction and declaration of 
jurisdiction to escheat the debts owed by the Sun Oil Company.  
The Court established a federal common law rule to resolve escheat 
of debt controversies.  The Court held the state of the creditor’s last 
known address as shown by the debtor’s books may escheat the 
370 U.S. 929 (1962) 
371 U.S. 873 (1962) 
372 U.S. 926 (1963) 
372 U.S. 973 (1963) 
379 U.S. 674 (1965) 
 
 342. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 389 (1943) (“The evidence consists of 
some seven thousand typewritten pages of testimony and 368 exhibits covering 
thousands of pages.”). 
 343. McKusick, supra note 328, at 218. 
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380 U.S. 518 (1965) debt. 
57 Louisiana v. 
Mississippi 
375 U.S. 803 (1963) Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi disputing the 
boundary at Deadman’s Bend on the Mississippi River.  The Court 
held the border to be the thalweg. 
375 U.S. 950 (1963) 
384 U.S. 24 (1966) 
58 Nebraska v.  
Iowa 
379 U.S. 876 (1964) Nebraska filed a bill of complaint against Iowa seeking to resolve a 
controversy over the ownership of thirty separate areas of land 
according to the terms of the Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact of 
1943.  The Court interpreted the compact and issued a decree 
declaring the ownership of the disputed areas. 
379 U.S. 911 (1964) 
379 U.S. 996 (1965) 
406 U.S. 117 (1972) 
409 U.S. 285 (1973) 
59 Illinois v.  
Missouri 
379 U.S. 952 (1965) Mississippi filed a bill of complaint against Louisiana disputing the 
boundary.  The Court adopted upon the agreement of the parties 
the master’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and proposed 
decree. 
380 U.S. 901 (1965) 
380 U.S. 969 (1965) 
382 U.S. 803 (1965) 
382 U.S. 1022 (1966) 
399 U.S. 146 (1970) 
60 Ohio v.  
Kentucky 
384 U.S. 982 (1966) Ohio filed a bill of complaint against Kentucky seeking a 
declaration of the boundary line and concurrent jurisdiction over 
the Ohio River.  The Court determined that the boundary is the 
1792 lower water mark of the northern side of the Ohio River. 
410 U.S. 641 (1973) 
440 U.S. 902 (1979) 
444 U.S. 335 (1980) 
445 U.S. 941 (1980) 
456 U.S. 958 (1982) 
471 U.S. 153 (1985) 
474 U.S. 1 (1985) 
61 Texas v.  
Colorado 
386 U.S. 901 (1967) Texas and New Mexico filed a bill of complaint against Colorado 
seeking enforcement of the Rio Grande Compact provision 
requiring Colorado “to deliver water in the Rio Grande at the 
Colorado-New Mexico state line.”344  The Court granted a 
stipulated motion to dismiss the bill with prejudice. 
389 U.S. 1000 (1967) 
390 U.S. 933 (1968) 
391 U.S. 901 (1968) 
474 U.S. 1017 (1985) 
62 Michigan v.  
Ohio 
386 U.S. 1001 (1967) Mississippi filed a bill of complaint against Louisiana disputing the 
boundary in Lake Erie.  The Court entered a decree establishing 
the boundary and charging costs to Michigan. 
410 U.S. 420 (1973) 
63 Missouri v. 
Nebraska 
389 U.S. 1001 (1967) Missouri filed a bill of complaint against Nebraska seeking 
settlement of its Missouri River boundary.345  The Court dismissed 
the bill upon motion of the parties. 
417 U.S. 904 (1974) 
417 U.S. 959 (1974) 
64 Arkansas v. 389 U.S. 1026 (1968) Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Tennessee to settle a 
 
 344. McKusick, supra note 328, at 220. 
 345. McKusick, supra note 328, at 221. 
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Tennessee 397 U.S. 88 (1970) boundary dispute over five thousand acres along the west bank of 
the Mississippi River.  The Court determined the boundary to be 
the main channel as it existed prior to an avulsion. 
397 U.S. 91 (1970) 
399 U.S. 219 (1970) 
65 Texas v.  
Louisiana 
397 U.S. 931 (1970) Texas filed a bill of complaint against Louisiana seeking a 
declaration that the boundary at the Sabine Pass, Lake, and River 
is the geographic middle and not the main channel.  The Court held 
the boundary to be the geographic middle of the Sabine. 
410 U.S. 702 (1973) 
414 U.S. 1107 (1973) 
416 U.S. 965 (1974) 
426 U.S. 465 (1976) 
431 U.S. 161 (1977) 
66 Pennsylvania v. 
New York 
398 U.S. 956 (1970) Pennsylvania filed a bill of complaint against New York seeking a 
determination of the jurisdiction to escheat unclaimed funds paid to 
Western Union.  Connecticut, California, and Indiana intervened as 
plaintiffs and Florida and Arizona intervened as defendants.  The 
Court held the rule of Texas v. New Jersey controlled. 
400 U.S. 811 (1970) 
400 U.S. 924 (1970) 
400 U.S. 1019 (1971) 
401 U.S. 931 (1971) 
407 U.S. 206 (1972) 
407 U.S. 223 (1972) 
67 Mississippi v. 
Arkansas 
400 U.S. 1019 (1971) Mississippi filed a bill of complaint against Arkansas seeking a 
determination of the boundary line to determine the sovereignty 
over an island formed by changes in the location of the Mississippi 
River.  The Court held the changes were the result of accretion and 
not avulsion and accordingly the island belonged to Mississippi.  
415 U.S. 289 (1974) 
415 U.S. 302 (1974) 
419 U.S. 375 (1974) 
68 Vermont v. 
New York 
402 U.S. 940 (1971) Vermont filed a bill of complaint against New York and 
International Paper Co. alleging discharges of waste into Lake 
Champlain and Ticonderoga Creek created a sludge bed that 
polluted the water and impeded navigation.  After the Court 
granted leave and some but not all the evidence was taken by a 
master the parties requested the court issue a consent decree 
appointing a river lake master.  The Court rejected this application 
and subsequently dismissed the bill under Rule 60. 
405 U.S. 983 (1972) 
406 U.S. 186 (1972) 
417 U.S. 270 (1974) 
419 U.S. 955 (1974) 
69 New Hampshire 
v. Maine 
413 U.S. 918 (1973) New Hampshire filed a bill of complaint against Maine seeking 
determination of the lateral marine boundary between the states.  
The parties applied before trial by a master for entry of a consent 
decree defining the terms necessary to resolve the dispute.  The 
Court held the entry of the proposed decree consonant with the 
Court’s Article III powers and granted the request.346 
414 U.S. 810 (1973) 
426 U.S. 363 (1976) 
434 U.S. 1 (1977) 
 
 346. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 364, 372 n. 1 (1976) (“The controversy 
arose out of a dispute over lobster fishing in the seabed. Maine’s regulatory 
laws, if applicable, are more restrictive than those of New Hampshire. For 
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70 Texas v. 
New Mexico 
421 U.S. 927 (1975) Texas filed a bill of complaint against New Mexico alleging breach 
of the Pecos River Compact by permitting excessive depletion of 
water in the Pecos River and seeking an order of compliance with 
the Compact.  The Court held it had jurisdiction to determine and 
remedy noncompliance with the Compact.  The Court determined 
New Mexico breached the compact and was therefore required to 
compensate Texas.  The Court also issued an injunction requiring 
future compliance with the Compact. 
423 U.S. 1085 (1976) 
446 U.S. 540 (1980) 
462 U.S. 554 (1983) 
467 U.S. 1238 (1984) 
482 U.S. 124 (1987) 
494 U.S. 111 (1990) 
71 Idaho v. 
Oregon 
423 U.S. 813 (1975) Idaho filed a bill of complaint against Oregon and Washington 
claiming fishermen in those states were taking disproportionate 
shares of anadromous fish destined for Idaho in the Columbia River 
and seeking an equitable apportionment of this resource.  The 
Court held Idaho stated a claim for relief but failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence real and substantial injury and 
dismissed the bill without prejudice. 
429 U.S. 163 (1976) 
444 U.S. 380 (1980) 
462 U.S. 1017 (1983) 
72 South Dakota v. 
Nebraska 
429 U.S. 810 (1976) South Dakota filed a bill of complaint against Nebraska disputing 
the boundary between them regarding Rush Island after the 
initiation of conflicting quiet title proceedings in each state.  The 
Court entered a consent decree settling the dispute and appointing 
a Joint State Boundary Commission to settle any further disputes.  
434 U.S. 948 (1977) 
458 U.S. 276 (1982) 
73 California v. 
Nevada 
433 U.S. 918 (1977) California filed a bill of complaint against Nevada in the nature of 
a quiet title action “precipitated by growing doubts about the 
geographic accuracy of the existing line” as determined by surveys 
in the nineteenth century.  The Court held that Nevada had 
acquiesced to the recognized boundary.347 
438 U.S. 913 (1978) 
447 U.S. 125 (1980) 
456 U.S. 867 (1982) 
74 Georgia v.  
South Carolina 
434 U.S. 917 (1977) Georgia filed a bill of complaint against South Carolina disputing 
the boundary “along the lower beaches of the Savannah River . . . 
and at the river’s mouth” as it affected emerging islands.  The 
Court held that the Barnwell Islands belonged to South Carolina by 
prescription.  The Court also held that new islands did not affect 
the boundary line between states as set by the Treaty of Beaufort.  
The Court determined other aspects of the boundary as well.  
497 U.S. 376 (1990) 
75 Tennessee v. 439 U.S. 812 (1978) Texas filed a bill of complaint against Arkansas disputing the 
 
example, Maine requires a license, available only to Maine residents, for the 
taking of lobsters in Maine waters. . . . Maine also imposes stricter minimum- 
and maximum-size requirements. . . . Before the original action was filed, efforts 
to settle the dispute failed, and violence over lobster fishing rights in the area 
was threatened.”). 
 347. Apparently this suit establishes the angle of the border over Lake Tahoe. 
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Arkansas 454 U.S. 809 (1981) boundary line.  The Court summarily adopted a master’s report and 
entered a decree settling the boundary line.  454 U.S. 351 (1981) 
76 California v. 
Arizona 
439 U.S. 812 (1978) California filed a bill of complaint against Arizona and the United 
States claiming to own lands outside of its jurisdiction as 
determined by the Interstate Compact Defining the Boundary 
Between the States of Arizona and California.  The Court entered a 
decree awarding some of the land underlying the Colorado River.  
440 U.S. 59 (1979) 
452 U.S. 431 (1981) 
77 Oklahoma v. 
Arkansas 
439 U.S. 812 (1978) Oklahoma filed a bill of complaint against Arkansas seeking a 
determination of the boundary.  The Court summarily adopted the 
report of a master and entered a decree in favor of Arkansas. 
469 U.S. 1083 (1984) 
469 U.S. 1101 (1985) 
473 U.S. 610 (1985) 
78 Colorado v. 
New Mexico 
439 U.S. 975 (1978) Colorado filed a bill of complaint against New Mexico seeking an 
equitable apportionment of the non-navigable Vermejo River, the 
waters of which had to date been fully appropriated by New Mexico 
users.  The Court held Colorado failed to meet its burden and 
dismissed the bill.  
459 U.S. 176 (1982) 
467 U.S. 310 (1984) 
79 Maryland v. 
Louisiana 
442 U.S. 937 (1979) Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Wisconsin filed a bill of complaint challenging the constitutionality 
of a Louisiana tax on the first use of natural gas imported into 
Louisiana that was not subject to taxation by another state or the 
United States.  The United States and several pipeline companies 
intervened.  New Jersey, the United States, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, and seventeen pipeline companies 
intervened as plaintiffs.  The Court held the tax unconstitutional. 
451 U.S. 725 (1981) 
452 U.S. 456 (1981) 
454 U.S. 809 (1981) 
80 Texas v.  
Oklahoma 
444 U.S. 1065 (1980) Texas filed a bill of complaint against Oklahoma disputing the 
boundary along the Red River.  The Court ordered a consent decree 
resolving the boundary. 
450 U.S. 1038 (1981) 
457 U.S. 172 (1982) 
81 Louisiana v. 
Mississippi 
445 U.S. 957 (1980) Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi and Avery B. 
Dille, Jr. disputing the boundary along a portion of the Mississippi 
River.  After Mississippi claimed the main channel migrated 
westerly so that the bottom hole of an oil well drilled under the 
terms of a lease granted by the state of Louisiana was now in 
Mississippi.  The Court held the bottom hole of the well was in 
Louisiana.  
466 U.S. 96 (1984) 
466 U.S. 921 (1984) 
82 California v.  
Texas 
457 U.S. 164 (1982) California filed a bill of complaint against Texas seeking a 
determination of the domicile of Howard Hughes at the time of his 
death.  The case was dismissed on stipulation pursuant to Rule 
53.1. 
458 U.S. 1119 (1982) 
459 U.S. 1067 (1982) 
459 U.S. 1083 (1982) 
459 U.S. 1096 (1983) 
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471 U.S. 1050 (1985) 
471 U.S. 1051 (1985) 
83 Arkansas v. 
Mississippi 
456 U.S. 912 (1982) Arkansas filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi disputing the 
boundary along a portion of the Mississippi River.  The Court adopted 
the report of a master and entered a decree resolving the dispute. 
471 U.S. 377 (1985) 
84 New Jersey v. 
Nevada 
474 U.S. 917 (1985) New Jersey filed a bill of complaint against Nevada and others 
seeking an order enjoining “interference with New Jersey’s contract 
with [a] private firm for disposal of New Jersey waste in Nevada.”348 
The Court dismissed the bill of complaint under Rule 53. 
487 U.S. 1211 (1988) 
85 Kansas v.  
Colorado 
475 U.S. 1079 (1986) Kansas filed a bill of complaint against Colorado alleging violations 
of the Arkansas River Compact.  The Court held Colorado violated 
the Compact, issued a judgment for money damages and enjoined 
Colorado to comply with the Compact. 
514 U.S. 673 (1995) 
533 U.S. 1 (2001) 
543 U.S. 86 (2004) 
556 U.S. 98 (2009) 
86 Illinois v.  
Kentucky 
479 U.S. 879 (1986) Illinois filed a bill of complaint against Kentucky disputing the 
boundary along the Ohio River. 500 U.S. 380 (1991) 
87 Oklahoma v. 
New Mexico 
484 U.S. 808 (1987) Oklahoma and Texas filed a bill of complaint against New Mexico 
over a dispute regarding the interpretation of the Canadian River 
Compact.  The Court interpreted the Compact. 
501 U.S. 221  (1991) 
88 Delaware v.  
New York 
486 U.S. 1030 (1988) Delaware filed a bill of complaint against New York to resolve the 
rights to escheat unclaimed distributions made by issuers of 
securities.  The Court held the state in which the debtor is 
incorporated is entitled to escheat when the creditor’s address is 
unknown.  
489 U.S. 1005 (1989) 
507 U.S. 490 (1993) 
89 Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma 
487 U.S. 1231 (1988) Wyoming filed a bill of complaint against Oklahoma challenging 
the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute requiring coal-fired 
electric generating plants burn a mixture of coal containing at least 
ten percent coal mined from Oklahoma and seeking an injunction 
against enforcement.  The Court held the Oklahoma statute 
unconstitutional. 
488 U.S. 921 (1988) 
502 U.S. 437 (1992) 
90 Connecticut v.  
New Hampshire 
502 U.S. 1069 (1992) Connecticut filed a bill of complaint against New Hampshire.  The 
Court dismissed the bill under Rule 46.1 after the states reached a 
settlement prior to oral argument on exceptions to a master’s 
report.349 
504 U.S. 983 (1992) 
507 U.S. 1026 (1993) 
91 Louisiana v. 510 U.S. 941 (1993) Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Mississippi disputing the 
 
 348. McKusick, supra note 328, at 230. 
 349. McKusick, supra note 328, at 185. 
113
CHEREN - ENV CONTROVERSIES-FINAL- NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:13 AM10:08 AM 
218 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31 
 
Mississippi 510 U.S. 1036 (1994) Mississippi River boundary.  The Court held in Mississippi’s 
favor.350   516 U.S. 22 (1995) 
516 U.S. 122 (1995) 
92 New Jersey v.  
New York 
523 U.S. 767 (1998) New Jersey filed a bill of complaint against New York asserting 
sovereignty over 24.5 acres added to Ellis Island by the United 
States subsequent to the 1834 compact granting sovereignty over 
Ellis Island to New York despite its location on the New Jersey side 
of the boundary settled by the compact.  The Court held New Jersey 
sovereign over the additional land. 
526 U.S. 589 (1999) 
93 Kansas v.  
Nebraska 
525 U.S. 805 (1998) Kansas filed a bill of complaint against Nebraska.  The Court 
summarily approved a final settlement stipulation accompanying a 
master’s report and dismissed the bill. 
525 U.S. 1101 (1999) 
527 U.S. 1020 (1999) 
530 U.S. 1272 (2000) 
538 U.S. 720 (2003) 
94 Virginia v. 
Maryland 
530 U.S. 1201 (2000) Virginia filed a bill of complaint seeking a declaration of its rights 
to withdraw water from the Potomac River and to construct 
improvements on the Virginia shore without obtaining permits 
from Maryland despite the terms of an arbitration award which 
was made binding as a compact.  The Court interpreted the award 
as affording Virginia these rights and issued a declaratory 
judgment to that effect and enjoined enforcement of any condition 
of a permit issued to a Virginia Municipality. 
531 U.S. 1140 (2001) 
540 U.S. 56 (2003) 
95 New Hampshire 
v. Maine 
530 U.S. 1272 (2000) New Hampshire filed a bill of complaint against Maine claiming 
sovereignty over the entirety of the Piscataqua River and 
Portsmouth Harbor.  The Court held New Hampshire judicially 
estopped from disputing the boundary by New Hampshire’s 
position in the litigation leading to the 1977 entry of a consent 
judgment settling the boundary. 
532 U.S. 742 (2001) 
96 Alabama v.  
North Carolina 
537 U.S. 806 (2002) Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, Virginia, and the Southeast 
Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Commission 
filed a bill of complaint alleging breach of an interstate compact for 
radioactive waste management, breach of contract, unjust 
enrichment, promissory estoppel, and money had and received and 
seeking declaratory judgment of the validity and enforceability of 
539 U.S. 925 (2003) 
130 S. Ct. 2295 (2010) 
 
 350. On the thicket of litigation in this controversy, Justice Kennedy quipped: 
“Like the shifting river channel near the property in dispute, this litigation has 
traversed from one side of our docket to the other.” Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 
U.S. 22, 23 (1995).  McKusick again served as master. Id. at 24. 
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the Commission’s sanctions resolution against North Carolina, 
damages, costs, and other relief.  The Court has so far held North 
Carolina did not breach the compact. 
97 New Jersey v. 
Delaware 
546 U.S. 1147 (2006) New Jersey filed a bill of complaint seeking a declaration that a 
1905 compact established New Jersey’s exclusive jurisdiction to 
regulate construction of improvements on the New Jersey shore.  
The Court held that under the compact Delaware could not impede 
New Jersey riparian owners from ordinary and usual exercises of 
the right to wharf out from the shore, but that the planned 
construction was neither ordinary nor usual and was therefore 
subject to regulation by Delaware.351 
552 U.S. 597 (2008) 
98 Montana v. 
Wyoming 
550 U.S. 932 (2007) Montana filed a bill of complaint against Wyoming alleging breach 
of the Yellowstone River Compact by permitting pre-1950 
appropriators to increase consumption by improving the efficiency 
of their irrigation systems which reduces the amount of wastewater 
return to the river.  The Court has so far held the permits do not 
violate the compact because the conserved water is used to irrigate 
the same acreage. 
552 U.S. 1175 (2008) 
131 S. Ct. 442 (2010) 
131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) 
99 South Carolina v. 
North Carolina 
552 U.S. 804 (2007) South Carolina filed a bill of complaint against North Carolina 
seeking equitable apportionment of the waters of the Catawba 
River basin.  The Court dismissed the complaint under Rule 46.1. 
558 U.S. 256 (2010) 
131 S. Ct. 855 (2010) 
 
  
 
 351. New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597, 602 (2008) (“The controversy . . . 
was sparked by Delaware’s refusal to grant permission for construction of a 
liquefied natural gas . . . unloading terminal that would extend some 2,000 feet 
from New Jersey’s shore into territory New Jersey v. Delaware II adjudged to 
belong to Delaware.”). 
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B. Denials of Leave to File and Dismissals on Demurrer 
1 New Hampshire v. 
Louisiana 
108 U.S. 76 (1883) New Hampshire and New York each filed a bill of complaint 
against Louisiana and officers of Louisiana’s board of liquidation 
seeking a decree enforcement of the terms of repudiated state 
bonds that were assigned to New Hampshire and New York for the 
purpose of seeking enforcement of the bonds in the Supreme Court. 
The Court held the litigation was really brought by the private 
parties and was therefore prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.  
2 Louisiana v.  
Texas 
176 U.S. 1 (1900) Louisiana filed a bill of complaint against Texas, the governor of 
Texas, and a Texas health officer for embargoing interstate 
commerce between New Orleans.352  The Court sustained a 
demurrer on the ground that the bill only alleged the 
maladministration of Texas laws and failed to set up facts to show 
the alleged actions of the health officer were attributable to the 
state of Texas. 
3 Alabama v.  
Arizona 
291 U.S. 286 (1934) Alabama moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against nineteen 
states (reduced by amendment to Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New 
York, and Pennsylvania) seeking an injunction against state laws 
prohibiting the sale of articles produced by convict labor on the 
grounds that they violated the Commerce Clause.  The Court 
denied leave to file because (1) the bill was multifarious for naming 
states with differing schemes without valid justification; and (2) 
the bill wanted equity for failing to sufficiently make out that 
Alabama would suffer great loss or serious injury. 
4 Arizona v. 
California 
298 U.S. 558 (1936) Arizona moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
California, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and Nevada 
seeking a judicial apportionment of the waters of the Colorado 
River Basin.  The Court denied leave because, if filed, the bill 
would have to be dismissed for failure to join the United States. 
5 Texas v.  
New York 
300 U.S. 642 (1937) Motion for leave summarily dismissed but granted on refiling.353  
6 Massachusetts v. 308 U.S. 1 (1939) Massachusetts moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
 
 352. WARREN, supra note 328, at 45 (Texas “by statute had given to her 
officials wide powers to enforce very drastic quarantine regulations and to 
detain vessels, persons and property coming into Texas. In 1899, a health officer 
of Texas took advantage of a single case of yellow fever in New Orleans to lay an 
embargo on all commerce between that city and the State of Texas, and the 
embargo was enforced by armed guards posted at the frontier.”). 
 353. Texas v. Floida (1937). 
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Missouri Missouri for Missouri’s assessment of an inheritance tax on a 
citizen of Massachusetts despite reciprocal legislation enacted by 
both designed to avoid multiple taxation.  The Court denied leave 
to file the bill because Missouri’s imposition of the tax did not 
impair Massachusetts ability to levy a separate tax and reciprocal 
legislation does not give rise to contractual rights to sue amongst 
states because it does not comply with the Compact Clause.  
7 Alabama v.  
Texas 
347 U.S. 272 (1954) Alabama and Rhode Island moved for leave file a bill of complaint 
against the United States and several states challenging the 
constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act.  The Court denied 
leave because challenges to the congressional disposition of the 
property of the United States are foreclosed by Article IV, § 3, Cl. 2. 
8 Arizona v. 
California 
377 U.S. 926 (1964) Arizona moved for leave to file a bill of complaint “against 
California and [a] California citizen to recover workers’ 
compensation benefits paid by Arizona state fund to Arizona 
citizen injured in auto accident allegedly caused by defect on San 
Francisco-Oakland Bridge and to assert tort claims assigned to 
Arizona by injured Arizonan and his employer.”354  The Court 
summarily denied leave with a citation to Massachusetts v. 
Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939). 
9 Kansas v. 
Colorado 
382 U.S. 801 (1965) Kansas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Colorado. 
The motion was dismissed under Rule 60. 
10 Wisconsin v. 
Minnesota 
382 U.S. 935 (1965) Wisconsin moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
Minnesota seeking an order enjoining “Minnesota from permitting 
Northern States Power Company to build dam and coal-fired steam 
generating plant on St. Croix River, allegedly creating nuisance 
and impeding recreational use of river.”355  Motion for leave to file 
summarily denied. 
11 Delaware v.  
New York 
385 U.S. 895 (1966) The Court summarily denied a motion for leave to file a bill of 
complaint “against all 50 States and the District of Columbia to enjoin 
use of the ‘state-unit’ (winner-take-all) system to cast electoral votes for 
presidential and vice presidential candidates.”356 
12 New Jersey v.  
New York 
390 U.S. 1000 (1968) New Jersey moved for leave to file a bill of complaint “against New 
York and private company, Hudson Rapid Tubes Corp., to enforce 
agreement between New Jersey and New York as to [the] 
 
 354. McKusick, supra note 328, at 210. 
 355. Id. at 207. 
 356. Id. at 210. 
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condemnation value of [a] railway allegedly violated by decision of 
New York’s highest court.”357  The Court summarily denied leave. 
13 Illinois v.  
City of Milwaukee 
406 U.S. 91 (1972) Illinois moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against four 
Wisconsin cities and two Wisconsin sewerage commissions alleging 
pollution of Lake Michigan by the discharge of over 200 million 
gallons of sewage and waste daily.  The Court held “the term 
‘States’ as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) [does not] include their 
political subdivisions” and exercised its discretion to deny leave to 
file a bill under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3). 
14 Illinois v.  
Michigan 
409 U.S. 36 (1972) Illinois moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Michigan 
for violation of a reciprocal treaty by allowing recovery against an 
Illinois re-insurance company in a case brought by two injured 
workmen.  The Court denied leave because (1) Illinois as a party to 
the decision complained of failed to file a timely petition for writ of 
certiorari; and (2) Illinois was only a nominal plaintiff because it 
filed the complaint to vindicate the grievances of particular 
individuals. 
15 Pennsylvania v.  
New York 
410 U.S. 977 (1973) The Court summarily denied a motion for leave to file a “against 25 
states to challenge constitutionality of states’ liquor ‘price 
affirmation’ policy, requiring liquor vendors to give states lowest 
available price”.358 
16 Nevada v.  
California 
414 U.S. 810 (1973) Nevada moved for leave to file a bill of complaint seeking a 
“declaration that Nevada state employee’s operation of state-owned 
vehicle in California did not constitute Nevada’s consent to suit in 
California state courts.”359 
17 Arizona v.  
New Mexico 
425 U.S. 795 (1976) Arizona moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against New 
Mexico for imposing an allegedly discriminatory tax on Arizona 
electricity generating utilities operating in New Mexico.  The Court 
denied leave because the pending state court challenge to the tax 
filed by the utilities in New Mexico provided an appropriate forum to 
resolve the issues with an available appeal to the Supreme Court. 
18 Pennsylvania v.  
New Jersey 
426 U.S. 660 (1976) Pennsylvania moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
New Jersey and Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont move for 
leave to file a bill of complaint against New Hampshire challenging 
the constitutionality of commuter income taxes. The Court denied 
 
 357. Id., at 209. 
 358. Id. at 209. 
 359. Id. at 210. 
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leave per curiam by a vote of 4-2 on the grounds that no sovereign 
or quasi-sovereign interests were implicated by New Jersey and 
New Hampshire’s collection of commuter income taxes. 
19 New York v.  
New Jersey 
429 U.S. 810 (1976) New York moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against New Jersey 
challenging the constitutionality of commuter income taxes.360  The 
Court summarily denied leave with a citation to Pennsylvania v. 
New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976). 
20 California v.  
Texas 
437 U.S. 601 (1978) The Court denied leave to file a bill of complaint to determine the 
domicile of Howard Hughes after his death for tax purposes per 
curiam with concurring opinions by Justice Brennan (noting that 
statutory interpleader was available to resolve dispute), Justice 
Powell (same), and by Justice Stewart with Justice Stevens (noting 
statutory interpleader was available and that Texas v. Florida was 
wrongly decided).  The Court granted leave upon refiling.361 
21 New Mexico v. 
Texas 
444 U.S. 895 (1979) New Mexico moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
Texas seeking “to enjoin enforcement of a Texas PUC order 
prohibiting any Texas electric utility from interconnecting in 
interstate commerce unless specifically allowed by the Texas PUC 
or FERC.”362  The Court summarily denied leave. 
22 California v.  
Texas 
450 U.S. 977 (1981) California moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Texas 
seeking “to enjoin Texas from quarantining California fruits and 
vegetables because of [a] Mediterranean fruit fly infestation” and 
moved for a temporary restraining order.363  The Court first 
granted the temporary restraining order but then summarily 
denied leave and vacated the temporary restraining order. 
450 U.S. 1038 (1981) 
23 California v.  
Texas 
454 U.S. 886 (1981) California moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Texas, 
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina seeking to enjoin 
those states from “quarantining California fruits and vegetables 
because a of Mediterranean fruit fly infestation.”364  The Court 
summarily denied leave to file. 
24 California v.  
West Virginia 
454 U.S. 1027 (1981) California moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against West 
Virginia “to establish breach of contract covering football games 
 
 360. Id. at 208. 
 361. McKusick, supra note 328, at 208; California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164 
(1982). 
 362. Id. at 209–10. 
 363. Id. at 210 . 
 364. Id. at 210. 
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between San Jose State University and the University of West 
Virginia.”365  The Court summarily denied leave to file. Justice 
Stevens dissented from the denial because the Justice Harlan’s 
reasoning in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. that the original 
jurisdiction over controversies between states and citizens of others 
states is discretionary does not apply to controversies between states. 
25 Oklahoma v. 
Arkansas 
460 U.S. 1020 (1983) Oklahoma moved for leave to file a bill of complaint “Arkansas and 
various municipalities and private companies to enjoin discharge of 
waste into Illinois River.”366  The Court summarily denied leave. 
26 Puerto Rico v.  
Iowa 
464 U.S. 1034 (1984) Puerto Rico moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Iowa 
seeking a writ of mandamus to compel “extradition of a Puerto 
Rican fugitive.”367  The Court summarily denied leave. 
27 Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma 
465 U.S. 1018 (1984) Arkansas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
Oklahoma challenging the “constitutionality of ‘retaliatory’ 
highway use tax on Arkansas-based motor carriers operating in 
Oklahoma.”368  The Court summarily denied leave. 
28 Pennsylvania v. 
Oklahoma 
465 U.S. 1097 (1984) Pennsylvania moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
Oklahoma challenging the “constitutionality of ‘retaliatory’ 
highway use tax on Pennsylvania-based motor carriers operating 
in Oklahoma.”369  The Court summarily denied leave. 
29 Pennsylvania v. 
Alabama 
472 U.S. 1015 (1985) Pennsylvania moved for leave to file a bill of complaint “against 38 
states to challenge their liquor ‘price affirmation’ systems.”370  
The Court summarily denied leave. 
30 South Dakota v. 
Nebraska 
485 U.S. 902 (1986) South Dakota moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri “in nature of a quiet title action’ to 
determine rights of South Dakota to waters of Missouri River as 
against Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri.”371  The Court summarily 
denied leave. 
31 Louisiana v. 
Mississippi 
488 U.S. 990 (1988) Louisiana moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
Mississippi seeking settlement of a portion of its Mississippi River 
boundary.372  The Court summarily denied leave over Justice 
 
 365. Id. at 209. 
 366. Id. at 209. 
 367. Id. at 209. 
 368. McKusick, supra note 328, at 208. 
 369. Id. at 229. 
 370. Id. at 210. 
 371. Id. at 207. 
 372. Id. at 207. 
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White’s impassioned dissent lamenting that “this is no way to treat 
a sovereign State that wants its dispute with another State settled 
in this Court.” 
32 Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma 
488 U.S. 1000 (1989) Arkansas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
Oklahoma seeking “to enjoin application of Oklahoma’s water 
quality standards to point sources within Arkansas.”373  The 
Court summarily denied leave. 
33 Texas v. 
Louisiana 
515 U.S. 1184 (1995) Texas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Louisiana. 
The Court summarily denied leave. 
34 Southeast 
Interstate Low-
Level Radioactive 
Waste 
Management 
Commission v. 
North Carolina  
533 U.S. 926 (2001) The Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management 
Commission moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against North 
Carolina for breach of an interstate compact for radioactive waste 
management compact and seeking to enforce its sanctions against 
North Carolina.  The Court summarily denied leave. The Court 
granted leave in the controversy upon its refiling by Alabama, 
Florida, Tennessee, Virginia and the Commission.374 
35 Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma 
546 U.S. 1166 (2006) Arkansas moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against 
Oklahoma.  The Court summarily denied leave. 
36 Mississippi v. 
Memphis 
130 S. Ct. 1317 (2010) Mississippi moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against the 
city of Memphis.  The Court summarily denied leave with citations 
to Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 74 n.9 (2003); Colorado v. 
New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 n.13 (1982). 
 
 
 
 373. McKusick, supra note 328, at 210. 
 374. Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2304–05 (2010) (“In July 
2000, seeking to enforce its sanctions resolution, the Commission moved for 
leave to file a bill of complaint under our original jurisdiction. . . . North 
Carolina opposed the motion on the grounds that the Commission could not 
invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, and we invited the Solicitor General to 
express the views of the United States. . . . The Solicitor General filed a brief 
urging denial of the Commission’s motion on the grounds that the Commission’s 
bill of complaint did not fall without our exclusive original jurisdiction over 
'controversies between two or more States.' § 1251(a).  We denied the 
commission’s motion.”). 
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